24 March 2006. Add remainder of opening statement, Paragraphs 108-326.

22 March 2006. Thanks to A for pointing.

Source: http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=408dc2ed-d950-4ee5-a4b7-392eb5faaf34&k=75162

Published: Tuesday, March 21, 2006

Prepared text of Tuesday's portion of the Crown's opening statement in the trial of seven men alleged to have plotted to bomb London. The rest of the statement was to be delivered on Wednesday:

REGINA

v.

OMAR KHYAM
ANTHONY GARCIA
NABEEL HUSSAIN
JAWAD AKBAR
WAHEED MAHMOOD
SHUJAH-UD-DIN MAHMOOD
SALAHUDDIN AMIN

OPENING NOTE

There are in your charge seven defendants. They all face an allegation that they conspired, or agreed, to cause an explosion or explosions - explosion or explosions which would be likely to endanger life or to cause serious injury to property. That is the allegation expressed in rather dry legal language. Put in rather more every day terms, the allegation is that they played their respective roles in a plan to acquire the ingredients necessary to manufacture a bomb or bombs which would be deployed at the very least to destroy strategic plant within the United Kingdom, or more realistically, to kill and injure citizens of the United Kingdom. As you will hear, they were intercepted before the plot could reach fruition, however again as will emerge, the interception came only when most of the necessary components were in place and all that remained. before their plans achieved their ultimate goal was for the target or targets to be finally agreed.

2. The seven defendants who the prosecution say were parties to that conspiracy no doubt had other co-conspirators. One indeed you will hear about in some detail. That person is a man named Momin Khawaja.

3. Momin Khawaja constitutes the Canadian end of the conspiracy. He awaits trial in Canada in relation to items found in him home in Ontario, and indeed in relation to his contact with the defendants you are concerned with and his vital role in this plot.

4. There are two further counts or charges which affect four of the defendants. I will return to these counts after I have outlined to you the events with which we are concerned. It suffices for the time being theat you know of their existence and know also that they arise out of the same facts as those which lie behind the central allegation to which I have referred.

5. Let me start by introducing the seven defendants to you. The first defendant, and perhaps appropriately so, is Omar Khyam. He is aged 24.

6. A photograph of Khyam at the time of his arrest, at the end of March 2004, is to be found at {JB 1, behind indictment, lettered A}. His family home is in Crawley.

Plans - page 1, 16 (photo)

7. Although that was the family home in the context of this case, this defendant, Omar Khyam lived for the most part at an address in Slough.

Plans page 1 and 3

8. In addition, in relation to Omar Khyam, there is a vehicle which was used by him during the period with which we are concerned and this vehicle was to be the subject of surveillance by the police and security services.

9. This vehicle was a Suzuki Vitara, registration number GV53 WHA and we shall see and hear quite a lot of it.

10. Omar Khyam has a younger brother who is also a defendant. He is Shujah-Ud-Din Mahmood. If we move down the indictment to defendant number 6 you will see his name. If he doesn't mind, we shall refer to him as Shujah Mahmood for brevity. His photograph at the time of his arrest is to be found at page [JB 1, behind indictment, lettered F].

11. He is not aged 18 and as one would expect, being the brother of Omar Khyam, his family home is the same - the address we looked at a moment or two ago. Before leaving that address, perhaps I should mention the fact that it has a garden shed - that fact was to be of significance as we shall learn in due course.

12. I have gone ahead to Shujah because as Omar Khyam's brother they can conveniently be coupled together. However I return to the order on the indictment. We come next to Anthony Garcia. You will see from looking at him in court and his photograph page [JB 1, behind indictment, lettered B] he has a rather more western appearance than his co-defendants.

13. He is aged 27 and as with some other defendants was known sometimes by different names - either Rahman Adam, Abdul Rahman or John Lewis or Rizvan on occasions. His home was in Ilford in Essex.

See plan - page 1, 33 (photo)

14. While you still have the plans to hand, we can note that another address was associated with Anthony Garcia. That is the address of his girlfriend at Turnstone Close, NW9 (page 1, 30).

15. Next we turn to Nabeel Hussain whose photograph is at JB One, behind indictment, lettered C. He is aged 20 and his family home was in Horley, a town as you might know which is close to Crawley. If we look at plans at pages one and 26 we find the Hussain home.

16. Hussain also had student accommodation in Uxbridge. He was a student at Brunel University [plan p. 36].

17. Next on the Indictment is Jawad Akbar aged 22, whose photograph is at JB One, behind indictment, lettered D, and as with Omar Khyam and with his brother Shujah Mahmood, Akbar's family home is in Crawley.

18. Although the Crawley address is the family home, Akbar lived during the period we are concerned with in Uxbridge.

See plan - page 1, 35

19. Next, Waheed Mahmood. He is aged 33, somewhat older than his co-defendants or most of them and his photo is to be found at JB 1, behind indictment, lettered E].

As one might expect, having regard to his age, Waheed Mahmood had been in employment for some time and the fact that from 19 January 2004 he worked for National grid Transco is of significance in this case. Transco, as you may be aware, owns and operates the high voltage electricity system in England and Wales, and the high pressure gas system in Britain.

Waheed Mahmood's home address again was in Crawley. If we go to plan at page 22 (photo) we can locate it at 90 Langley Drive.

20. Before we move to the last defendant, Salahuddin Amin and indeed, in his case, to an address in Luton, it may be as well to look at one or two maps in order to collect together the various addresses and defendants to whom I have already referred [pp.2, 12, 13].

21. The last defendant is Salahuddin Amin. He is aged 30. We can see a photograph of him at JB 1, behind indictment, Lettered G. His home address is, as I mentioned earlier, in Luton. See plan at pages 1 and 10.

22. As we will hear in due course he spent a considerable amount of time prior to February of last year in Pakistan. Indeed many of the defendants have spent time in Pakistan. Some of them have family connections with that country. Their principal purpose however in spending time in Pakistan was to acquire expertise in relation, particularly to explosives, an expertise which was to be deployed in the plan to cause explosions with which we are concerned.

23. So if we bring the countries together, the explosion or explosions were to take place in this country. A great deal of preparation was undertaken in Pakistan and also in Canada through the work of Momin Khawaja to whom I referred a moment ago.

24. To those countries has to be added the U.S.A. This is because part of the evidence you will hear will come from a U.S. citizen. A U.S. citizen who has pleaded guilty in New York to various terrorist related offences. His name is Mohammed Babar. Two of those offences relate to what the Americans describe as the "British Bomb Plot" and have a direct bearing on the conspiracy with which we are concerned. In fact it might be helpful to look a charge number 3 by way of example {JB2, divider F, page 248}. In relation to this charge the allegation is headed "conspiracy to promote material support" and if we go to the final paragraph we will see the essence of the allegation. {Read}. It is of particular relevance to note in passing that part of the conspiracy to which he pleaded guilty related to the acquisition of ammonium nitrate and aluminium powder for bombs to be used in attacks on the UK.

25. I will start my introduction to the evidence which you will hear in this case by outlining what I anticipate that witness will be able to tell you about the conspiracy with which we are concerned.

26. I start with Babar primarily because as someone who had contact with most of the defendants, he has an insight as an insider into the events and plans which an outsider could not have. However, it is only right that I invite an element of caution to this witness's evidence.

27. He falls into the general description of an accomplice ie, because of his involvement, he is open to the suggestion that by implication someone else, or exaggerating their role, he could avoid implicating himself or could minimise his own role.

28. Further he is open to the suggestion that he might feel that he will secure in due course a lighter sentence than would otherwise be the case, by giving evidence against others. Also you should know that he has been provided with immunity from prosecution in relation to the evidence he gives before you.

29. On the other hand he only needs such immunity because he is coming to give evidence - so he gains nothing there. Also, such immunity does not extend to committing perjury of course. Further, he has of course already pleaded guilty to the charges he faces and will be sentenced in due course but you will assess the witness and the evidence he gives and judge that evidence particularly by analysing whether it fits in with and is supported by other evidence from separate sources.

30. Babar was born in Pakistan but he went to the United States in 1977 as a child. He was educated in the US and attended university in New York. He visited Pakistan on occasions and then from 2001 to 2004 he went to live there.

31. He had since the first Gulf was held what he describes as a "Jihad' view ie, Muslims should unite and join Jihad to fight anyone who is against Muslims or Islam.

32. He is fact left the United States a few days after the 9/11 attack upon the twin towers in 2001. He had been a member of Al Muhajiroun (or ALM) for some time.

33. Once in Pakistan he worked for that organisation and indeed helped to set up an office in Peshwar for ALM. He moved then to Lahore - to an address in Muslimtown in that city. Thereafter he had contact from time to time with most of the defendants with which we are concerned in this trial.

34. The majority of that contact was in Pakistan and it involved, for the most part, one continuing theme - that was the acquisition of training and expertise, particularly in relation to explosives. Connected to this them was the actual acquisition of items which might be used as explosive devices or necessary in order to make explosives devices.

35. Whereas to begin with the motivation of Babar and the defendants was directed towards the struggle in Afghanistan, as we move towards the period we are concerned with, the plans were directed towards targets within the UK.

36. Before I provide you with a little more detail of these events, I have to rather complicate matters by selling out the names by which the defendants were known to Babar. This is complication however which is not of my making, because as Babar will, I anticipate, tell you, to periodically change names in order to avoid identification is part of Jirad security.

37. Indeed such measures were not restricted to names. As Waheed Mahmood, the 5th defendant, emphasised to Babar mobile phones and laptop computers should be disposed of on a regular basis. Added refinements were that the 1st defendant Omar Khyam and Babar, when communicating by email, for example, would use codes - a simple but important example is that the code for detonators was "cigarettes."

38. Let me turn to the alternative names which the defendants used. Please do not worry if at this stage you do not absorb and remember all such names - you will hear them referred to repeatedly during the course of the evidence and by the end of the case they will be imbedded in your minds.

39. Omar Khyam used the name of Ausman in Pakistan. Anthony Garcia, the defendant you will recall who had the address in Ilford in Essex, used various names. John or John Lewis. Also Adam or Abdul Rahman. Indeed, it is by the name of Abdul Rahman that he was principally know to Babar.

40. Shujah Mahmood, Omar Khyam's brother, was, you will be relieved to hear, known by the name Shujah.

41. Waheed Mahmood was likewise referred to as Waheed. He however used alternative identities - Abdul Waheed, Esmail, Javed or Jave. Fortunately, the witness Babar him principally as Waheed so perhaps while bearing in mind that he used various identities we can conveniently refer to him as Waheed.

42. Amin - the defendant from Luton used the name Khalid, so far as Babar was concerned.

43. The defendant Jawad Akbar used the name Hamza.

44. The Canadian conspirator, Momin Khawaja, who is to be tried in Canada, also features in the Pakistan side of events; he used the name in addition Yas or Yassir.

45. As I have indicated, the witness Babar will provide evidence for the most part as to the events and the defendants' activities in Pakistan. One of the defendants, Nabeel Hussain, did not cross Babar's path in Pakistan, no doubt for the very good reason that Hussain was not there.

46. The allegation against Hussain relates very much to his activities in late 2003 and early 2004 in the UK. We shall come to those matters in due course.

47. Babar had contact in Pakistan with Washeed (that is of course Waheed Mahmood the 5th defendant) as early as the end of 2001. In due course Waheed came to Babar's house in Lahore. Thereafter Babar was to learn from Waheed that he, Waheed, was a supporter of Al Qaeda. In the early stages however, both Babar and Waheed were cautious and circumspect. For example, when the suggestion was made by a man named Nadeem Ashraf (another member of the Crawley group) that they should attend a training camp, both Babar and Waheed were agreed that it would be crazy to do that and put their heads above the parapet so soon after 9/11.

48. In November 02, Babar travelled to England to raise money to assist the cause of the Jihad in Afghanistan.

49. In the course of this visit he met Omar Khyam the 1st defendant. For a while at least, where necessary, to defendants by both names by which they have to be known. So he met Omar Khyam who he knew as Ausman. He met also other members of "the Crawley lot" as he describes them. This included Anthony Garcia or Abdul Rahman as he knew him.

50. Khyam or Ausman indicated that he and the brothers were working for a man called Abdul Hadi. In due course when he met Amin or Khalid as he was known, the defendant from Luton some time later, he was to learn from him that he, amin, also worked for Abdul Hadi. Hadi said by Khyam/Ausman to be number 3 in Al Qaeda.

51. In due course in early 2003 Babar returned to Pakistan and lived in a flat called Eden Heights in Lahore [Photo JB2, divided A, pages 84 and 89].

52. Around February he went to see Waheed in Gujar Khan. [Plans folder, pages 48 and 49]

53. He found Garcia/Abdul Rahman there. In due course Amin/Khalid turned up and indeed Babar learned also that Khyam/Ausman was also in Pakistan.

