My name is Samuel Provance and I come from Greenville, SC. I enlisted in the United States Army in 1998 and sought a specialization in intelligence in 2002. I was drawn to the Army by the professional training and good life it promised, but also because it provided me an opportunity to serve my country.

The Army has stood for duty, honor and country. In wearing my country’s service uniform and risking my life for my country’s protection, it never occurred to me that I might be required to be a part of things that conflict with these values of duty, honor and country. But my experience in Iraq and later in Germany left me troubled by what has happened to the Army. I saw the traditional values of military service as I understood them compromised or undermined. I am still proud to be a soldier and to wear the uniform of the United States Army. But I am concerned about what the Army is becoming.

While serving with my unit in Iraq, I became aware of changes in the procedures in which I and my fellow soldiers were trained. These changes involved using procedures which we previously did not use, and had been trained not to use, and in involving military police (MP) personnel in “preparation” of detainees who were to be interrogated. Some detainees were treated in an incorrect and immoral fashion as a result of these changes. After what had happened at Abu Ghraib became a matter of public knowledge, and there was a demand for action, young soldiers were scapegoated while superiors misrepresented what had happened and tried to misdirect attention away from what was really going on. I considered all of this conduct to be dishonorable and inconsistent with the traditions of the Army. I was ashamed and embarrassed to be associated with it.

When I made clear to my superiors that I was troubled about what had happened, I was told that the honor of my unit and the Army depended on either withholding the truth or outright lies. I cannot accept this. Honor cannot be achieved by lies and scapegoating. Honor depends on the truth. It demands that we live consistently with the values we hold out to the world. My belief in holding to the truth led directly to conflict with my superiors, and ultimately to my demotion.

I welcome the opportunity to speak to you today and to answer your questions.
Duty Position in Operation Iraqi Freedom

I was sent to Camp Virginia, Kuwait just before Operation Iraqi Freedom began in February 2003. I was the NCOIC of the Targeting Section of the V Corps ACE (Analysis and Control Element). It was from Camp Virginia that we fought the war, collecting intelligence, nominating targets for destruction, and overseeing deep attacks. My responsibilities focused on information systems.

At the war’s end, I was placed as a section leader in the SYSCON (Systems Control) platoon.

Duty Positions from Abu Ghraib to Present

In September 2003, I was sent to the Abu Ghraib prison to replace SGT Andreas Zivic, who had been wounded in a mortar attack. I replaced him as the NCO in charge (NCOIC) of System Administration at the prison. We first had to recover the site that had been mortared. They had been working out of an unprotected and fully exposed tent, which was very unsafe as the site had been receiving mortar fire almost every day. A request had been made to move the operation into the hardened building right next to it prior to the fatal attack. The request was denied by COL Pappas – there was a great deal of sensitivity about what was going on in that hardsite and access to it was severely limited. As a result of conducting the operations in an unsheltered position, two soldiers were killed and numerous wounded, some disabled for life and chaptered from the Army. I later came to understand that this was one of the direct costs to my unit of the abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. I also served as the local Security Officer until relieved by CW² Rumminger in January 2004.

At first there were only a couple companies of military intelligence (MI) soldiers (from the 325th Reserve and 519th Airborne) and a handful of computers, but then a group came from Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Cuba to “make the place better run” (as we were told). There was a conflict between the GTMO soldiers and those who were already at Abu Ghraib, having to do with the way interrogations were being conducted and reported (I do not remember the specifics of the conflict, but in general our people wanted to use the techniques we were trained to use at Ft. Huachuca, and the GTMO people had very different ideas). After this period, the number of civilian contractors who reported in

† This statement has been redacted at the request of the Department of Defense to eliminate the names of personnel whose identities have not yet been publicly disclosed.
increased significantly. These contractors were principally from CACI and Titan Corporations, and were functioning as interrogators, translators and linguists. The interrogators were principally Americans, but the others were frequently Arab-speaking Middle Easterners, but not Iraqis. In the course of my duties, I would see some of these civilians regularly, others maybe only once or twice. Soldiers from other MI units then came, as well as even more civilians.

I worked the night shift (from 8 p.m. until 8 a.m. the following morning). My nightly routine consisted of making accounts for new users, troubleshooting computer problems, backing up the secret shared drive, maintaining the secret and top secret network connectivity, and manning the top-secret part of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). SPC Leon Wilson worked with me and handled the day shift.

