28 February 2002
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2002 02:16:11 -0500
To: fight-censorship@vorlon.mit.edu
From: Matthew Gaylor <freematt@coil.com>
Subject: Michael Dell's statement about suspicious orders
Cc: cypherpunks@minder.net, smith2004-discuss@yahoogroups.com
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2002 01:55:38 -0500
From: Seth Finkelstein <sethf@sethf.com>
To: Matthew Gaylor <freematt@coil.com>
Cc: Brian McWilliams <brian@PC-RADIO.COM>
Subject: Michael Dell's statement about suspicious ordersThanks for the opportunity to respond to the customer issue. Please note (and post if you will), this note from Michael Dell to Dell customers, which we hope adequately explains the situation and Dell's response. Please let us know if you have additional questions.
Thanks very much, [Dell PR person]
To Our Valued Customers and Friends:
U.S. export laws restrict the sale of technology to terrorists and to people in countries that support terrorism. These laws also prohibit computer sales to people who will use the technology in developing biological or nuclear weapons. Dell strictly complies with our country's export laws in order to ensure the safety of our customers and citizens around the world. When there is reasonable cause for concern, we carefully review customer orders for prohibited destinations and activities.
When additional follow-up on an order is required, our sales representatives ask our customers four basic questions:
1. Who is the end-user?
2. Where will the product be used?
3. What will the product be used for?
4. What type of business or industry is involved?
The answers to these questions, like all customer information we gather, are confidential and are not shared outside of Dell.
We recently received an order from a customer whose company name included the word "combat." We cancelled the order to give us enough time to follow up with the customer and be assured that the sale would be in compliance with U.S. export law. However, we failed to contact the customer, and as a result, we did not deliver the order as promised, and the customer did not know why. Once we discovered our error, we apologized to the customer for this misunderstanding, as well as the inconvenience caused by the delay. This is not the service standard that we hold ourselves to at Dell, and if I were a customer who'd received similar treatment, I would be very disappointed.
We at Dell feel a strong obligation to uphold our federal law, but we have just as strong an obligation to be responsive to the needs of all our customers. I want to assure you that Dell does not discriminate against any business, regardless of the products or services they sell, nor do we discriminate against individual consumers. We do, however, sometimes make mistakes - as we did in this case.
Thank you for your support.
Sincerely,
Michael Dell
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Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2002 08:01:15 -0800
To: cypherpunks@lne.com
From: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
Subject: Re: Michael Dell's statement about suspicious orders
Michael Dell's statement is a more grievous attack on civil liberties than the original it tries to apologize for.
It is inappropriate for a company to engage in the range of considerations for domestic, non-export use of a product Dell outlines unless the company has made those considerations publicly known, and law substantiates the restrictions. Patriotism and information warfare are insufficient reasons.
Perhaps Dell has been covertly deputized to perform this role but it is more likely that it has taken it on in the same way ISPs and a slew of other zealously patriotic companies and individuals have chosen to put government interests ahead of customer and citizen privacy.
Dell's apology is a shallow cover-up of a deeper cover-up. It is likely there will be more of these as exhortations increase to take commercial advantage of inflamed panic over homeland security, demonstrated by Cheney's speech in California a few days ago and the global security summit upcoming in NYC in early March. Read the list of 77 speakers and corporate sponsors to see who is throwing fuel on the fire and anticipating firefighting:
http://www.globalprivacysummit.net/
Note the inclusion of privacy as the bait for the switch.
What to brace for are more incidents which will justify a united front of government and corporate assault on civil liberties as the terrorism machine generates lucrative economic apologies for boom time.
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2002 08:48:35 -0800
Subject: Re: Michael Dell's statement about suspicious orders
From: Tim May <tcmay@got.net>
To: cypherpunks@lne.com
On Thursday, February 28, 2002, at 08:01 AM, John Young wrote:
[Snip]
In a free society a person may sell to whom he wishes, or not sell, as he wishes.
Claims about making "considerations publicly known" and "law substantiates the restrictions" are inconsistent with a free society.
In a society not based on coercion, Dell is free to not sell to gun owners and other people they dislike...and we are free to ridicule them, launch boycotts, and try to drive them out of business.
--Tim May
"The great object is that every man be armed and everyone who is able may have a gun." --Patrick Henry
"The best we can hope for concerning the people at large is that they be properly armed." --Alexander Hamilton
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2002 08:43:36 -0800
To: cypherpunks@lne.com
From: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
Subject: Recruiting Agents
Dell's admission of vetting customer use of its products on behalf of domestic and national security, raises the issue of who else is doing that.
About ten days ago I got a telephone message from a person who claims to work for a major ISP as a sysadmin. This person had previously disclosed the ISP's cooperation with federal authorities to run a nationwide surveillance system from a central hub of the ISP, claiming that the system was set up under a memorandum of understanding when the ISP was bought by a foreign corporation. We've published this allegation on Cryptome.
We returned the call and talked about twenty minutes with the person, who said that surveillance of the Net is increasing rapidly over what he had said earlier. Then came a pitch that I get on board by vetting information sent to Cryptome with federal authorities if I thought there might be a threat to national security.
The pitch got intense.The person asked if I had criminal background. I said no. Did I believe the US had enemies.I said yes. Did I believe it was my responsibility to protect the nation. I said maybe. Was it not wise to report threats to the nation to authorities? I said no, it was wise to report them to the public so it could protect itself.
But, he said, don't you think the threats should be checked with the authorities first? No, I said, it is not for me to decide what is a threat and what is not, that my task is to make information available and let readers decide.
Wouldn't you like to boost your authority, he said, by having it supported by official authority? I said no, that I did not want authority, that such authority is widely available for those who want it from responsible sources. Instead, I said, what is needed is more information not filtered by authorities or responsible sources.