54. On this occasion Babar and Waheed had a discussion. It may be of significance because Waheed said he couldn't understand why people were coming all the way to Pakistan or Afghanistan to fight when they should be fighting Jihad in the UK and conducting operations there.

55. Waheed took that theme further. Because he was concerned that he might be monitored by M15 in England, he suggested that a new convert to Islam should come to Pakistan to receive explosives training - a person less likely to be monitored and thereafter to return to the UK to train others.

56. The importance of these exchanges was the coming into existence of the two parts of the equation, firstly explosives training in Pakistan and secondly the fact that such training was to be acquired in order to conduct operations in the UK.

57. It did not rest there because on the following day Waheed told Babar and Amin/Khalid that he knew someone to contact in relation to explosives training.

58. Having provided the platform for the events which followed, it is unnecessary for me in opening to rehearse in detail those events as between Babar and the defendants. I will concentrate on those twin themes I have identified.

59. You will appreciate that the plans, the discussions included also training with weapons, training in poisons, raising money for the fighting in Afghanistan. However, because of the allegations you are here to try and because of subsequent events in the UK, I will concentrate on those two twin themes ie explosives training in Pakistan and bombs in the UK.

60. Before very long Waheed had details in relation to training camps. Khyam/Ausman travelled from Islamabad where he was living in early 2003 to visit Babar in Lahore. Another associate called Haleem was present. Khyam said he could arrange explosives training. He went into more detail and referred to two ingredients as being used for explosives. They were refined sugar and more significantly aluminum powder.

61. However, nothing concrete in relation to training happened immediately. Indeed, in the Spring of that year, 2003, Babar, Khyam and Waheed were back in England. Babar met them there and further he was introduced to Shujah - as you know Omar Khyam's brother.

62. On his return to Pakistan and as 2003 wore on, Babar learned more as to the explosives training particularly. He heard because he was a participator - one of the group.

63. Particularly from Khyam he heard that he, Khyam and Amin had received such training at a house in Kohat. A house in which Garcia had stayed. Training as to the theory and practice over a period of two days. [Plans folder, pages 48 and 49].

64. In addition a training camp was arranged in a place called Malakand. Various arrangements were made to finance such a camp. Khyam and Garcia made a trip to Gujar Khan to collect money from Waheed Mahmood's brother in law. Garcia also asked his brother Lamine to send cash over from the UK.

65. At much the same time Babar and Khyam went to meet Amin in Rawalpindi [Plans folder, page 48]. There was much conversation about detonators. Some detonators it is clear had already been obtained and there was discussions between Babar and Khyam as to how those detonators could be transported to the UK.

66. Indeed small radios were purchased in order that detonators could be transported by being hidden in those ratios.

67. At much the same time, June 03, three other events happened which are of significance. Firstly, Khyam told Babar that he wanted to do operations in the UK. He then referred to potential targets; pubs, nightclubs or trains. He talked again as to how the detonators might be transported to the UK. Khyam's motivation, as explained to Babar was clear. The UK was unscathed, it needed to be hit because of its support for the U.S.

68. Thirdly, Babar became aware that in his own flat (in Lahore) in which Khyam was at that time living was ammonium nitrate. It was kept in the closet. Ammonium nitrate is as we shall hear a vital ingredient of the type of improvised explosive device, or bomb, with which the allegations in this case are concerned. Garcia took part with Babar and Khyam in testing ways in which ammonium nitrate might be safely transported.

69. Khyam's brother, Shujah, came over from the UK with a set of digital scales in order that the ratios of the ammonium nitrate to the aluminium powder might be measured. Whatever was to be used in the explosives training the plan clearly was that these substances were to be used for operations in the UK. Indeed Khyam referred to the probability of using an alternative substance, Urea, because as he put it "if this worked for making bombs this was one less ingredient needed to smuggle in to the UK."

70. In July 03, they went to the training camp - in fact to a place called Kalam initially {Plans folder, page 49}. Some care was taken in order to disguise the fact that they were attending a terrorist training camp. For example they took on the appearance of tourists visiting lakes and glaciers in the area in which the training camp was held. This device included even the taking of photographs and some survive, particularly of Shujah.

71. A number of associates arrived in Pakistan in order to attend the training camp. I shall not trouble you at this stage with their names but in relation to those men with whom we are directly concerned, Khyam was very much at the centre of operations. Amin stayed with others in Islamabad but didn't actually attend the camp. Shujah attended as I already indicated. Garcia, not only attended, but because he had previous training, taught those with less experience how to dismantle and to reassemble weapons.

72. All those involved did not travel to and from the camp at the same time. Babar, for example, had to leave the camp at one stage to return to Lahore because his wife had given birth. Also, at a later stage, Omar Khyam and Babar went to Islamabad to collect other individuals who were to attend the camp.

73. One of those collected at Islamabad Airport was Jawad Akbar, the fourth defendant, you will remember using the name Hamza.

74. Ingredients including ammonium nitrate and aluminium powder were taken to the camp. There experiments were conducted, one unsuccessful, the other achieving its objective. Although only between a half and one kilogram of ammonium nitrate was used, the explosion, using also the aluminium powder, a metal water bottle and a short fuse, made a u-shaped hole under the ground and made the ground feel unstable. In view of events which were to materialise later in the year, that that effect was achieved with that small amount of ammonium nitrate, may be of significance.

75. What is also of equal significance is the fact that those experiments with explosives at the training camp appear to crystallise the view that the essential ingredients required to manufacture successful bombs were ammonium nitrate, aluminium powder and a detonator.

76. If I try to cut matters short, the defendants who attended the camp returned to England. They didn't do so all at the same time and indeed Babar, Khyam and Amin still had matters to finalise in Pakistan.

77. These matters included how detonators were to be transported to the UK. A route via Belgium was provisionally agreed because Khyam said that the last part of the journey he could arrange by using the ferry where, according to him, there was limited security.

78. After Khyam had left England at the end of August or early September, Babar and Amin met in Pakistan. Babar wanted detonators which he knew Khyam had left with Amin. He said he wanted to take them to the UK. Amin said he would hand them over when they were needed. In addition, Babar wanted to see him so that he, Babar, could receive further explosives training. Both requests were turned down by Amin although he did tell Babar he would supply him with manuals of instruction in relation to explosives. These incidents perhaps indicate Amin's relatively high position in the group or organisation with which we are concerned.

79. By the Autumn of 2003, although the ingredients for an explosive device had been identified and indeed tested, there was a problem in relation to those items. Firstly in relation to detonators, those which Babar had in his possession he had disposed of in October or November. This he did because he had to leave his home and move in with his in-laws. The majority of the aluminium powder had been used in the training exercises and although the remainder had probably gone with Khyam to England it would have been only a relatively small amount. In the Autumn of 2003 Babar also emailed Khyam in England requesting more money. In due course he received an advance from Khyam via Western Union.

80. And it is to England that Babar travelled in January 2004. There he met up with Khyam, Shujah, Waheed Mahmood and Jawad Akbar and Garcia albeit not at the same time.

81. In early February 2004, Babar returned to Pakistan and we shall leave him and the evidence I anticipate he will give, in order to move in a moment of two to an entirely different form of evidence.

82. Before I do that however, I want to remain with Babar and something I said when I introduced his evidence; that given that Babar falls within the category of an accomplice, a valuable test as to his truthfulness and accuracy may be gained by seeing how his evidence fits in with other evidence from separate and independent sources.

83. To this end, where possible, the investigating officers have tried to locate addresses, hotels, employment, money transfers etc and have examined records to see whether they support, or on the other hand, undermine Babar's account.

84. As you will appreciate, on occasions records in Pakistan have not always been kept or retained. On other occasions, records are available and may be applied in the manner in which I have suggested.

85. Babar does not know of these enquiries but when he has given his evidence, we will be able to test how it compares with such other evidence. I am not going to itemise such evidence now there is one basic evidential tool to which I should introduce you so that you are familiar with it before Babar gives evidence.

86. This is a Time Chart or Time Line. It has, as you will see on the front page, a line alongside each defendant and some other individuals who feature. The purpose of the chart is to indicate, so far as records are available, entry into and departure from, Pakistan. If we go to page 7 for example, we find we are in the period June and July 2003. That was, you may remember, a period of some significance because according to Babar, that was when the Malakand training camp took place.

87. Against that background we see Khyam and Garcia are indeed in Pakistan. If we go back to page 6 we see Khyam arrived on 7 May; if we go back to page 5 we see Garcia arrived on 10 February. Reverting to page 7 we see Shujah arrived on 27 June, with his digital scales you may recall.

88. Jawad Akbar arrived later on 25 July and Khawaja a little earlier on 16 July - they attended later than the first batch you will recall. This chart is dependent upon records - passports and a system called PISCES which Pakistan had introduced only in the last two or three years and not at all airports. Accordingly the records may not be complete and may not cover someone - Amin may be an example - who has been in Pakistan on a long term basis.

89. The ability to test Babar's evidence may come from two further sources. Firstly he has of course pleaded guilty in the United States to offences including what is described as the British bomb plot. While one may observe that an individual is unlikely to plead guilty to an offence which he has not committed, you will have the opportunity to see the record of his appearance before the court when he entered his pleas of guilty. As you may know, the system in the United States is somewhat different from our system and you will gauge the car which is taken before a defendant, and we are concerned here with Babar of course, is allowed to enter pleas of guilty.

90. The final source of evidence which may support Babar's credibility may on occasions, ironically, comes from the defendants. I give you but two examples. In the period prior to the training camp, perhaps in May 2003, Babar had returned to Pakistan from the UK and found that Garcia was staying at a hotel, the Safari Hotel in Lahore, Because Garcia had run out of money, Babar had to allow him to stay at his flat at 13-S Ilyas Street. Unfortunately, records for the Safari Hotel no longer exist.

91. However, at Garcia's home address at Ilford, was found in due course an undeveloped film. When that film was developed (DRH/158) and shown to the Pakistani landlord of the flat, in two of the photographs (numbers 1 and 24) he recognised the flat and indeed Garcia can be seen in the photographs {JB2, divider A, pages 1 and 24}.

92. Another example is to be found in the fact that according to Babar in the period before the training camp at Kalam, he, together with Khyam, Garcia and two others, went to Karachi to obtain funds from a man named Riaz. In doing so they stayed, he claims, at the Avari Hotel.

93. A document recovered from the Khyam/Shujah family home a year later, is a rental agreement in relation to the hire of a car from that hotel at that time. For completeness, that hotel has the records of the reservation in Babar's name for five people for that stay ie from 9th to 12th June {JB2, divider C pages 186 and 187 and divider E page 233}.

94. I am only concerned at the moment with introducing to you ways in which you may test Babar's evidence. The best time to test it in that way will of course be after you have heard the evidence.

95. I now move as I said I would a moment or two ago to an entirely different form of evidence. It is surveillance or covert evidence. Such evidence gathering was carried out from February 04 by the Security Services, Special Branch and the Anti-Terrorist Squad of the Metropolitan Police.

96. This category of evidence included the insertion of listening devices into the homes of two of the defendants. Firstly that of Omar Khyam in Slough and secondly that of Jawad Akbar in Uxbridge. Also, such a device was in the Suzuki Vitara - the vehicle of Khyam which I mentioned earlier.

97. In addition, surveillance operations were carried out ie, that is the following of the defendants, or some of them, whether while they were in vehicles or on foot. This was supplemented by static observation and on occasions, if it was available, CCTV.

98. In a perfect world a detailed picture would be built up for you as to what the defendants, or some of them, were doing, where they did it, what they were saying etc. Of course life is never quite that easy. Precisely what all the defendants were doing every minute with the period of surveillance is impossible to monitor. Further, when a number of individuals are speaking, and perhaps speaking with accents, to discern precisely what is being said is often difficult.

99. However, what you will be able to build up is a picture over this period,(and the essential period is between 11 February and approximately 23 March of 2004), of what in general terms these defendants were doing and saying. What we suggest such evidence does is to fit in with and compliment what they were doing and saying as revealed by Babar in the preceding months ie, it is the continuation of the preparation for the UK operation - an operation to plant a bomb or bombs with the inevitable consequences for the safety of human life and rather less important, that of property.

100. Before summarising for you the effect of this evidence, may I take a moment to explain how the evidence will be presented. In order for it to be comprehensible to you, we will present it in a daily format ie, what happened, where it happened and what was said, taking one day at a time.

101. Explanation of the PRESENTATION

102. The surveillance operation effectively ended on 30 March because it was on that day that the defendants were arrested.

103. In order to outline for you what was seen and heard I shall divide that overall period of some 7 weeks into 4 periods.

104. Firstly the 11 to 19 February - a period which sets the scene and concentrates mostly on Omar Khyam and his brother Shujah, the use of internet cafes etc.

105. Secondly a short period - a weekend in fact - from Friday 20 to Sunday 22 February. This weekend marked the visit of Momin Khawaja from Canada. You will recall Khawaja, about 7 or 8 months before had been in Pakistan and indeed had been at the training camp.