MISTREATMENT OF PRISONERS AT ABU GHRAIB

I had many discussions with different interrogators and analysts. Being “the computer guy,” my job required me to interact with most of the MI team, and I often had the time to speak with them personally. Over time I began to get a pretty clear picture of what was being done to the detainees at Abu Ghraib. What I learned surprised and disturbed me.

The first alarming incident I heard about was that some of the interrogators had gotten drunk, and then under the guise of interrogation, molested an underaged Iraqi girl detainee. It could have been worse, but MP on duty stopped them. Friends of some of the interrogators involved were concerned that COL Pappas would deal severely with the incident. They asked me to recite a falsehood about COL Pappas, in the hope that he would be disqualified from serving as convening authority. I refused to do this.

I befriended SPC Hannah Schlegel, an analyst who was being retrained to be an interrogator (many others were being retrained in this same way). Schlegel told me detainees were routinely stripped naked in the cells and sometimes during interrogations (she said one man so shamed had actually made a loin cloth out of an MRE (Meal Ready to Eat) bag, so they no longer allowed him to have the MRE bag with his food). She said they also starved them or allowed them to only have certain items of food at a time. She said they played loud music – “Barney I Love You” being the interrogators’ favorite. I was shocked by this and told her I couldn’t understand how she could cope with the nudity. Wasn’t it embarrassing or at least uncomfortable? Schlegel said that this was one of the new practices and they got used to it. Moreover, she got a thrill out of being a woman interrogating them, knowing how much it angered and offended them to have a woman in
a position of authority and control over men. She said they used dogs to terrify and torment the prisoners. She also said they deprived them of sleep for long periods of time. This was all part of a carefully planned regimen that had been introduced after the arrival of the teams from GTMO.

Schlegel once invited me to accompany her to the hardsite, where I observed the MP’s were constantly yelling at the detainees. One detainee was being made to repeat his number over and over again.

I also befriended SPC Donna Menesini, who was with the first MP units that set up Abu Ghraib after the war. Menesini told me that she had witnessed abuses of Iraqi people and even seen some of them murdered. She said she documented these things in diaries that she sent home to her family in case someone killed her before she made it home to do something about it. She particularly mentioned fearing her chain of command. Her view, that anyone disclosing these incidents of abuse would face swift and severe retaliation, was widespread among soldiers at Abu Ghraib.

SPC Israel Rivera, an analyst I had known from training at Ft. Huachuca, told me that he had seen some detainees handcuffed together in contorted positions as punishment for raping a boy. He also said the interrogators were using the detainee’s faith in Islam as a tool to break them and get them to talk. He said he was bothered by these practices – felt they were wrong – but wasn’t in a position to do anything about it.

While eating at the dining facility at Camp Victory, SPC Mitchell, an MI guard, told an entire table full of laughing soldiers about how the MP’s had shown him and other soldiers how to knock someone out and to strike a detainee without leaving marks. They had practiced these techniques on unsuspecting detainees, after watching, he had participated himself.

In discussions I had with some of my colleagues, brutal treatment of the detainees was justified by the fact that they were “the enemy” and that they “belonged here.” But to my surprise, I learned that a large number of the detainees had no business being there at all. SSG Schuster, who worked in the outprocessing office, told me that most of the detainees had just been picked up in sweeps for no particular reason, and that some of them weren’t even being tracked or registered. She also said they were all being kept there “indefinitely.” Sometime later, I learned that a few detainees had been released and they were telling stories on the outside about having been abused while interrogated. The accounts at the time involved cigarettes being put in their ears and being told that American soldiers would be sent to rape their families. I was surprised about these claims
and asked SSG Schuster what she thought. She said not only were these claims probably true, she had a good idea just which soldiers would have been involved.

SGT Nathan Brown, whom I knew from my company, told me his soldiers (MI guards) were being subjected to and made to do things he did not like. He said when he and others from 302nd got to the prison, they were told they could “do whatever they wanted to the detainees,” particularly while making them do exercises (a practice known as “smoking”). He described an incident in which SPC Kersey grabbed the ankle of one detainee, causing him to hit his head on the floor. They all laughed.

SPC Elizabeth Caudill, also from my company, gave me essentially the same account as SGT Brown.

I was told that SPC Armin Cruz and Luciana Spencer were relieved from interrogation duty by LTC Jordan: Cruz for being too brutal and Spencer for escorting a detainee naked in front of the general population.