Don't get me wrong, he said, I admire what you're doing on Cryptome, and I wish I had your courage. Thanks, I said.
Still, he said, I think it would be a good idea for you to establish an ongoing relationship with the authorities so you don't get in trouble. No, I said, that is definitely not something I want to do, for if I did that it would be a betrayal of Cryptome readers.
You know, he said, I'm very troubled by what my company is doing, but I think in times of danger we all have to do what we can to protect the nation, and I think you should get in touch with the authorities to be sure information you get is okay to publish. No, I said, that's not for me, what is needed in times of danger is more information about how to protect yourself, and in times of danger authorities are often a threat as great as what they warn about.
How can you be sure of that, he said, I think you need to talk to the authorities to be sure you know what the threats are and what you are doing is okay. No, thanks, I said.
Someday, he said, I hope I have your courage, but now I have to think about my job. Agreed, I said, you should do nothing that will put you in danger, don't jeopardize you job and your family.
However, he said, I want you to think very carefully about arranging to check with the authorities about information to be published on Cryptome. Look, I said, the authorities have more than adequate means to keep track of information going on Crypotme and they don't need my help.
But you need to protect yourself, don't you see, to be sure that you are not entrapped by information sent to you for that purpose. Agreed, I said, but we were told soon after setting up Cryptome to expect entrapment efforts, so we do, and the reason we don't claim authority is to be sure readers know they have to protect themselves in the same way we do.
But wouldn't you like to be protected by the authorities, to advocate to your readers that they do the same? No, I said, that is the role of authorities and responsible publishers, not Cryptome.
__________________
I think this conversation is like many going on around the country, and shows how recruitment of agents is being done. We'd like to publish such accounts on Cryptome, anonymized or not. Send to: jya@pipeline.com. PGP public key on home page.
Vasiliy Mitrokhin, The KGB in Afghanistan, CWIHP Working Paper No. 40, February 2002, Note 54, pp. 34-35:
When a regime similar to the Soviet system is established in a country and KGB agents come to power and occupy the most senior posts, then the agent relationship with the country is interrupted and some agents become trusted contacts.
What is the difference between an agent relationship and a trusted relationship? An agent relationship in intelligence circles is a form of contact between the intelligence service and a person who has been brought into intelligence work, and to secret co-operation as an agent, either under his own flag or a false flag. An agent carries out intelligence tasks consciously, systematically and secretly according to an agreement on secret co-operation with an official representative of the intelligence service or a representative of some organization, sometimes false, whose role is being played secretly by a member or agent of the intelligence service.
A trusted relationship and trusted co-operation are a form of intelligence relations between intelligence officers who, as a rule, are concealing the fact that they belong to an intelligence service and people who are not bound by any obligations to the intelligence service but who carry out the intelligence requests of the intelligence officers in a form and within limits which are acceptable to them. Trusted contacts provide operatives with information on the basis of ideological and political compatibility, material interest, and friendly or other relations which have been established between them. The basis of the contact are the spiritual and material needs of the person, his interests and his personal characteristics which the operatives use to give him motives for a trusted relationship.
Contacts of influence are particularly important in government and political circles which are used in secret by the intelligence service to carry out active measures to influence state organs and the social and political life of the targeted country. In accepting such a relationship the foreigner tries to act on the whole within the laws and norms of the country of which he is a citizen in order not to expose himself to the threat of a criminal investigation.
But in such a relationship he does things which are outside the norms of a usual acquaintance and clearly recognizes that the operative is acting, not as a private person, but in his capacity as the representative of some institution and that he is representing not his own personal interests but the needs of the institution. The co-operation of a foreigner with the service must be secret. Unlike an agent, a trusted contact does not receive any operational training, The member of the Residency, therefore, constantly has to make sure that the confidential character and nature of the relationship has not become known to the contact's acquaintances or to possible agents of the opponent. When a confidential contact has been examined and tested, and is known to be reliable and honest, then he is asked to guarantee that he will not divulge the nature of his relationship to his associates or the special services of the opponent and that he will not use the relationship against the interests of the KGB.
Confidential relationships differ from legal relationships through the awareness and stability of the business-like dealings of the foreigner with the intelligence service. Information is obtained from him or he is directed to take certain actions, not without his knowledge but from a clear and mutual understanding between the foreigner and the intelligence officer.
The difference between the relationship with trusted contacts and the relationship with recruitment targets at a certain stage of their development is that in the former case there is a definite degree of observance or transgression by the foreigner and the member of the Residency of the lawful and administrative norms, a relatively clear divergence from the official opportunities, whereas in the latter case these limits have not yet been established and the intelligence service is trying to push the contact beyond the observance of certain legal rules.
When targeting a contact the service must know whether it is aiming to establish an agent or trusted contact relationship. The definition of the final aim must be one of the main tasks of the first steps of the targeting. In a recruitment targeting the elements of secrecy are introduced more prominently and firmly. The tasks are set more precisely and the methods to be used examined in more detail. More attention is paid to obtaining the material which to a certain extent reveals the interests of the intelligence service and its methods of working. The possible forms of recruitment and the methods to be used for the secret co-operation as an agent are explained.
In intelligence work there is one more form of secret relationship which is similar to a trusted contact. It is known as an "special unofficial contact." Only really major government and political figures are included in this category, such as heads of state and government leaders, leaders of the main political parties and the most important members of the business world, in other words, people who have serious political influence on a national and international scale. A clever and successful use of 'especially unofficial contacts' is considered a very positive contribution to the work of a Residency. Only the head of the FCD (First Chief Directorate of the KGB) has the right to open and close files on "especially unofficial contacts."