106. Thirdly the period from 23 February to 16 March - a period during which possible targets were discussed. Targets discussed in order to put into effect the knowledge and expertise in relation to explosives gained in Pakistan.

107. Finally 17 March to the arrests on 30 March. A period when it appeared that plans were moving towards a final phase.

108. Let us go back to 11 - 19 February. Khyam and his brother Shujah were observed in Slough, and of course Khyam's flat was situated in Hencroft Street in that town there were visits to Crawley and more particularly considerable use by Khyam of three internet cafes. Two of them were in Slough, and the third in Crawley. We can locate them on our plans.

109. Plans bundle page 3 (Slough) and page 13 (Crawley)

110. Monitoring of Khyam's use of these sites indicated that he was in contact with Khawaja in Canada. I will come back to the topic of emails in due course; however, some of the traffic included discussion as to the means of making a remotely operated detonation device and indeed, this was to tie in with items in due course discovered at Khawaja's home when he was arrested on 29 March.

111. Khyam visited the website also of Cotswold Outdoor Clothing. Later he purchased a substantial quantity of outdoor clothing. This again tied in with evidence from Babar, that acquisition of clothing, camping equipment and funds for the cause in Afghanistan. Indeed this further ties in with such equipment found at the addresses of the defendants in due course. Just to illustrate further this activity, at this time in relation to Shujah, as the recovery of receipts was to confirm, on 18 February at Field & Trek in Slough, he spent E209.89 on five trek towels, two C7 torches and four Lucido torches. On the next day be returned to purchase walking shoes and laces at a cost of E82.99.

112. Another feature of this period of surveillance was the visits either to the website or the actual premises of travel agents or airlines. The interest displayed was in flights to Pakistan in the near future - in the following month in fact. Indeed, in due course Khyam and Shujah it emerged, purchased tickets to fly to Karachi on 6 April together with a man who we will come across - Mr. Azar Khan.

113. Again this ties in with Babar's conversations with Khyam, who he of course knew as Ausman. He had been told by Khyam that he, Khyam, would plan an operation in the UK but travel to Pakistan before the operation would actually take place. In fact the date of departure of Khyam and Shujah was one which it is clear had to be subject to a degree of flexibility. No doubt because the exact timing of any "operation," as it was so described, was subject to a number of factors and when you've heard all the evidence it may be that you conclude that it had originally been hoped to carry out the operation rather earlier. I will come back to this topic in due course. Suffice it to say at the moment that from surveillance on Khyam in Universal Video in Slough on 15 February he was at that date looking at flights leaving at times varying from 1 March, 29 March to early April, as was some time later in fact booked.

114. During this period, the officers carrying out the surveillance noted also that Khyam and Shujah were extremely aware of vehicles and pedestrians around them. Perhaps such awareness can be given the shorthand of "surveillance sensitive." There were to be examples in later periods that the defendants, having regard to what they were engaged in, were conscious of the possibility that they were under surveillance.

115. If I revert to two emails, there are links between this initial period and the arrival of Khawaja on 20 February. A draft message dated 25 January indicated that Khawaja had got the devices working and he would get a booking as soon as possible to come over. A message dated 18 February indicated he would be arriving at Heathrow on an Air Canada flight at 11.15 on 20 February. You will recall that the devices it is alleged Khawaja was responsible for were remote controlled detonators.

116. As we move into that second period, Khyam and Shujah were waiting at Heathrow at 11.15 on 20 February to meet Khawaja. During the remainder of the day from conversations overheard in Khyam's car (the Vitara) Khyam emphasised the importance of working in a group. He said you have to be professional and if you mix with too many people you're going to get caught and he gave the example of another cell who worked with them in Pakistan who had got caught.

117. Of perhaps greater significance in the conversation overheard was when Khawaja was with Khyam and Shujah in Khyam's flat in Hencroft Street. This conversation related, or so say the prosecution, to the remote controlled device, a device of course by definition to be used to detonate the explosion from a distance.

118. This may be an appropriate occasion on which to give you an example of the product from the covert listening devices. As I have mentioned, it is not always easy to discern precisely what is being said. You will be provided with transcripts prepared by officers who have listened, no doubt over and over again, to the tapes. However, it is important to remember that these transcripts are produced as an aid for you - the real evidence is what you hear on the tape.

119. In order to illustrate this point, I am going to ask you to look at the transcript of this conversation, or part of it, so that you become familiar with this type of evidence and indeed the care which we will need to exercise.

120. If you look please at (Additional Jury Bundle, page 1) we will see the first page. The very first line provides important background information i.e., the date - 20/0/2/04 and the initial "M." That stands for Mercer, as each covert listening operation has a code name. For the Vitara it is Hobbit; for listening to conversations at Khyam's flat in Hencroft Street, as I have said, it is Mercer. At Jawad Akbar's address in Uxbridge, it is Assonance. Accordingly, if by way of example we turn to page 4, we will see that what is indicated is conversation taking place in the Vitara on 21 February.

121. Let us go back to page 1, the Mercer or Hencroft Street conversation, and go on to page 3. 1 shall read it, if I may, so that you get the flavour of the exchanges and perhaps the care and patience which we will need to apply to this category of evidence. (Read page 3).

122. You will decide what is being said but whether you are able to discern the precise meaning of every sentence, you will have little doubt as to the subject matter. It is clearly the remote controlled detonator with increased range, using antennae, perhaps a range of one or two kilometres. With the use of a booster chip, which it was not possible to block, and it had a dipswitch to encrypt the signal.

123. Later that day, the three men went to Universal Video, where they stayed for about an hour. The next day they were able to pay a return visit. Opportunities of course for Khawaja to show Khyam and Shujah web-based photographs or images of the remote detonation devices he had manufactured.

124. On the second day of this visit i.e., Saturday 21 February, a meeting took place at an address in Crawley. It is not an address we have looked at before, so we had better look at our plans. If we go to pages 13 of the plans folder we are going to the Gossops Green area of Crawley and the home address of Wasim Gulzar. He is not before the court, but this rather important meeting took place at his home, and indeed he had featured in Pakistan in 2003, as we shall hear from Babar.

125. Khawaja, Khyam and Shujah were present, and so, it seems quite clear, was Waheed Mahmood. We deduce that from the fact that his car was seen parked outside.

126. It is an inevitable and safe conclusion, you may think, that because of Khawaja's presence and indeed the distance he travelled to attend the meeting, the purpose must have been to discuss his contribution in his area of expertise, the plan to detonate a bomb using remote encrypted radio transmissions.

127. Such a conclusion is indeed supported by the recorded conversation in the Vitara on the way to Gossops Green, and by conversation which took place on Sunday

22 February after Khawaja had departed from Heathrow on his return journey to Canada.

128. That conversation on Sunday took place at Uxbridge, the address used by Jawad Akbar. This is an address covered by a listening device - under the code name Assonance you may recall. It was a discussion between Akbar and Khyam, albeit that Shujah was in all probability also present. It was conversation which ranged over a number of topics of interest to young men pursuing such a plan as they were concerned with, however a reoccurring theme was that of potential targets.

129. Jawad Akbar referred to attacks upon the utilities, gas, water or electrical supplies. Alternatively, a big nightclub in central London might be a target. As he put it..."The biggest nightclub in central London, no one can put their hands up and say they are innocent - those slags dancing around." Indeed, as the conversation went on, Jawad Akbar went on, "I think the club thing you could do but the gas would be much harder."

130. So that closes that long weekend, 20 -

22 February. Khawaja, having provided his expertise regarding remote controlled detonation, returned to Canada having been taken, as I mentioned, to Heathrow by Omar Khyam and Shujah. When he landed in Toronto he was kept under surveillance by the Canadian authorities. We will come back to Khawaja on 29 March when he was arrested.

131. We arrive at the third period - 23 February to 16 March. I shall try to briefly but fairly summarise what was seen and heard by the officers monitoring the defendants' movements.

132. Visits by Khyam and Shujah to the internet cafes in Slough and Crawley continued. Jawad Akbar explained to his wife that he didn't pray in the Mosque because he didn't want to appear ostentatiously religious and it seemed clear from what he said that the precise nature of the operation in the UK, and his role in it, had not been fixed. That, at least, was what he was telling his wife. He said... "I don't want people to know what? I am religious because the decision has still not been made, I might be going in about a month or two's time or a year's time, yeah, and whichever is true I don't want people to know I'm religious, you understand. Whatever they are going to make me do is going to someone who is going to act like completely stupid, they are going to train me up and probably send me back here, act like completely stupid and do a big mission." He went on to say, "We know Allah hates the Kufs." "Kufs" is the word used to describe "non-believer." That conversation was on 26 February.

133. On 1 March Akbar was again talking to his wife. He sounded anxious. His anxiety related to two missing CDs. He said in relation to this... "...it's something else much more seriouser, I don't even know where I put them ... its CDs... Two CDs... They got Transco written on them ... Transco; you know what if we get raided today we're finished." He went on to say... "No I wasn't I was going to say it's serious and that's it... I'm never going to tell you what it is."

134. I shall come back to Transco and the CDs in due course. I merely remind you that National Grid Transco owns and operates the high voltage electricity system in England and Wales and the high pressure gas system in Britain. In the South East of England, Transco rely upon two principal contractors. One of these is a company called Morrisons Utility Services. At the time we're concerned with, the defendant Waheed Mahmood was employed by Morrisons.

135. The conversation between Akbar and his wife when Akbar had said "I'm never going to tell you what it is" came to an end almost immediately after he'd said that because he went on to say... "The less you know the better, get your stuff and get into the kitchen." And as he said this, a knock could be heard on the door.

136. Akbar's reason for wanting his wife out of the way soon became clear; because the knock on the door heralded the arrival of Khyam, Shujah and Anthony Garcia. The discussion they had included reference to "really dodgy stuff." It will be as well if I read the short extract to you... Akbar - "The serious stuff is really dodgy, as well the serious stuff." Garcia - "I know man I was there when you were doing it...." Akbar - "This is very true." Garcia - "This is deep stuff - pure evidence man." In due course, when you've heard the full story, you will have to decide what it was that was described as "serious dodgy stuff." We may get an indication in due course.

137. Further conversations took place on 10 March between Akbar and a man named Osim. Its significance is not in relation to what Osim said, but Akbar's contribution. It was a wide-ranging discussion which included possible targets again, and the consequences of a post-bomb arrest. Akbar referred to himself as "a little pawn" (he actually said "little prawn") in it all and indeed at times he appeared frustrated with the delay, that sometimes it felt that it was not going anywhere.

138. And to some extent on the evening of 12 March with Khyam, Akbar was pursuing the same theme by making the point that if you haven't got the target, then you can't work out the problems associated with it. However, there was reference by Akbar, although it wasn't totally clear, to three bombs, the changing of identities, whether it was easier to hide here or in Pakistan.

139. To bring this period to a close, a discussion in the Vitara between Khyam, Shujah and Akbar on the evening of Sunday 14 March, serves to perhaps reveal the attitude of those defendants to the realities of what they were involved in. I say that with this word of caution. There were two others present, and indeed in this respect, they took the lead. However, it is Khyam's and Shujah's reaction to what was said which is of importance. This exchange occurred in relation to the Madrid bombing. When the view was expressed that the Madrid bombing should have been carried out in June because there would have been all those families on holiday, Shujah's reaction was to say "fantissimo" and Khyam's reaction was, it seems, to compare it in that respect with the Bali bombing.

140. So we move to the final period - 17 to 30 March. I have identified this as the final period because matters appeared from this date to be moving towards a final phase approaching a conclusion. Indeed, on 17 March, there was conversation between Khyam and his brother Shujah about their flight from Heathrow and the time in which they should arrive at the airport, etc. You will recall the significance of this from Babar's evidence i.e., that Khyam had told him that he would travel to Pakistan before the operation, as he described it, took place.

141. In addition, another factor was to emerge upon this date which supports the view that matters were moving towards a conclusion. I will return to that in a minute.

142. On 19 March in Khyam's car, a conversation was recorded which Khyam had with Waheed Mahmood. This defendant, Waheed Mahmood, made it clear he wanted to act and to do so sooner rather than later. He asked Khyam "is it worth getting all the brothers together tonight and asking who would be ready to go?" And his general attitude was revealed very clearly when in relation to the Madrid bombing, he said, "Spain was a beautiful job weren't it, absolutely beautiful man, so much impact."

143. Waheed even raised the possibility of, as he described it, "a little explosion at Bluewater - tomorrow if you want."I don't know how big it would be we haven't tested it but we could tomorrow - do one tomorrow." Bluewater is, as you will know, a very large shopping centre (in Kent) and this conversation was taking place on the Friday so the following day would be the Saturday.