A unit of MI guards was formed because the MP’s no longer wanted to do the things they were being asked to do by interrogators. The MI guards were well known for being extremely rowdy at night, drinking bottles of Robitussin DM with tablets of Vivarin, and then partying in a dark room full of blinking lights and loud music. They were even doing this with one of the civilian interrogators (“DJ”), whom they worked for directly during interrogations. One night they came back with rings on their fingers and I asked where they got them, and they said they got them from detainees.

Stephan Stefanowicz, a civilian interrogator, requested that I give him access to highly classified information. He said it was vital, and despite the fact that he had no clearance through the Brigade S-2, tried to convince me he had a clearance and demanded I give him this information. I declined his requests and reported the matter to the Brigade S-2.

I nevertheless had the impression that civilian contractors were being given access to highly classified information notwithstanding the lack of proper clearance. Moreover, these civilian contractors involved in interrogation frequently behaved as if they were the superiors of the uniformed military interrogators, giving them directions and instructions. Their presence and activities clearly seemed to undermine or confuse the chain of command at Abu Ghrabi and to undermine discipline and morale.

I spoke with a number of other interrogators and analysts, and most corroborated in some way the accounts of abuse and mistreatment I have described here. Most everything I note here was either widely known or openly discussed. The community there was very small, so even the mechanics and cooks knew a lot of what was going on. Because of these facts,
I was amazed that so few soldiers provided accounts of what happened during the official investigations undertaken by MG Taguba and then MG Fay.

In October 2003, one day I noticed that a delegation from the Red Cross was at Abu Ghraib performing some sort of mission. Word got around that the Red Cross had been very critical of what they saw at the prison. I hoped that this would lead to some changes. However, shortly after their visit, LTC Jordan spoke to our unit telling us of the Red Cross visit. He said they had made many complaints about the conditions in which the detainees were held. Jordan said by contrast their conditions were far better off than they were under Saddam Hussein. The message seemed to be that nothing was going to change, that everything was going on just the way the command authority wanted.

In December 2003, SPC Wilson and I were in COL Pappas’ office fixing his printer. COL Pappas and his staff captain were discussing staging a mock fast rope attack (in which assault troops would repel down ropes from helicopters) in the middle of the hardsites as a “Christmas present for the detainees.” They laughed together about it, saying it would scare the bejeezus out of the detainees. I thought they were joking at the time, but it further convinced me that they had an attitude of indifference or even hostility towards detainees and that they wanted to use fear and intimidation as the main tools against them. Later, I read MG Taguba’s interview with COL Pappas, and learned that he in fact staged this exercise, and defended it to MG Taguba as necessary to prevent a possible prison uprising.

THE TAGUBA INVESTIGATION

Watching AFN one day in January 2004, I saw General Ricardo Sanchez talking about an investigation into what happened in the Abu Ghraib prison regarding abuses. In this way I learned that an investigation had been commenced. On January 21, 2004, I was interviewed by Criminal Investigation Division (CID) investigators at Abu Ghraib.

Days later we were told to go see CID investigators in groups. While there, we each were given a generic questionnaire asking questions about detainee abuse and some photographs. Based on what I already knew and suspected, I thought the focus of this investigation was going to be on interrogators and interrogations (both military and civilian). Because I had answered some of the questions “yes,” I was called back to see CID. I got worried when the JIDC leadership announced to everybody who was being called back for interviews. I noticed very few others were called back, which implied they had nothing to say. As a result, the other soldiers there felt that I must be in trouble or
was telling on those who were. There was a great deal of tension within the unit at this time and concern about disciplinary measures that might be taken because of the abuse that had gone on. On the other hand, many felt confident that what was being done was consistent with new policies that had been introduced and that they would be protected.

I was interviewed by a CID agent, Ryan Bostain, when called back. I told the CID investigator everything I knew at the time and could remember. I was surprised that while I was providing information based on things other soldiers had told me, many of those soldiers were not talking to CID. I was concerned about this.

I had considered making a formal written complaint about what I had heard as early as October 2003. I didn’t do this at this time for several reasons. One was that much of what I knew involved hearing accounts from other soldiers, rather than things I observed directly. But more than this, everything I saw and observed at Abu Ghraib and in Iraq convinced me that if I filed a report, I wouldn’t be listened to, that it would be covered up. I thought that the best case was that I would be considered a troublemaker and ostracized, but that potentially I might even place my life in danger. Even when the CID inquiry began and I started to cooperate with the investigators, I was worried that something might happen to me.