144. Thus far, if you are in due course satisfied by the evidence of Babar, the defendants, with the exception of Nabeel Hussain, in Pakistan to varying degrees were, you may think, preparing themselves and receiving instruction to carry out some terrorist bomb attack in the UK. The preferred ingredients were ammonium nitrate and aluminium powder and Momin Khawaja had also been in Pakistan and his area of expertise was the remote controlled detonation device.

145. If we add to that the evidence I've just summarised, we get an insight into the attitudes of some of the defendants and discussions as to targets. However, no precise target appears, from the evidence available, to have been agreed upon. I say from the evidence available, because of course, it was not possible to monitor all the conversations and actions.

146. It is perhaps important in this respect to remind ourselves that the charge or allegation which all defendants face is a conspiracy to cause an explosion or explosions. Provided there was such an agreement, any defendant who was a party to such an agreement will be guilty - the prosecution do not have to prove a specific explosion was agreed upon, whether it be a nightclub, shopping centre or whatever. And indeed in cases such as these, that the law provides that it is the agreement that is the offence has very sensible advantages. It will hardly be in the public interest if the police had to wait for the explosion to take place and the deaths and damage to be caused, before the perpetrators were guilty of a crime. Further, whatever precautions the police took (and you will hear in due course that they took in particular one very sensible precaution) to wait until the last moment would inevitably involve risks to the public which would be unacceptable. This would be so even if you felt you could monitor sufficiently closely the movements and actions of each member of the group at all times - itself hardly a realistic expectation.

147. I shall return briefly to this topic in due course. However, what I shall do beforehand is to go ahead to the arrests of the defendants, and all except one took place at the end of March, and to refer to what was said, if indeed they chose to say anything.

148. The arrests took place on three days. Khawaja was arrested in Canada on 29 March 2004 and as I mentioned he awaits trial in that country. All other defendants, except Amin, were arrested on the following day, Tuesday 30 March. Finally, Amin was arrested on Tuesday 8 February 2005 when he arrived at Heathrow Airport having just landed from Islamabad in Pakistan.

149. All defendants, except Amin, can be dealt with relatively shortly. All were interviewed under caution over a period of days. All declined to answer questions. When they were charged however, Khyam, Shujah, Jawad Akbar and Waheed Mahmood tendered through their solicitors short prepared statements. I shall return to these statements in due course. Suffice it at this stage to say that all denied any involvement in terrorism or any intention to be involved in terrorism.

150. The situation in relation to Amin requires more explanation and indeed, as he did answer questions in extensive interviews, requires an outline at least of what he had to say.

151. Before embarking upon that outline, I should give you this warning. What Amin had to say in interview is evidence only in his case. Insofar as he refers to other defendants, what he has to say is not evidence against those defendants. It is not evidence for the simple but compelling reason that they were not present during the Amin interviews; they had no opportunity to express their disagreement with anything he said.

152. Salahuddin Amin, you will recall, came from Luton. From what he told the police in interview however, he had been born in Pakistan and brought up there prior to moving to England when he was about 16. He thereafter returned to visit Pakistan in 1999/2000 and became interested in and supportive of the Pakistani struggle with India over Kashmir.

153. After that short stay in Pakistan he returned to Luton and indeed became a student at the University of Hertfordshire. He also had a job as a taxi driver. He had decided, prior to returning to England, that he would make financial donations to the cause in relation to Kashmir. This he did.

154. Amin then took a year out from being a student to work full time as a cabbie and this enabled him to make donations of E5 to E10 per day.

155. He also came under various influences. One such influence was a young man named Aftab. Aftab had apparently undergone training in Pakistan and indeed was in due course to be killed in Afghanistan. It was to Aftab that Amin handed over his donations for onward transmission. Aftab also provided videos and cassettes.

156. Those videos and cassettes had the effect of making up Amin's mind to undergo training and to go to fight in Kashmir or Afghanistan.

157. He was at this time studying Islam and praying for about two hours a day. Among the visitors to his mosque in Luton was a man named Abu Munthir - we will come across Abu Munthir in due course in Pakistan and indeed you may recall that Babar knew of him as a senior man who Babar wanted to meet.

158. Of particular relevance to this case is the fact that Amin's mosque or centre also received a visit from members of the Crawley group. Amin recalled that this was how he met Omar Khyam and Waheed Mahmood for the first time.

159. When in the summer of 2001 Amin went to Pakistan for his sister's wedding, he took the opportunity to "check out," as he put it, a training camp. He wasn't in the event very impressed with it but he did this because he thought he might return to undergo training. He told the police, in response to a question in interview, that he viewed himself at that time as a radical follower of Islam.

160. This was the summer of 2001 - shortly before 9/11. Amin was still in Pakistan on 11 September 2001. He viewed the World Trade Centre as a significant target. He said he regretted the civilian deaths but he felt good and happy that there was such a big financial loss.

161. He returned to Luton but determined to go back to Pakistan to see if he could get some training in order that he could fight in Afghanistan. So he sold his house in Luton and went to live in Pakistan on about 25 November 2001.

162. Thereafter, because as he said he didn't wish to expose his real name, he started using the name Khalid - apparently a very common name in Pakistan. You will recall that this fits in with the evidence of Babar who knew Amin by the name Khalid when later their paths crossed.

163. Initially in Pakistan, Amin worked in his uncle's business. However, in due course a man who he had known from the mosque back in Luton came to see him. His name was Abdul Quayam. He asked Amin would he help in the transmission of money and equipment to people fighting in Afghanistan - like Al Qaeda and Mujahideen. And the recipient of the money and equipment was to be Abu Munthir, to whom I referred a few minutes ago.

164. Abu Munthir was now of course in Pakistan or Afghanistan, and thereafter Amin received the money and equipment and passed it on, usually via an intermediary to Abu Munthir.

165. In February 2003, Omar Khyam, the first defendant, arrived in Pakistan. Amin had been notified of his arrival and that he, Khyam, was coming out to help. He would stay until August 2003 and again tying in with the evidence of Babar, Khyam was known to Amin by the name Ausman. Initially Khyam was concerned with the supplying of the equipment to go to Abu Munthir. There were associates of Khyam also involved - one was the second defendant, Anthony Garcia. Amin knew him by the name of Rizwan and knew he was Algerian.

166. Amin was also aware that Khyam wanted to have explosives training "in order to do something in the UK," as Amin expressed it in interview. Indeed, you will recall that Amin had been interested in attending a training camp quite independently of Khyam's wishes.

167. The explosives training took place near a town called Kohat - you may recall my reference to Kohat when I outlined Babar's evidence. The instructor was a man known to Amin as Tarik - his real name was probably Majid. Khyam and Amin (under the names Ausman and Khalid of course) attended this training course as did a third man, Ayoub.

168. The training lasted two days. When in interview Amin was asked by the police what materials were involved in the making of the explosives, the first item he mentioned was fertiliser. When asked if it was any particular fertilizer, he said ammonium nitrate.

169. Amin expanded upon the tuition received and included the fact that one of the other ingredients which had to be mixed with the ammonium nitrate was aluminium powder. Indeed, they were instructed that aluminium powder could be purchased from paint shops.

170. The training course included the fact that there were alternative substances to ammonium nitrate. The instruction was not restricted to explosives as a means of causing death or damage. As you will hear they were instructed in some detail as to how ricin was prepared. Khyam and Amin took notes of the training they were given. To tie the Kohat training camp in with Babar's evidence, you will recall that he had been told of this by Khyam and that he, Khyam, and Amin had attended such a camp. Now in his interviews, Amin is telling the police about it first hand.

171. During this period, Amin also met a Canadian friend of Khyam's. He didn't know his name but the fact that his occupation was in the computer/IT world tends to point to this Canadian being Momin Khawaja.

172. In addition, Waheed Mahmood, who you will recall had with Khyam visited the Luton mosque, was living in Pakistan. He was living in Gujar Khan. Amin saw him on four or five occasions, usually in the company of Khyam, and in fact purchased a car from Waheed Mahmood.

173. An indication to the trust imposed in Amin and his position in the Pakistani end of the organisation is gained from the passing of information to him in relation to a radioisotope bomb. Abu Munthir asked Amin to contact a man named Abu Annis on Munthir's behalf. Amin did so via the internet and Abu Annis said they had made contact with the Russian mafia in Belgium and from the mafia they were trying to buy this bomb.

174. Amin told the police in interview that he didn't believe this could be genuine. In his own words, he didn't think it was likely "that you can go and pick an atomic bomb up and use it." And indeed nothing appears to have come of this however, as I say, it perhaps gives an indication as to Amin's position in, and his usefulness to, the organisation.

175. Whether the possibilities of acquiring and using a radioisotope bomb were realistic or not, we now turn to a fundamental and a concrete and immensely important contribution which Amin made to the conspiracy to cause explosions.

176. By February of 2004, Omar Khyam, Anthony Garcia, Waheed Mahmood and Shujah were all back in the UK. Indeed, as were all the defendants with the exception of Amin. You will recall the surveillance evidence I outlined earlier, and what they were planning and what they were saying.

177. Amin told the police that around February 2004 he received a very specific request from Omar Khyam. Before telling you about that request, it may be instructive to tell you how Amin and Khyam communicated with each other. Khyam would ring Amin on Amin's mobile - mobiles which he changed regularly to avoid detection. Khyam would tell Amin on the mobile to "come over." Amin knew that meant to "come over" on the internet. He would go to one of five or six internet cafes he used. The email accounts they used were likewise regularly changed so that, as Amin put it, "they don't get traced."

178. Those are the precautions they were taking. What did Omar Khyam want to know in February 2004? He told Amin that he had 650 kg of ammonium nitrate and he basically wanted to know two things. Firstly, what should he mix with it to make explosives and secondly, in what ratios. Khyam explained that he had forgotten the detail of the instructions they had received back in June 2003 in Kohat. So, it seems, had Amin because he went to Abu Munthir, his superior, in order to obtain this information. This took two or three weeks but he was assiduous enough to make notes, thereafter destroyed, of what he was told. That information he passed on to Khyam.

179. When interviewed by the police in February 2005 he couldn't recall the details which he had provided as to ratios, etc. He could recall reference to ammonium nitrate of course, and aluminium powder and also sugar and sulphur. Whatever the detail, it goes without saying this was vital information in relation to any plan to cause explosions in England.

180. Amin told the police also that he knew what he was doing was wrong. However, he told them that he regretted it and it only came about because he had been, as he put it, "brainwashed." He also said that it was because he regretted it, that he'd given himself up to the Pakistani authorities in April 2004, albeit that he knew at that time that the Pakistani authorities were looking for him.

181. Of course, if you've played a part in a crime or an agreement to commit a crime that you thereafter regret, it may be deserving of a degree of credit, but it will not absolve you from responsibility for that crime to which you have been a party.

182. However, Amin, particularly in the latter part of his interviews, went further. He explained that after he gave himself up to the Pakistani authorities in April 2004, he was kept in detention. He was interviewed by the Pakistani, American and British security services. He claimed that he was very badly treated by the Pakistani authorities and received threats. He made complaints to a lesser extent about his American interviews. He said he had even admitted things he had not done.

183. He also claimed that when he was placed on a plane to come to London, he had been told by the Pakistani authorities that he had received his punishment for his crime. He was there, I think, referring to the period from April 2004, when he gave himself up, to February 2005, when he came to London.

184. What I have outlined as Amin's admissions to his involvement is based entirely upon what he had to say in interview in London. The conditions under which those interviews were conducted, you will have to evaluate. Whether Amin could have been under any misapprehension that very serious allegations were being investigated; that every effort was made to allow him to say exactly what he wanted. He knew he was under arrest, had a solicitor throughout the interviews and those interviews were not only recorded, but they were videoed. He accepted that not only had the British Security Service shown him every consideration in Pakistan, but during the interviews with the police here in London, in his own words - "As far as you lot are concerned, you've treated me very well and I respect you for that, thank you very much."

185. When you hear the interviews you may come to a conclusion that as the interviews progress, there came a time when Amin regretted revealing quite as much as he had. Thereafter he claimed, for example, that having provided the information in relation to ingredients and ratios to cause explosions, he didn't know what exactly it was intended should be done and that he didn't know the intention was to do anything in England. Indeed by the time he came to be charged at the end of the interviewing process, his stance had become clear; he said, "I wasn't involved in any conspiracy at all by God; I knew nothing about the other stuff by Omar Khyam and the others."

186. When you hear all the evidence you will have to evaluate those claims. Evaluate them particularly in view of the fact that he knew that when Omar Khyam said he had 650 kg of ammonium nitrate, Omar Khyam was of course in England, and that was where he had the ammonium nitrate. Indeed, you will want to compare it with what Amin had said earlier in his interviews in relation to the training in June 2003 when the initial grounding in substances and ratios necessary to make explosions had been provided: I quote from his interview - "I knew that they wanted to get explosives training to do something in the UK."

187. Thus far I have dealt with the case you are here to try in compartments, i.e. introducing the defendants, the evidence of Babar, the surveillance evidence, both visual and audio, what Amin said about his role, etc. This approach has a disadvantage. It tends to obscure the fact that those compartments cover the same period. It tends to obscure the fact that events in one compartment of evidence may well fit in with, may throw light upon, events going on at the same time in a different compartment of evidence. In due course, I will return to this topic in order to provide a couple of examples of what I mean. For the moment it will suffice that you are at least aware of the need to remember that many events are going on at the same time in different places, even different parts of the world, England, Pakistan, Canada, etc.

188. In a moment I will move to events in England but in order to provide a bridge to those events, may I ask you to bring back to mind the evidence of Babar. He had heard from Khyam that he and Amin had received training at a house in Kohat, training as to the theory and practice of explosives. When considering the case of Amin, as I have already said, you will note how this ties in with Amin's admissions in interview.

189. Babar relates further that shortly afterwards, there was further training in Malakand. This training was not attended by Amin but was by Khyam, Shujah, Garcia, Akbar and indeed, the Canadian Khawaja. You may recall I told you about experiments being conducted with ammonium nitrate and aluminium powder and indeed, that those two substances had clearly become the essential ingredients required to manufacture successful bombs.

190. That second training exercise was in the summer of 2003. In due course, those defendants who had attended, and indeed Waheed Mahmood also returned to England. Let's see what happened at the end of 2003 and in the early months of 2004 when, of course, the surveillance operation started. Let us start by looking at our maps, particularly at pages 1 and 40 of the maps bundle. You will see that in Burgess Hill in Sussex is an agricultural merchant called Bodle Brothers. In October and November 2003 this business was approached in relation to providing nitrogen or ammonium nitrate fertiliser. Ammonium nitrate, apart from other uses to which we have referred in the context of bomb making, has an innocent agricultural use i.e., as a fertiliser. The approach was by a man who variously used the name John or Tony. It could be that John and Tony were different men but it may be that you will come to the conclusion that it was one man and that was the defendant, Anthony Garcia, who you may recall sometimes used the name John Lewis.

191. In order to try to cut matters short, there was an initial prospective purchase of 50 kg then eventually delivery was taken of 600 kg of ammonium nitrate fertiliser. Garcia had originally indicated that he wanted it for his allotment. This was perhaps somewhat surprising as the allotment would have to be the size of four-or five football pitches and further, it was the wrong time of year to purchase and apply ammonium nitrate as a fertiliser.

192. Garcia had asked if Bodle Brothers could deliver to Ealing in West London. They couldn't, as it happened. He had also during the ordering and purchasing process indicated that he needed to consult an associate regarding the amount required.

193. If we go to West London, which was clearly the intended destination of the ammonium nitrate, it is obvious that the 600 kg would have to be stored somewhere.

194. The initial idea, it would appear, was to be Big Yellow Storage in Slough. Indeed on 7 November, Omar Khyam reserved a I00 sq. ft. unit and paid a E25 deposit. He, however, cancelled that on 10 November. It was cancelled because for whatever reason, an alternative place of storage was identified.

195. On the same day, 10 November, Anthony Garcia went to Access Self Storage at 145-147 Boston Road in Hanwell. (Maps bundle pages 2, 28 and 29) I He booked a storage unit likewise of 100 sq. ft. capacity. He said he needed the unit to store gardening equipment and enquired whether there would be a forklift and driver available to unload the equipment on the following day. He said he would need the store initially for a few weeks, and the cost was agreed at E207.45 per month.

196. Garcia provided a mobile telephone number and in respect of the E25 deposit which was required, a Switch card was offered. That card was the Switch card of Nabeel Hussain, a defendant who was not featured in relation to the events in Pakistan which I have been outlining. His role is very much more centred around the storage of the ammonium nitrate. Not, I hasten to add, that as we shall hear, this was his only role.

197. Hussain was spoken to over the telephone and the deposit authorised and the rental payments were to be collected from the Hussain account on the 11th of each month for an initial period of three months. The deposit receipt in Garcia's name was in due course recovered from the premises.

198. That was 10 November. The following day, 11 November, three events occurred. These were the completion of the formalities of the rental of the unit at Access, secondly the hiring of a drop-sided lorry on which to transport the ammonium nitrate and thirdly, the delivery of the ammonium nitrate to Access Storage.

199. At the completion of the rental agreement, Hussain, in whose name and at whose expense the unit was being hired, attended. He was accompanied by Garcia and Khyam. It was Nabeel Hussain and Anthony Garcia who took the primary roles while Khyam remained in the background. Hussain signed the contract documents and retained the top copy of the agreement.

200. A password was required. The word "pink" was selected - apparently after Mr. Pink, from the film "Reservoir Dogs." The access code eventually chosen was 6666 - a number it was thought they could all easily remember. It may be helpful to look at the contract and what is called the 24 Hour Access Statement.

201. Contract - JB1, divider C, pages 56, 58, 59. Access sheet - page 60 You will see from the latter document where Hussain has corrected the spelling of his name and where Hussain's date of birth - 9 April 1985 (i.e., 9485) has been changed to the number 6666 as the access code.

202. The hiring of the drop-sided vehicle was obtained from Ludrose Vehicle Hire who carry on business from an industrial estate just outside Crawley (see plan pages 38-39). The hiring was carried out by Omar Khyam and his Barclaycard was used. Indeed, his name and address - his Crawley address to tie in with the Barclaycard, appear in writing on the rear of the rental agreement. The actual hiring was effected, however, in the name of a second man who accompanied Khyam, as we shall see if we look at the hire agreement. (JB I, divider D, page 98)

203. In the top left hand corner you will see the name of that second man - "Mr. N. Ashraf of 88 Maiden Lane, Crawley." You may recall that that name cropped up when I was dealing with the evidence of Babar. Ashraf, it was, who in Pakistan had suggested in early or mid 2002 that Babar and Waheed Mahmood should attend a training camp. Babar and Waheed felt it was much too soon after 9/11 to put their beads above the parapet.

204. The hiring of the lorry was for a period of 24 hours and this was all that was needed to collect and transport the 500-600 kg of ammonium nitrate to Access Storage and this was of course the third significant event of that day, 11 November. It was Garcia, Khyam and Hussain who arrived on the lorry with the ammonium nitrate.

205. The unloading process had to be undertaken in two parts. Firstly, the unloading with the assistance of the forklift truck which Garcia had asked for the previous day. Once loaded onto a pallet, the three men then had to somehow get the 600 kg bag onto a pump truck in order to transport it to the actual unit (number 1118) where it was to be stored. The manager, a lady named Pinderjit Saini, drove the forklift truck. She was assisted by the three men, Khyam, Garcia and Hussain. She then left them to the second part of the operation, getting it onto the pump truck and into the unit. She had some conversation with them. She asked what it was in the bag. She received the reply, probably from Khyam, that it was fertiliser. She had noticed a hazard warning on the side of the bag. She asked why they were storing it. She didn't receive a reply to that question. Perhaps that is hardly surprising, however she was told that it was being stored for a couple of weeks and then they would be making other arrangements.

206. As the bag is secured in its storage unit (number 1118) it may be a convenient moment to look firstly at the unit, and secondly at the bag itself. Unit - photo JB 1, pages 3 0-31 Bag - photo JB 1, pages 51-51 A You will note the warning on the bag, which illustrates the dangerous properties of ammonium nitrate i.e., "CAUTION, OXIDISING AGENT ASSIST FIRE." Not that the prosecution suggest any of these defendants would require such information.

207. The lorry was returned to the rental company outside Crawley the next day. It had travelled 143 miles during the period of its hire.

208. To just follow through the storage for the next three months - 11 December, 11 January and 11 February - the rental cost was paid out of Hussain's bank account as had been arranged.

209. I am going to pause in the narrative to again try to gather together some of the threads of evidence to illustrate how they fit together in a sensible and compelling chronology.

210. We have from Babar the view expressed by Waheed Mahmood that he couldn't understand why people were coming all the way to Pakistan to fight when they should be fighting Jihad in the UK and conducting operations there.

211. This was bolstered by Khyam in about June 2003 telling Babar that he wanted to "hit the UK," by which he clearly meant hitting the UK with explosions. Indeed, when considering the case in respect of Amin, you may recall that Amin told the police that he, Amin, was aware that Khyam wanted to have explosives training "in order to do something in the UK." This was followed by Khyam and Amin attending the training camp in or around June in Kohat. You will recall particularly the instruction in relation to ammonium nitrate and aluminium powder and of course, detonators.

212. Babar is shortly afterwards told about this training by Khyam. This is followed, according to Babar, by the training camp at Malakand a month or so later. A training camp attended by Babar, Khyam, Shujah, Garcia, Akbar and Khawaja. Again, instruction and indeed experiments, using ammonium nitrate and aluminium powder.

213. When we return to the UK we find Khyam, Garcia and Hussain are obtaining a very large quantity of ammonium nitrate. When considering the case in respect of Amin, his admission that in February 2004 Khyam requested, and be, Amin, provided, the advice as to what should be mixed with ammonium nitrate and the ratios required, and that he, Khyam, had 650 kg of ammonium nitrate is corroborated to the hilt. They had it stored in Access Storage. In fact it was 600 kg because the original sample of 50 kg was not retained.

214. At much the same time, Khawaja is travelling to the UK. He is of course the man with the expertise in relation to the remotely controlled detonator devices, the third requirement along with ammonium nitrate and aluminium powder.

215. We learn from the surveillance evidence of his visit on 18-20 February. We learn also from the surveillance evidence of the involvement of Shujah. The attitude of the defendants, the discussions about targets, Akbar's reference to a big nightclub, his big mission and the missing CDs, Waheed Mahmood's reference to the Bluewater Shopping Centre, etc.

216. That very brief summary will illustrate, I hope, how important it is to have in mind how different events in different places fit together, and how also the order of events is the preparation and training in Pakistan, followed by the acquisition of the vital ammonium nitrate in the UK and the preparation of the detonators in Canada to be made available in the UK. Only the aluminium powder is missing, and we will come back to that in due course.

217. For the moment however, as I have just referred to the weekend of 18 - 20 February, may I fill in more background to events concerning the storage of the ammonium nitrate at Access around that time.

218. On the day that Khawaja bad arrived in the UK i.e., 20 February, coincidentally the staff at Access had become suspicious as to the quantity of fertilizer they were holding and the lack of activity in respect of it. On that day, they accordingly contacted the police. They were unaware of course of the police operation which was already underway. For their part, the police at this stage took, what I described earlier, as a very sensible precaution. After photographing the ammonium nitrate fertilizer in the unit, they then substituted an inert substance for the ammonium nitrate. So far as we can tell, they did so with sufficient expertise for the substitution not to be detected. While not removing totally the risk that something would go wrong, from their point of view, this would at least reduce that risk.

219.The defendants were of course unaware of the suspicions of the Access staff and of at least the direct involvement of the police, whatever may have been their sensitivities to monitoring of a more general nature. On 26 February, Khyam rang Access to check that "the payments were going OK." In making this call, he pretended to be Nabeel Hussain from whose account of course the payments were being made. He, Khyam, was told that the payments were indeed going through without any problem. Khyam, posing as Hussain, explained that his reason for telephoning was that he had received a letter from Access but had not opened it. As any such letter, and it was probably a receipt for the direct debit February payment, would have been sent to Hussain at his home address in Horley. It would seem therefore that the call must have been prompted by some communication from Hussain to Khyam; otherwise it is difficult to see how Khyam would have known about it.

220. In fact following through that theme, there must have been more detailed communication between Hussain and Khyam and Shujah because prior to the payment due on 11 March, Hussain appeared to be becoming somewhat financially stretched. That is hardly surprising because although he had a part time job with Boots, he was a student and the Access costs of E207 every month must have constituted a sizeable outgoing. I say there must have been some communication of this fact to Khyam and Shujah because on 5 March, under the surveillance of the police, Khyam drove Shujah to the National Westminster Bank in Crawley. Shujah went into the bank and deposited E200 in cash to be placed to the credit of Hussain's bank account, in anticipation, no doubt, of the payment out which was due on 11 March. In actual fact, it was not quite sufficient to meet the required amount. The communication as to the bank details may well have followed an exchange on 26 February in fact. On that date, Hussain, Khyam and Shujah were listened to at Akbar's address at Colley House. Hussain was heard to say "I'll see if I can get those bank details" and Khyam replied "Yeah, text it to me."

221. In fact, on the day before the date for payment fell, an event occurred in relation to the police investigation. On 10 March a female undercover police officer, using the name Amanda, took up the position of receptionist at Access Self Storage.

222. She, in that capacity, on 11 March attempted to collect the monthly rental of E207.45. The payment was declined by the bank so she left a telephone message on Hussain's mobile number. Almost immediately the call was returned. The caller said he was Nabeel Hussain and further he said that he needed to get a friend to deposit money into the account. He was asked to attend at Access Storage and he said he would do so on the following day.