In February 2004, I was redeployed back to Heidelberg, Germany and reunited with my company. The company took leave for a month.

**Publication of the Abu Ghraib Photos**

On April 28, 2004, I learned that CBS ‘60 Minutes’ and the *New Yorker* magazine were publishing photographs of detainee abuse from Abu Ghraib. I understood immediately that these must be some of the photographs which had triggered the CID investigation. In the following days, this story was in the newspapers everywhere. None of the things which came out in those days were surprising to me, and they could not have been surprising to any of the soldiers I knew who served at Abu Ghraib at this time, because they were things the soldiers had heard, seen, or done themselves. I thought that the truth would finally come out.

But I was disappointed to see that only those few MP’s in the pictures were being investigated, and that there seemed to be an effort to exclude the MI personnel from the process as much as possible. In the following days, I saw Secretary Rumsfeld appear on television many times in Washington, before a Senate committee, and then in Iraq,
explaining that this was all the work of a few “bad apples.” He appeared to be setting up
the MP personnel to be scapegoated and to be denying that what happened at Abu Ghraib
was the result of policies and decisions that he and others high up in the chain of
command had put in place. This struck me as extremely dishonest and I was shocked by
it.

First Warnings about the Media

SG Palenik gave daily briefs to the morning formation. About this time he began to vilify
the news media. He said that no soldier was to speak with the media under any
circumstances. He said a few in the 265th MI Brigade had already done so anonymously,
and as a result, other soldiers were “looking for them.” Another time he referred to it as
the “web of Abu Ghraib” working its way to the company.

MAJ Hall, an officer in the Analysis and Control Element (ACE), informed me that the
next day I was to be interviewed by a general in Darmstadt. He told me that the scandal
would probably be as bad as My Lai, and that even though he couldn’t tell me not to
speak to the press, he strongly advised I not do so.

Interview with General Fay

On May 1, 2004, I was interviewed by MG Fay in Darmstadt, Germany. I went with SPC
Jerry Rush and SPC Elizabeth Caudill to Darmstadt. There were a few other soldiers from
B 302 MI BN, but I was surprised how few soldiers from my unit were there or otherwise
involved in the investigation. Each of us was interviewed by MG Fay. Our statements were
dictated by his assistant, and when they had been typed up, they were brought back in for
review, edits and signature.

I was called in last. MG Fay explained that he was conducting an investigation into
allegations surrounding Abu Ghraib. He then began asking me questions related to my
knowledge of the Geneva Conventions, my military intelligence and particularly
interrogation training, my interaction with LTC Jordan, certain MP’s, photographs, and
anything I had personally witnessed. I was astonished by the fact that he never asked me a
question about the MI interrogators. I answered his questions to the best of my ability.
After doing so, I told him that I didn’t understand why he had no questions about the MI
interrogators. I volunteered that most of what I knew or had heard came from them. He
was not interested. I repeated that I had heard a number of very troubling accounts. He
looked annoyed by this, but then he invited me to share some details with him. I then
shared with MG Fay much of the account that I just wrote in this statement. MG Fay was clearly very unhappy to have all this account. He pulled out my statement to CID from January and quoted back to me the passage in which I said I was glad something was being done because what had been going on was shameful. He then said he would recommend administrative action against me for not reporting what I knew sooner than the investigation. He said if I had reported what I knew sooner, I could have actually prevented the scandal. I was stunned by his statements and by his attitude.

Mistreatment of General Zabar and his Son

SPC James Gehman was informed that he would be interviewed by MG Fay. I told Gehman that it was most likely because I had mentioned his name in connection with the interrogation of General Hamid Zabar, an Iraqi flag officer, and his 16-year-old son (we had interrogated his son together; the son was incorrectly reported as having been 17 years old). I told him the account I had given, namely that General Zabar had been mistreated and his son taken prisoner to get him to talk. Gehman then he corrected me, saying it was in fact the general’s 16-year-old son who was abused to get the general to talk, explaining it in detail. He promised me that he would be sure to give MG Fay a complete account, which he did. I was extremely uncomfortable about the way General Zabar had been treated, but particularly the fact that his son had been captured and used in this way. It struck me as morally reprehensible and I could not understand why our command was doing it. Later Gehman told me he had been reinterviewed about this incident twice by CID investigators, who had cautioned him and tried to persuade him to change his account. It was clear that the investigators were very concerned about the incident.