223. Shortly thereafter, at 2.14 p.m., Khyam rang Access and said he would attend with Hussain the following day between 1.00 and 2.00 p.m., From the introduction of the undercover police officer, Amanda, into the investigation, the telephone calls were recorded so you will be able to read transcripts or even hear them if necessary.

224. In fact on the following day, 12 March, only Khyam attended. He initially gave the name Hussain, but then said he was Omar. He handed over E250 in cash (in fact in L50 notes) and asked if henceforth someone could come in on 10th or 11th and pay for the storage in cash. He was asked if he had any smaller denominations. He didn't. So the arrangement was made that he would attend later in order to collect his change.

225. Khyam also availed himself of that opportunity to enter the unit and inspect the ammonium nitrate. He explained in the course of doing this that it was his friend Nabeel's and he (Khyam) had only been there once before. The undercover officer, Amanda, noticed that Khyam appeared rather nervous prior to entering the unit and viewing the bag, however having done that he was much more relaxed.

226. On 15 March Omar Khyam again attended at Access. Part of the reason, no doubt, was to collect his change from the E250 he left on 12 March; however he also said that he had spoken to Hussain and that a further deposit for a further contract would not be needed as this was going to be the last month of storage. Khyam also again entered the storage unit itself and appeared to mark the bag of fertiliser whilst there. This was caught by CCTV and is perhaps an illustration of the concern that there might be monitoring of the defendants' activities. You will decide in due course but if you decide Khyam was in fact marking the bag, the likely reason was to enable him thereafter to see whether or not it had been moved in any way.

227. This was followed on 17 March, two days later, by Khyam and Hussain visiting Access again. Khyam appeared to take the lead role but Hussain completed the required paperwork and a month's rental as a deposit to enable them to convert to the monthly cash payment system was handed over.

228. It may be significant that Khyam said that they'd spoken about how long the storage facility would be required and that may be it would be until the end of the month and thereafter "they would see."

229. I say that may be of significance because you may remember earlier that I said in relation to the fact that on this date, 17 March, there was conversation between Khyam and his brother Shujah about what time they should arrive at Heathrow, etc. This was linked to the fact that Khyam and Shujah had purchased tickets to leave the UK (via Heathrow) on 6 April, and linked further to the fact that Khyam had told Babar that be would leave the UK before the operation had reached fruition. When these various factors are linked to the fact that on 15 March and again on 17 March, reference was made to this probably being the last month when storage was required, you may understand why I say this may be of significance.

230. On 18 March Jawad Akbar and Nabeel Hussain were recorded, while at 16 Colley House. In relation to that conversation what you make of it, how you construe it, may well have an important bearing on how you view the case in relation to Nabeel Hussain.

231. In coming to a conclusion about this conversation, you have to decide whether on the one hand, as no doubt will be contended for on his behalf, it illustrates that Hussain had perhaps been taken advantage of and was unaware that his part in storing the ammonium nitrate related to any plan to cause explosions.

232. The defence will no doubt point to questions asked by Hussain as to what you can make out of "fertilization," as he described it. He said ..."There was someone talking about fertilisation - you use it to make explosives and I started thinking to myself why is it under my account. Why has it been there for so long ...?" And "I never knew what it was I never asked, I considered it doing a favour."

233. On the other hand, references to ... "Big big the size of this kitchen, yeah it's in a room stored in a room, what it's huge, the amount of explosives there you could take yourself massive big out man." Would, we suggest, point firmly in the opposite direction.

234. However, what is important is that in due course you examine carefully the whole of relevant transcript - there is a danger in my identifying extracts which cannot provide the full context. Suffice it at this stage for me to flag up the issue which will arise. Of course you have to consider that conversation along with all the other evidence in the case. The fact that the hiring of the Access unit was not only in his name but that he paid out the vast majority of over E1, 000 to store something with a value of less than E100. He had helped unload a bag with the hazard warning on it. With his knowledge of his co-defendants, why should they be storing, and him paying so much for the storage of fertiliser for any innocent purpose. And that, as we shall hear in due course, was not the end of his involvement. When you study the exchanges between Hussain and Jawad Akbar in detail you may come to the conclusion that Hussain, as matters were moving towards their conclusion, was trying to prepare the ground to minimise his role and falsely adopt a position of ignorance. Perhaps one gains a glimpse of his true motives from something he said to Akbar during the same conversation - "If I go down I'll take everyone down with me."

235. I want to return to the arrests which I touched on very briefly before. You may recall the first to be arrested was Momin Khawaja. This was on Monday 29 March 2004 and took place, of course, in Canada. On that date also his home in Ontario was searched.

236. The searches and the property recovered prove further, if proof be needed, firstly Khawaja's role in this plot and secondly, adds flesh to the suspicions and inferences which I invited you to draw from his visit to the UK on that weekend of 20-22 February, the conversations at Hencroft Street, visits to the Universal Internet Shop, the meeting at 2 The Hollows in Crawley, etc.

237. Documentation recovered from Khawaja's home confirmed what I have already mentioned i.e., that his training and background was in computers and IT - he was accordingly ideally suited to his role in this conspiracy. Secondly, it revealed many Jihad related documents and his radical views in that direction.

238. In a second floor room was found also a significant quantity of computer and printed circuit board parts in various stages of assembly, particularly there were a matching pair of home-made radio transmitter and receiver boards, both using chips and operating in the 916 MHz bandwidth. These were examined by a scientist who's had particular experience in the world of explosive devices. She has seen such devices used over the years in the construction of improvised explosive devices (JEDs). Such devices allow the IED to be detonated from a safe distance.

239. Further if, as was the case here, the transmitter signal was encoded and the receiver signal decoded, this ensures that the IED is not inadvertently initiated by an unintended signal. The bomb planter is therefore protected from an accidental setting off of the device, or bomb as one might call it. I will come back to these items recovered from Khawaja's possession and we will look at photographs of them in due course when we can better understand how they fit in to the full picture.

240. Khawaja also accessed Yahoo's email service on a regular basis and appears to have posted a regular journal on the internet. Such an activity is apparently known as "blogging." Some of the entries in this journal only serve to demonstrate further Khawaja's radical approach to Islam.

241. There also appeared to be evidence of the use of a "dead-drop box." This involves the creation of an account with an anonymous service provider such as Hotmail or Yahoo. Then, multiple members of a group - no doubt with similar radical views - are given access to the account by a single name and password. Members log into the account and create a draft document with whatever information they wish to disseminate or share. The next member logs in, reads the document, deletes it and creates an updated draft with his or her comments. No messages ever therefore enter or leave the account so secrecy is maintained.

242. There were many email messages in an account titled "nicole chic shara@yahoo.co.uk" which seemed to fit this profile. This account was set up with Yahoo on 30 December 2002 in the name of Ms Lucy Davis in the UK. The messages referred to the name "nigga" and it will be as well to look at some of these, which have been recovered because they provide an insight into the build up and indeed the purpose of Khawaja's all important visit to the UK on 20 February.

243. If we go back a little to the end of 2003 - the emails are in the additional jury bundle 27 October 03 - page 5 30 November 03 - page 6 19 January 04 - page 10

244. If we pause for a moment to fit this all into the wider timetable, it was in mid/late October that the first approach was made to Bodle Brothers in relation to the ammonium nitrate and by January, the 500 kg had been waiting in Access storage for a couple of months.

245. Moving on a few days to 25 January (page 11). 2 February 04 - page 11A 8 February 04 - page 12 10 February 04 - page 12 12 February 04 - page 13-14 15 February 04 - page 14 18 February 04 - page 14 19 February 04 - page 15

246. You may recall that in relation to the two visits to Universal Video in Slough on 20 and 21 February, I invited the inference that they would have been viewing the images of the remote detonation devices. You may think those two passages on 18 and 19 February make such an inference a compelling one. Those are the emails up to the weekend of Khawaja's visit to the UK. It would appear that thereafter the email account was changed for further communications. A similar pattern and precaution to that we have come across before. The new email account was puretropicana2004@yahoo.com. I will not trouble you with the detail but there was reference to continuing work on the device, i.e. the remote controlled detonation device, and testing it and so on.

247. For completeness it also emerged from the investigation following the arrest of Khawaja and search of his premises, that he used the name Yas and the address klashinaat@hotmail.com. I shall not trouble you to look at communications from Khawaja using this address but they refer to his mates in the UK, to training with them and to the Mujahideen.

248. On the day following Khawaja's arrest i.e., 30 March, as I told you before, all other defendants with the exception of Amin were arrested. They were for the most part arrested at their home addresses. The exceptions were Omar Khyam who was arrested in room 440 of the Holiday Inn just outside Crawley, also Nabeel Hussain was at the relevant time - 6.20 a.m. - at Jawad Akbar's flat at 16 Colley House in Uxbridge, rather than his home at Horley.

249. As you would expect, the premises associated with the defendants were searched. In most of these premises there was a quantity of outdoor clothing and equipment. By way of example perhaps we can look at some photographs.

250. At Garcia's address in Ilford, in an attack room were found in two bergens the items photographed at pages 198 and 199 and shown on the screens. At the address of his girlfriend in Collingdale were also some pieces of outdoor equipment and associated items - a tent, a brochure, etc. In addition, in a ground floor bedroom, was found a letter. It seems clear it was a letter from Garcia to his brother. You may think when you read it that he is saying goodbye to his brother, telling him to keep what he, Garcia, has done, or is about to do, to himself and similar sentiments. I will trouble you to look at the letter because it may be unfair for me to extract individual sentences out of context. At page 16 of the additional bundle is a copy of the original and at page 18 a typed copy.

251. In Crawley, the Omar Khyam and Shujah family home, were various items of survival and camping equipment. When linked to receipts recovered, this evidence is consistent with the assistance which we heard about before in either raising money to buy equipment for the cause in Afghanistan or acquiring the equipment itself for the same purpose. By way of example receipts were found in Khyam's Vitara motorcar for purchases for outdoor clothing totalling E1, 506 in price.

252. Such equipment was not required for the plot to explode a bomb in the UK; it would be utilised in Pakistan or Afghanistan. It does, however, illustrate the motives of the defendants and helps you to evaluate the purposes for which the ammonium nitrate, the detonators, etc., were being acquired in relation to the UK. You will also be provided with evidence which demonstrates how Khyam, in the weeks leading up to his leaving the UK to go to Pakistan with Shujah, had been acquiring loans and credit facilities to some extent, no doubt for his own financial benefit but to facilitate also the purchase of equipment needed.

253. In relation to what was found at each address I shall not, subject to two exceptions, trouble you with great detail at this stage. To do so would probably confuse rather than help, however may I give you the outline of what was found.

254. If we start with Khyam and his brother Shujah, the family home was in Crawley. We looked at the relevant map and indeed a photograph at the beginning of my opening. The items recovered from this address included literature in relation to electronics including a book entitled "understanding solid state electronics" which had been heavily marked. Another document was entitled "what to do if contacted by M15 or SB" (Special Branch). In addition there was a Western Union money transfer document from Khyam to Mohammed Babar for E2, 471.00. You may recall that Babar had in the autumn of 2003 requested money following Khyam's return to England and had received a sum via Western Union. This document appears to confirm this piece of evidence and indeed, as it is dated 12 November 03, fits in with that timescale. It must have been a busy period for Khyam because 11/12 November was the time of the delivery of the ammonium nitrate to Access and the return of the lorry to Ludrose Vehicle Hire.

255. Finally, there was a long list of synagogues. In due course there were found seven fingerprints of Khyam and 19 of Shujah on these documents. This can be shown on the screens. The likely purpose of this information you may think was in relation to potential targets. And you may recall in the Khawaja email of 27 October 2003 one of his thoughts was a one way operation to the most high - "may be in Yahoodi land." Clearly six months down the line, the plan wasn't for a suicide bomber - if that was what a "one way operation" refers to - and the location had changed because all these synagogues in this list were situated in Britain but the possible targets perhaps had not.

256. As we follow the order of the Indictment and Anthony Garcia and Ilford, I have already referred to the various items of outdoor equipment at both that address and that of his girlfriend in Collingdale. Equipment which was undoubtedly, you may think, to be taken to Pakistan.

257. Moving on to Jawad Akbar, his family home was in Crawley but he lived at 16 Colley House in Uxbridge where indeed, some of the 62 recorded conversations I referred to earlier took place-you may recall reference to potential targets such as the utilities or a nightclub.

258. It is perhaps worth referring to the fact that a number of items were found which reflect the very close relationship with other alleged conspirators. For example, at Akbar's house there was a quotation for storage hire dated 10 November from Big Yellow Storage in Slough. It was Omar Khyam who had, on 7 November, paid a deposit in order to hire a 100 sq. ft. unit. This was cancelled on 10 November, the same day as the Akbar quotation to which I have just referred was obtained. This was likewise for a 100 sq. ft. unit. Why both were abandoned in favour of Access on the same day we do not know, but these transactions illustrate the involvement of Akbar, Khyam and Hussain, who utilised his credit card with Access as well as Garcia in the plans to store the all important ammonium nitrate. It was also of course, as I mentioned, found at Akbar's home address, albeit that in due course he was to say that it was nothing to do with him.