On May 3, 2004, I was placed as the EUCOM (European Command) NCOIC within the ASI (All Source Intelligence) platoon.

On May 4, 2004, MG Taguba’s secret/soforn report was leaked. Soldiers in my company told me that my name was on the internet, listed on this report. I realized that I had now been publicly identified as a witness, something I never expected to happen. But I was completely shocked to find out I was the only MI soldier listed as a witness (Torin Nelson being the only MI civilian). I could not understand how it was possible that other MI soldiers failed to give accounts of what they did or saw.

On May 12, 2004, I gave telephonic testimony at SPC Megan Ambuhl’s Article 32 proceeding from Patton Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany (the hearing was in Baghdad). I
gave my testimony and both my name and portions of my testimony were reported in the news the next day, something else I did not expect to happen. I was surprised when I discovered that my testimony ran contrary to the contentions of the prosecutors in Ambuhl’s case. I had thought that the prosecutors were working to reveal what happened and to punish the wrongdoers. After this experience, I was increasingly suspicious of how the prosecutions were being handled. They seemed to me to be designed to shut people up, not to reveal the truth about what happened and punish all the wrongdoers. In particular, they seemed focused on trying to shut off the responsibility of those who were higher up the chain of command.

Ordered to be Silent about Abu Ghraib

On May 14, 2004, I was ordered by CPT Hedberg not to “discuss” Abu Ghraib. While off-duty, I received a phone call from CPT Hedberg. He told me it was urgent that I come in to see him in his office. When I arrived, he handed me a written order not to speak with anyone in anyway about Abu Ghraib. He said that he didn’t want me to ask him any questions or say anything, only to read the order and sign it. I was very disturbed by this order. I told him that my name was now in the papers in connection with the Abu Ghraib case. What was I supposed to do when I got a call from my mother asking me if her son was an abuser? In response, he repeated that I was not to ask questions or say anything, only to read the order and sign it. He presented this as an order. 1SG Palenik was there. I did as he ordered.

Immediately afterwards, I asked other soldiers who were at Abu Ghraib in my company if they had received any similar written orders and they all said, “no.” To this day, I know of no other soldier who was at Abu Ghraib to receive any similar written orders. I am convinced that the order was issued because I was speaking honestly and candidly about what happened and because of concern that the information I was providing would be circulated in the media and to Congress.

Interview with ABC News

My mother told me that ABC News had tried to contact me through my former wife in South Carolina. I made a mental note of it at the time, but understanding what a sensitive issue this scandal and investigation was, I did not respond. Later, however, I became convinced that a massive effort was under way within the military to cover up what had
happened at Abu Ghraib and to scapegoat a handful of MP’s. I was particularly concerned that no higher ups, whether policymakers or officers with responsibility for Abu Ghraib, were being held to account for what happened. I considered this to be highly dishonorable. I remembered reading the speech of a holocaust survivor who was saved when her camp was liberated by American soldiers. One of those soldiers took care of her, married her and took her back to America. She summarized the lesson of her life with these words: “Thou shalt not be a victim. Thou shalt not be a perpetrator. Above all, thou shalt not be a bystander.” After what had happened at Abu Ghraib, I was haunted by this thought. I felt I owed a duty to those who were suffering abuse, and just as much to my fellow soldiers who were trapped, suffering and degraded by the implementation of these new policies. That duty was to speak, no matter the consequences that I might suffer. I decided to do so.

On May 16, 2004, I was again contacted by ABC News and asked to talk about both what had happened in Abu Ghraib and in the investigation. I agreed. My interview with reporters Brian Ross and Alexandra Salmon was aired on ABC’s ‘World News Tonight with Peter Jennings’ on May 18, 2004.

Interview with Senator Graham

On the morning of May 21, 2004, Lindsey Graham, the senator representing my home state of South Carolina, called me at home. The conversation I had with Senator Graham marked the first time a representative of our government was in touch with me, asking serious, focused questions which made clear that he was determined to get to the bottom of what had happened. Although we had only a brief conversation, Senator Graham covered a wide range of topics with me, and he was particularly focused on the role of MI in the abuses at Abu Ghraib and the specific techniques or procedures which had been used. Speaking with Senator Graham made me feel that my ABC News interview was having a positive effect, that now something would be done, the stonewalling would stop, and the truth would come out. After the call from Senator Graham, I was contacted repeatedly by staff members of the Senate Armed Services Committee requesting clarification and further information on the matters I discussed.