259. In a similar vein, in a Holiday Inn laundry bag was a Barclaycard slip in the name Omar Khyam and a pay and go sim card box on which in manuscript was a telephone number- it was the number of Bodle Brothers, the suppliers from whom the ammonium nitrate had been obtained. Still in the bag also was a National Union of Students card in the name of Jawad Akbar. That is hardly surprising because he certainly had in the past been a student at Brunel University in Uxbridge. There was also a Brunel University card with the signature of Nabeel Hussain.

260. In relation to Waheed Mahmood and his address in Crawley, again some outdoor or similar equipment was found. I should mention also the white transit van outside the premises. This was used by Mahmood in the course of his employment with Morrisons, who I referred to some time ago.

261. That vehicle provides a link also with property recovered from an address associated with Nabeel Hussain. You will recall Hussain lived in Horley. There were found items connected with the storage at Access as one might expect-it had been done in his name and largely with his money.

262. Hussain attended Brunel University and had therefore student accommodation in room 3, flat 37 Isambard Close in Uxbridge [map p.37]. On his desk in that room were, as one might expect, various personal documents relating to a bank account, a mobile telephone and the like. In addition, there were 14 CD Roms. 12 of these related to Transco, a company to which I referred in passing some time ago and to which I indicated would return.

263. The link between these CDs found in Hussain's room and Waheed Mahmood is that Mahmood worked for Morrisons, one of Transco's two main subcontractors.

264. At the beginning of my opening, in the course of introducing the defendants to you, I referred to the fact that National Grid Transco owns and operates the high voltage electricity system in England and Wales, and the high pressure gas system in Britain. The electricity system consists of 4,500 miles of overhead line, 410 miles of underground cable and 341 sub-stations. The gas system consists of 4,200 miles of underground high pressure gas pipelines and 24 compressor stations, which feed a network of 170,000 miles of distribution pipelines. National Grid Transco (NGT) relies upon another company called Advantica to provide the technology to manage its information systems. Of those 12 disks found on Hussain's desk, 11 were produced by Advantica and the other by NGT.

265. The NGT disk was labelled "the way ahead, NGT field operations update October 2003." The Advantica disks related variously to mains data, extract maps, scanned microfiche cable data and areas of special interest and hazardous underground plant. The data covered either the south east of England or the whole of Britain.

266. In addition, the data indicated the presence of hazardous plant, including such plant owned by other companies, for example oil pipelines and high voltage cables.

267. That set of disks would enable one to locate Transco's assets and the assets of the regional electricity companies in part of Transco's south of England network. They represented the October 2003 update and although only strictly accurate for a period of three months, they were essentially accurate for the early months of 2004. The disks are typically used to update a notebook computer, which is then taken to the place of work.

268. Anyone armed with such information would have no difficulty identifying, in the context of this case, a potential target. If, for example, an attack were made against a high pressure main, many of which are clearly shown on the CDs, the damage and disruption caused would be very considerable.

269. Waheed Mahmood had been employed by Morrisons Utility Senices since 24 November 2003. From 19 January 2004 he worked for Transco at their Brighton depot. He would have been issued with a notebook computer, which was updated from the discs to which I have referred. He would not in the course of his work, however, have control of these discs. That is not to say that he could not gain access to them, albeit that he was not permitted so do to. Neither was he entitled to have them in his possession.

270. That he did obtain possession, however, is clear. His job was concerned with the resetting and updating of gas meters, not with the laying of pipes or interruption of gas supplies, which might have required possession of such disks and information.

271. Even less of course was there any reason, or innocent reason at least, as to why they should be in Hussain's possession on top of his desk in his student room. In due course, not surprisingly, Hussain's thumbprint was found on the plastic cover of one of the microfiche cable data discs.

272. In addition however, the fingerprints of Jawad Akbar were also found on the covers of two of the disks. Again, it is very difficult to see how there could be any innocent reason why Akbar should have had contact with any of these disks. Indeed, any thought that such contact was innocent can be removed by recollecting part of the evidence to which I have already referred.

273. In the recorded conversation on 22 February at Colley House, Akbar had referred to a possible operation in relation to the utilities and to the effect this would have on the economy.

274. Of even more significance is an extract which I briefly referred to before in dealing with a conversation at 16 Colley House between Akbar and his wife on 1 March 2004. I referred to his anxiety in relation to two missing CDs. Forgive me for reminding you of what Akbar said on that occasion- "... its something else much more seriouser. I don't even know where I put them... its CDs... two CDs... They got Transco written on them... Transco, you know what, if we get raided today we're finished."

275. Not only clear reference you may think to the Transco CDs, but also a clear indication that the possession of the CDs related to potential targets and the bomb plot. Why else should Akbar say when he couldn't find them "if we get raided today we're finished?" Maybe it was felt that there was less danger of student accommodation being raided and that is why they were moved to Hussain's room in the university.

276. I said I would deal with the recovery of exhibits in outline, save in two respects. The first exception, the Transco CDs, I've just dealt with. The second, in many respects, completes the circle of evidence required for conspiracy to cause explosions. As the beginnings of the plot progressed in Pakistan, the three essential components required had emerged as ammonium nitrate, aluminium powder and detonators. The ammonium nitrate awaited its use at Access Storage; Khawaja apparently had almost perfected the remote control detonator. The only principal component which remained outstanding was the aluminium powder.

277. This ingredient had been tested in Pakistan and according to Babar, that which had not been used in the training exercises, had, as he understood it, gone with Khyam to England in the late summer or autumn of 2003.

278. To follow the trail, let us go to the Khyam/Shujah family home in Crawley. Indeed it will be as well to remind ourselves of its location and appearance [plans p.16]. In the rear garden there is a shed-a photo at page 279 shows this rather more clearly, and can be shown on the screens. Behind that shed was found a Sainsbury's Danish Butter Cookies tin. Inside that tin was a small clear plastic bag, a larger plastic bag and 10 grip seal bags (see photos 281, 282 shown on the screens). The bags, in turn, contained a fine silver powder which turned out to be aluminium powder.

279. On one of the grip seal bags, and on a larger plastic bag, a total of three finger marks of Omar Khyam were in due course found. On one of the small grip seal plastic bags used to wrap the aluminium powder, two finger marks of Shujah were found. The essential components were complete.

280. This may be an opportune moment, therefore, to consider how these ingredients can effectively be combined into an improvised explosive device, or bomb, for shorthand. The fertiliser at Access contained 77% ammonium nitrate. As we noted from the warning on the bag, it is an oxidising agent i.e., a source of oxygen. In order to become an explosive substance, it has to be mixed with a fuel. That could be sugar or diesel or aluminium which may be, as here, in powder form.

281. The aluminium recovered was small in quantity. It would have been sufficient, when mixed with the ammonium nitrate, to have caused only a relatively small scale explosion. Whether or not this consignment of aluminium powder was only for testing and kept available for that purpose and a larger consignment hidden elsewhere was not discovered in the investigation; what is clear is that from the amount of ammonium nitrate purchased and stored, it was to be used with a much larger quantity of aluminium powder than has been found. Otherwise the majority of the ammonium nitrate would have been superfluous and attracted suspicion totally unnecessarily.

282. Moving on, you would in addition need a detonator and you would need expertise, of course, to provide a remote controlled detonation. A booster would also be required. I read to you earlier the reference by Khawaja to a booster - that is during his conversation with Omar Khyam and Shujah on 20 February, when Khawaja came to England.

283. You might also want a jamming device - that is a device to jam mobile telephones in the area to ensure that a rogue signal does not activate the explosive device when the bomber is, for example, in the course of placing it.

284. Having mixed your ammonium nitrate and aluminium, powder and placed in it a booster i.e., a small quantity of high explosive - semtex used to be fashionable - a detonator is placed within the booster. A detonator, as you may know, is perhaps the size of a pen and in essence it's a metal tube with an ignitor in it. If current passes into the ignitor, it ignites the primary explosive within the detonator and causes the explosion. That explosion, in turn of course, causes the deaths and/or damage hoped for by the members of the conspiracy. The precise results will be determined by the size of the bomb, its location and to some extent by chance - chance as to who and how many unfortunate and innocent men, women and children happen to be in the vicinity.

285. Perhaps the easiest way of illustrating what I'm talking about is to look at what Khawaja had prepared and indeed what you may think he would have demonstrated to Omar Khyam and Shujah on their visits to Universal Video when he came to the UK on the weekend of 20/22 February. When he was arrested in Canada on 29 March 2004, his home in Ottawa was, I told you, searched. If you turn to the photographs at page 20 and following in the additional jury bundle we can see some of the items which were discovered.

286. First of all let us deal with the jamming device-to provide extra security by preventing an inadvertent activation of the bomb. There are available some perfectly lawful commercial devices - they are used, for example, in hospitals to prevent transmission to mobiles for obvious reasons. Indeed, if we look at photograph at page 21, there is such a commercial device. Khawaja had it no doubt as part of his development of a more sophisticated and portable jamming device which could be carried by the bomber. That portable jamming device is shown at photograph page 31. At the top of the page we see a mobile phone. In fact, it's a totally false mobile phone with a false display, etc. It is a cellular jammer which would not attract any attention because it appears to be nothing more than a mobile phone.

287. If we go to photograph at page 24, we see the receiver or decoder board. This would receive the signal which activated the detonator. It would be powered by a battery, and we see the battery connectors to the right of the photograph, so that is the receiver, and we should note in passing that it was on a frequency of 916 MHz.

288. In order for a signal to be received, there has to be a transmitter. If we turn to page 27, we will see the home made radio frequency transmitter or encoder board. This matches the receiver which we looked at a moment ago because again, it was on a frequency of 91.6 MHz. Hence the bomb can be activated at a safe distance. Perhaps the one or two kilometres claimed by Khawaja in his email of 30 November would be optimistic, however certainly at a distance of several hundred meters.

289. You will have the full picture when we consider together the overheard conversations between Khawaja, Khyam and Shujah on the weekend of 20-22 February, the emails by which Khawaja kept Khyam up to date as to his progress in constructing the remote controlled detonator and the evidence from the expert who examined these devices discovered in Khawaja's Canadian home.

290. As we have now identified the various components required, where they were found, the Transco discs, what various defendants were overheard to say in the audio surveillance, in outline at least, it may be an opportune moment also to summarise what the defendants who chose to tender short prepared statements after being charged had to say in those statements. You will recall that all except Amin declined to answer questions, however, Khyam, Shujah, Akbar and Waheed Mahmood through their solicitors tendered such statements.

291. All made the point and this is my summary, not their exact words that they could not really comment on the audio extracts played to them in their interviews, i.e. the recordings of conversations at Hencroft House, 16 Colley House etc. This was because only part had been played, they were out of context etc. They all denied being part of any conspiracy to cause explosions. Shujah, Akbar and Waheed denied any knowledge of the fertiliser or ammonium nitrate. For his part, Akbar accepted that he had, as he put it, certain views which emerged from the audio recordings but he had not played any part in a terrorist plot and indeed he was at a loss to understand why he had been arrested.

292. Omar Khyam, on the other hand, said that he understood that the fertiliser was for gardening purposes. Moreover he had been asked to check it, to see if it had any cuts, etc., as a favour. He had collected Khawaja from the airport but again had done so as a favour and indeed while he accepted that he kept the aluminium powder at the bottom of the garden, he had thought it was paint and again he was doing it as a favour.

293. He also made the point that he was planning to travel to Pakistan on 6 April (you will recall he and Shujah had the tickets) and as he put it -"under such circumstances it is not possible for the fertiliser to be converted into a bomb."

294. You will, of course, have to evaluate that against Babar's evidence to the effect that to be out of the country when the plot came to fruition was always part of the plan. Indeed, it will of course be your task to evaluate all the evidence and assertions made on each side in order to determine where the truth lies.

295. I have, to a large extent, outlined for you the structure of the case you are to try. There are two further categories of evidence which I have to mention which you will hear. They will supplement the events which I have outlined and they are firstly telephone evidence and secondly, computer evidence.

296. In neither case will I go into any detail because to do so now would be, as I have said before, rather more confusing than illuminating. However, it is important that you know of its existence and how it may help you in considering this case. I will start with the telephone evidence.

297. As we all know, mobile telephones, and we are principally here concerned with mobiles as opposed to landlines, can be of enormous assistance to all of us in making arrangements, carrying out various activities and plans with other people. That is so whether the activity is legal or illegal.