I had a strong sense that immediately from the time Senator Graham first contacted me, my command was aware of my communications with him and Congressional staff. From this point forward my relations with my unit got progressively tenser.
Flagged, Suspended Security Clearance

On May 21, 2004, I was administratively flagged and my top-secret clearance suspended by LTC Norwood in Wiesbaden, Germany.

I met my assigned JAG lawyer, CPT Stanfield, and I reported to LTC Norwood. In his office were several people, all in my chain of command, who were sitting behind me (later I learn that SGM Allen, CPT Hedberg and MSG McMillan were present so that they could each sign a document as witnesses if I refused to do so). LTC Norwood read me a DA 4856 that flagged me and suspended my clearance, then asked me to sign it. I told him that my lawyer had instructed me not to sign anything until it had been reviewed by counsel, and said I did not want to disregard this instruction. LTC Norwood got very angry and demanded that I sign it. I repeated my lawyer’s instruction, and then LTC Norwood dismissed me. CSM Fast then came to me a few minutes later saying, “All you had to do was sign it.” When I got back to my company, I turned in my security badge and reported to the headquarters platoon.

The flag was “pending the outcome of MG Fay’s investigation,” and its basis was “a violation of an order issued to you by your company commander.” The suspension of my top-secret clearance was due to the claim that my “reliability and trustworthiness” had been “brought into question,” and that I was now “vulnerable to influence and pressures from outside agencies/organizations that may be contrary to the national interests and the procedure 15 investigation into abuses.”

I was told that CID wanted to question me regarding the interview given to ABC News, but they were referred to my JAG lawyer. I never heard from them again.

SFC Keller, my platoon sergeant up to May 2004, prepared an NCOER (a permanent evaluation report for sergeants). I was to receive a “no block” under “Duty” in the “Army Values” column, because I had “disobeyed a direct order.” I protested this to her and MSG McMillan (he was a third party to the counseling), but they said it didn’t matter; an order was an order even if it was wrongly given. I then asked how she could do this since I was no longer in her platoon. Later that day SFC Keller called me and said she realized I was not in her platoon, that the counseling was getting shredded, and that my NCOER (to be read by LTC Jones) was going to be “good and fine.” I still have a copy of the now shredded document. When LTC Jones read my NCOER, he made a point of telling me that the work I did at Abu Ghraib was very good and that he was proud of my performance. He appeared to be aware of the risks I was taking and was offering me moral support.
In early June 2004, SGT Kashmir McClean told me that leaders in the ACE were delivering briefings to soldiers in which I was harshly attacked. My statement to ABC News was described as “a lie,” and they claimed that it would be used as “propaganda by the enemy.” In sum they were labelling me as a traitor. SGT Curtis Gehman later confirmed this account. I understood what they were doing as a demonstration to other soldiers who had been at Abu Ghraib: if you speak up about what really happened, you will be cast out and targeted.

On August 25, 2004, the MG Fay/LTG Jones Report was released. iSG Palenik gave the analogy of a soldier whose only job is to turn screws and says he “should only talk about turning screws, nothing else.” This was understood by everyone as a reference to me and my willingness to answer the investigators’ questions freely. SGT Morseberger approached me later at the motor pool to ask me how “the screwing” is coming along.

Even though the Fay Report was completed, I remain flagged and my clearance suspended.

On September 1, 2004, I was requested to come to Washington, DC by a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee to assist in preparations for a hearing on the Fay/Jones Report.

The Pentagon delayed my flight, according to iSG Palenik, inhibiting the goal of my travel. I was to leave that Friday, and had tickets to do so, but was told I couldn’t leave until Monday. As a result, my time with Senate staff was cut down to just the 48 hours – one day before the hearings and the day of the hearings themselves. I missed meetings that had been set over the weekend to assist staffers in preparations for the hearing.

On my return, Major Soller, the battalion executive officer, openly mocked one of the senators and likened my trip to a “Herbie Goes to Washington” movie.

**Reduced in Rank**

In July 2005, I was given an Article 15, and reduced in rank for “disobeying a direct order,” namely, the order not to speak about what happened at Abu Ghraib. During the initial reading, LTC Gorton, the convening authority, said that if I had demanded a court martial, I could have faced 10 years in prison. My flag was lifted (confirmed on Enlisted Records Brief) and my top secret clearance was placed in adjudication.
Dated: Washington, DC
February 13, 2006