298. To those involved in illegal activities they are perhaps absolutely essential. Communication with co-conspirators as to pushing the illegal plan forward, communication in the course of obtaining this or that commodity, transporting it, last minute changes of plan, etc., are all facilitated by mobile telephones. The other side of the coin is that they may assist the investigators if they can firstly attribute a particular mobile or number to an individual, and secondly, obtain records as to the use of that phone- who was making and receiving a call and when.

299. I referred earlier to the fact that Waheed Mahmood had emphasised to Babar that mobiles and laptops should be disposed of on a regular basis for obvious reasons of security. Accordingly, the first task for the investigator is to attribute a particular phone as being used by a particular individual. That may be on a few occasions straightforward - an individual may be the subscriber and the telephone may have been in the defendant's possession or at his home on arrest. Far more likely the phone will be unregistered and will be a pre-pay phone. If that is so, the process of attribution has to be more painstaking, however in the end, it will be equally compelling. The pattern of calls to and from partners or close associates can be linked with the fact that the name and number appear in the memory of other co-conspirators' mobiles for example, or the individual may have given his telephone number on a job or credit card application.

300. How may the records of telephone use assist? Firstly the fact that telephone calls were made to and from Bodle Brothers, Ludrose Vehicle Hire, Access Storage etc- and there were such calls- help to flesh out the evidence relating to the acquisition and storage of the ammonium nitrate. That acquisition in November 2003 pre-dated, of course, the surveillance operation.

301. Secondly, once the surveillance operation had commenced, the telephone evidence may on occasions complement that evidence. And in particular cell-site evidence may be of particular assistance. You probably know what I mean by cell-site evidence; however may I shortly set out what I mean. You will know that there are vast numbers of transmitter/receiver masts or beacons throughout the country. Whenever a mobile is activated, its scans for the nearest cell-site via which a call may be made or received. That cell location is recorded and stored with the billing records. In built-up areas such as we are concerned with in this case, it may be possible therefore to locate to a few hundred yards from where a call was made or received.

302. I give you just one example of how such evidence may compliment and add to existing evidence. I told you how the hiring of the Access storage facility was affected in Hussain's name and largely funded by him. Also he had helped in the unloading of the ammonium nitrate fertiliser. The cell site evidence can take his role further because the mobile telephone of which he was the subscriber was used in the immediate vicinity of Ludrose Vehicle Hire, at 11.41 a.m. in fact, at much the same time as Khyam and Nadeem Ashraf were actually hiring the vehicle.

303. In another way the whereabouts of the user of the mobile may support the contention that it was X and Y who were in the same area when it is suggested they were talking to each other as revealed by an audio probe at a particular address. It may not, on the other hand, but as you will appreciate it is of assistance only if calls happen to be made or received at the relevant time. If none are made there will be no cell-site activity which can be assessed.

304. As I have already mentioned, following the arrests, the various addresses connected to the defendants and of interest to the police enquiry were searched. At these addresses, both the homes of the defendants and addresses frequented by them, computers and computer data storage items (floppy discs and compact discs, for example) were recovered.

305. The computers and storage media were examined for traces of transactions which might show these computers or media retained any trace of activity connected to the conspiracy, any 'electronic footprint', if you like.

306. You will be aware that computer operating systems and many software applications lay down a record of the activity of the user in the computer's stored data. To take two obvious examples, an e-mail application will usually store the incoming and outgoing messages accessed or created by the user and a word-processing programme will often store copies of the documents written with it. A third example is that an internet access programme such as Microsoft Internet Explorer typically stores the data it downloads when a web page is viewed. You may also know that these programmes not only store this data when it is deliberately saved by the user. Sometimes these programmes save copies of the data automatically, either because the standard programme settings tell it to, or because a previous user has set the settings to do so.

307. What may not be so obvious to all is that, even where no copy is saved at all, either deliberately by the user or automatically by the software, a data trail may remain in the computer and either the whole or a part of a file of data may remain on that part of the machine in which data is stored, usually the hard disk drive.

308. This can even be the case when the user has tried deliberately to delete the file after use. The reason for this is that computer data is never truly removed from a computer unless that part of the disk drive on which it is stored while being used is later 'over-written' with new data, either by normal operation or by using a specialist disc-cleaning programme. Unless that happens, what may appear to the user as 'empty' storage space (known to computer literate people as 'unallocated space') may in fact have old data fragments still stored on it.

309. The examinations carried out in this investigation, in some instances, looked both for complete stored files and also such fragments of data in unallocated space.

310. You will in due course hear and see the results of these examinations. At this stage, it is necessary simply to outline the various ways in which the prosecution says that this material will be of assistance to you in your deliberations: in essence, the prosecution says that the 'electronic footprint revealed shows use of the computer on one or more occasions of significance, sometimes very great significance, to the issues in the trial. There are:

(1) Use of the computer or media to store or access material that may interest someone whose view of Islam may be described as extreme. By way of example: on a Phillips computer tower, recovered from Crawley, video files showing (4490) a very violent execution of a Russian soldier, (4491) a Taliban Execution, (4492) Iran Justice - showing execution by shooting with automatic weapons; (4496) Taliban execution in Kabul;

(2) Use of the computer or media to access or store material that may be of interest to someone intent on using violence for political or ideological ends. By way of example: a) Computer tower, found at Ilford address, which had on it also e-mail messages sent both to and from the defendant Garcia, an extract describing itself as an Al Qaeda manual: fifth lesson: 'Means of Communication and Transportation;' (b) on a Cybercom laptop computer found at 16, Colley House, PDF pages showing a document describing the use of mines, missiles, grenades, machine gun, combat stress control, sniper weapons, etc.;

(3) Use of the computer to send or receive messages of importance to those who wished to communicate in furtherance of the conspiracy. By way of example: (a) finding on the Computer tower in a store room at Ilford address, a message from Omar Khyam. to Garcia 12/11/03 at 17.59 'wots up nigga' (p.108) - with no other written content: its terms suggest an invitation to make contact. The use of the word 'Nigga' is distinctive to other communications; b) on a Phillips computer tower, found at Crawley, in the inbox of an e-mail account 'dawa_carrier@hotmail.com,' includes messages from Momin Khawaja dated 22/9, 3/10, 11/11, 16/11, 18/11, 22/11, 3/12 - additional emails to those we have already looked at;

(4) Use of a computer to gain immediate but temporary access to information of a type which was simply too incriminating to carry or be found in possession of in hard copy form: A clear example of this is the finding, after detailed analysis and comparison, of one part of hifidigimonster image, (identifiable by its unique data fingerprint) which the prosecution say was created by Khawaja, on one of the computers.(CEE/6) at Universal Internet Cafe, 49, Herschel Street, Slough. This computer was seized by police on 30th March 2004, some weeks after Khawaja, Khyam and Shujah Ud Din Mahmood were seen to go there on 21st February 2004, but this residual data was still present.

311. I said I would return to the Indictment and the allegations which these defendants face, which is to be found at the front of JB1. The central allegation reflected in the first count is that the defendants were involved in a conspiracy to cause an explosion or explosions. Conspiracy is a rather old fashioned word which means no more than an agreement.

312. Perhaps I should say a little more as to the nature of that conspiracy or agreement. As I emphasised before, if an individual is a party to that agreement the offence is committed - that the explosion never takes place is neither here nor there. As I mentioned also, the investigating authorities in cases of this sort have to do all they can to intercept and ensure that that event with all its terrible consequences does not take place.

313. It follows therefore at the time of that interception and the arrests of the defendant, there may be aspects or components necessary for explosions which are not yet in place. We don't know here whether the Khawaja remote controlled device, etc., had been smuggled into this country or whether the amount of aluminium powder, necessary for the sort of explosion these defendants were planning, was to hand.

314. It follows also that the precise target or targets may not have been agreed upon again providing the agreement to cause an explosion is made out, that is the offence. The ultimate agreement as to a target and the explosion might leave little opportunity for intervention even if the investigating authorities were fortunate enough to learn of it. You will remember Waheed on 19 March was contemplating Bluewater on the following day.

315. Likewise there could be no guarantee by the very nature of these things that everything would be in place by 6 April - the date of the planned removal to Pakistan. Indeed, there clearly had been some slippage in the plans. You will remember the enquiries to obtain the ammonium nitrate started in October and its actual acquisition in November. This fits in with the Khawaja email of 21 October to "look for the urea and nitro stuff," and by 28 November, Khawaja is saying "we pray to the most high we can do this in December." Then on 19 January in relation to his side of things, Khawaja is saying "its not working correctly yet - may be we need a few more days on this." Then there are the discussions as to how to get the devices into the UK and Khyam is looking at various dates to fly out - at the beginning of March, end of March or beginning of April. Alongside this is the uncertainty in March as to how long they will require the Access hiring facility for the ammonium nitrate. They may have achieved their ends by 6 April, they may not have done. Indeed, you may recall that I referred earlier to a passage of conversation when Akbar was talking to his wife. He said "They're going to train me up and probably send me back here, act like completely stupid and do a big mission, do you understand." As I say provided the agreement had been made and the defendant you are considering was a party to it, it matters not.

316. In every conspiracy, members of that conspiracy have different roles, there will be leaders within the conspiracy, they will probably have greater knowledge of the overall plot than others, there may indeed be safety in restricting detail as to contacts, potential, targets to the operating minds of the conspiracy. The members of the conspiracy will also have different roles to play, different functions to perform. Most will have acquired the training and expertise in Pakistan; others, and there will be considerable overlapping, will be concerned with the acquisition and storage of the ammonium nitrate; others will have knowledge of and access to information concerning a potential target; some will be concerned with the acquisition and storage of the aluminium powder.

317. Some may well not know detail relating to the activities of others. I give you an example. You will recall a conversation between Akbar and Hussain on 18. March when I suggested to you Hussain was trying to falsely minimise his role. To bring it back to mind, it was the conversation when he used the phrase "if I go down, I'll take everyone down with me." During that conversation while the two men are discussing the fertiliser and its storage, Akbar asked - "Where is it I forgot?" "What?" asks Hussain. "The lock-up - where if you store stuff," replies Akbar. Hussain then responds - "Big, big the size of this kitchen, yeah it's in a room, stored in a room, what it's huge, the amount of explosives there you could take yourself massive big out man."

318. Akbar has clearly forgotten precisely where it is: the acquisition and storage of the ammonium nitrate was not his essential role.

319. That conversation, as I'm referring to it, illustrates another feature of this type of conspiracy. You may have been struck by on the one hand the sensitivity to the possibility of being under surveillance or monitoring while on the other hand true names were used in hiring the Access facility, the Ludrose lorry, etc.

320. The reason for that apparent contradiction lies in the view of the participants as to the different aspects of the plot with which they happen to be dealing. It may be a rather naive approach, but they seem to take the view that in acquiring fertiliser and a lorry on which to transport the fertiliser, those items were of themselves perfectly innocent. Also of course, if storage is to be for a period of time, I suppose you have to give actual contact details as regards addresses, telephone numbers, etc.

321. This approach was illustrated in the same conversation as I've just referred to. In relation to the fertilizer, the following exchange took place - Akbar - "I don't think it's nothing dodgy. I think it's just a component which will be - its nothing to do with bombs." Hussain - "Nothing to do with bombs right." Akbar - "So what I'm saying if you get caught it doesn't sound fishy. You bought it for no apparent reason but you've never...." Hussain - "I never bought it." Akbar "That's what you're going to say innit. Or you're going to say no comment or whatever. You've done nothing fishy. Where as some of the others..." There may be arguments as to whether the purchase and storage of this amount of ammonium nitrate fertiliser by urban dwellers such as these defendants is, or is not, rather odd, however you can understand how they viewed it.

322. There are undoubtedly others involved in this plot - others who are not defendants at the back of the court. Khawaja and Babar are two of them. You will see one of those, Babar, as a witness. Other names will crop up and you will not see them. You may think the sensible course is to concentrate on those defendants in your charge.

323. If you would look at the indictment for a moment, I said I would mention counts 2 and 3. They both allege possession of an article for the purposes of terrorism. The first "article" is the 600 kg of ammonium nitrate fertiliser - that's in count 2. Count 3 relates to the aluminium powder. Count 2 is alleged against Khyam, Anthony Garcia and Nabeel Hussain to reflect their dealings with the fertiliser and count 3 against Khyam and Shujah in whose garden of course, the aluminium powder was found.

324. As I said earlier, these two counts arise out of the same facts as we are dealing with in relation to the principal count i.e., count 1. We will no doubt return to them in due course but I wouldn't worry too much about them for the moment.

325. I have tried to explain to you what this case is about and the allegations which are made and an outline of the categories of evidence I anticipate you will hear. I hope this will enable you to better understand the evidence as it's called and the issues which may arise. It is important however, that you remember that you try this case on the evidence that is given from the witness box and that which may be read to you as agreed evidence. What I say is not evidence nor, with respect, is that which my learned friends may say in due course. It is on the evidence you determine this case.

326. Burden and standard of proof.