19 July 2002
Source:
http://intelligence.house.gov/Word/THSReport071702.doc
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[14 pages.]
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Counterterrorism Intelligence Capabilities and Performance Prior to 9-11
A Report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Minority
Leader
July 2002
MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM AND
HOMELAND SECURITY
Saxby Chambliss (R-GA),
Chairman
Jim Gibbons (R-Nv),
Vice-Chairman
Peter Hoekstra (R-MI)
Ray Lahood (R-IL)
Richard M. Burr (R-NC)
Terry Everett (R-AL)
Porter J. Goss (R-FL),
Ex Officio
Majority Staff:
Jay Jakub,
Subcommittee Staff Director
James Lewis,
Professional Staff Member
Krister Holladay,
Staff
Diane Roark,
Professional Staff Member
Riley Perdue,
Professional Staff Member
Kevin Schmidt,
Staff Assistant |
|
Jane Harman (D-CA),
Ranking Democrat
Gary Condit (D-CA)
Tim Roemer (D-CA)
Silvestre Reyes (D-TX)
Robert (Bud) Cramer, Jr. (D-AL)
Nancy Pelosi (D-CA),
Ex Officio
Minority Staff:
Carolyn Bartholomew,
Professional Staff Member
Beth Larson,
Professional Staff Member
Marcel Lettre,
Professional Staff Member
Wyndee Parker, Counsel,
Professional Staff Member |
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY
[Member names above omitted]
July 17, 2002
The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
Speaker of the House of Representatives
United States Congress
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Speaker:
In accordance with your instructions, and those of the Democratic Leader,
we hereby submit this report of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland
Security of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
The Subcommittee was established at your direction as a bi-partisan 'working
group' in January 2001 with a mandate to make recommendations on how to improve
America's counterterrorism and homeland security capabilities. It was later
given the responsibility to investigate the intelligence deficiencies that
existed on September 11, 2001, and its status changed to that of a subcommittee
of the Intelligence Committee.
We subsequently set about evaluating the performance of the three key agencies
charged with protecting America from the scourge of terrorism, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. This report represents our findings on the gaps in the
aforementioned agencies counterterrorism capabilities prior to 9-11, and
makes specific recommendations on how those gaps should be addressed. Because
of your expressed desire to improve Congressional oversight of counterterrorism
and homeland security, we have also included our assessment of the current
oversight situation in the House on these issues, and have offered options
for streamlining and enhancing the quality of oversight. Additional information
on terrorism and homeland security matters has been included to provide you
with a useful reference aid.
It has been our honor to serve in this bi-partisan capacity in support of
the security of all Americans. We will continue to provide you and Leader
Gephardt with our assessments, in various forms, of key issues related to
the war on terrorism during the remainder of the 107th Congress and for as
long as our work remains useful to you.
Respectfully submitted,
Saxby Chambliss
Chairman
Jane Harman
Ranking Democrat
A Report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Minority
Leader
from the
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
July 17, 2002
Executive Summary
The principal objective of this report and the work of the Subcommittee has
been to review the counterterrorism capabilities and performance of the
Intelligence Community before 9-11 in order to assess intelligence deficiencies
and reduce the risks from acts of terrorism in the future.
The terrorist attacks perpetrated on September 11, 2001 constituted a significant
strategic surprise for the United States. The failure of the Intelligence
Community (IC) to provide adequate forewarning was affected by resource
constraints and a series of questionable management decisions related to
funding priorities. Prophetically, IC leadership concluded at a high-level
offsite on September 11, 1998 that "failure to improve operations management,
resource allocation, and other key issues within the [IC], including making
substantial and sweeping changes in the way the nation collects, analyzes,
and produces intelligence, will likely result in a catastrophic systemic
intelligence failure."
The Subcommittee has found that practically every agency of the United States
Government (USG) with a counterterrorism mission uses a different definition
of terrorism. All USG agencies charged with the counterterrorism mission
should agree on a single definition, so that it would be clear what activity
constitutes a terrorist act and who should be designated a terrorist. Without
a standard definition, terrorism might be treated no differently than other
crimes. The Subcommittee supports a standard definition as follows:
"Terrorism is the illegitimate, premeditated use ofpolitically motivated
violence or the threat of violence by a sub-national group against persons
or property with the intent to coerce a government by instilling fear amongst
the populace."
The Subcommittee concludes its work for this report by reflecting on three
key areas:
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Summary findings and recommendations across agencies
-
Recommendations for congressional activity
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Questions,for further focus in the future
Summary Findings and Recommendations Across Agencies
CIA
The summary finding regarding CIA is that CIA needs to institutionalize
its sharp reorientation toward going on the offensive against terrorism.
This report also arrived at the findings and recommendations that follow.
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Keep HUMINT Mission Central. CIA is the government's national HUMINT
organization -- it has to keep this mission at its center. CIA did not
sufficiently penetrate the al-Qa'ida organization before September 11th.
Because of the perceived reduction in the threat environment in the early
to mid 1990s, and the concomitant reduction in resources for basic human
intelligence collection, there were fewer operations officers, fewer stations,
fewer agents, and fewer intelligence reports produced. This likely gave CIA
fewer opportunities for accessing agents useful in the counterterrorism campaign
and eroded overall capabilities. Several management decisions also likely
degraded CIA's CT capabilities by, for example, redirecting funds earmarked
for core, field collection and analysis to headquarters; paying insufficient
attention to CIA's unilateral CT capabilit; relying too much on liaison for
CT; and neglecting sufficient investment of foreign language training and
exploitation. The dramatic increase in resources for intelligence since 9-11
improves the outlook for CIA's CT capabilities, but only if CIA management
acknowledges and deals with the systemic problems outlined in his
report.
Recommendation: CIA leadership must ensure that HUMINT collection remains
a central core competency of the agency, and should develop additional
operational tools, in conjunction with other appropriate agencies (FBI, etc.),
penetrate terrorist cells, disrupt terrorist operations and capture and render
terrorists to law enforcement as appropriate. More core collectors need to
be put on the streets.
-
Build New Platforms. CIA needs to make long-term investments in new
platforms to collect on the al-Qa'ida target. Using both unilateral and liaison
resources will be necessary. Recognizing that liaison partners may have different
interests, maintaining a unilateral capability is of key importance. More
attention to individual al-Qa'ida network presence worldwide is
necessary.
Recommendation: CIA should ensure that a management structure is in place
to steward the multi-year investments needed to build new platforms to collect
on terrorist targets. CIA in must also ensure sufficient numbers of unilateral
CT slots in field statioi and bases.
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Forewarning of Terrorist Intentions. There were a number of pre-9-11
successes, including a number of takedowns during the Millennium. There was
also, however, intelligence acquired prior to 9-11 that, in retrospect, proved
to be directly relevant to 9-11. The ability to watchlist terrorist suspects
by CIA and in other agencies proved inadequate. Fixing some of the structural
issues identified in this report might have put CIA in a better position
to make use of such warning information.
Recommendation: CIA should lead an effort to improve watchlisting to ensure
that all relevant agencies, including FBI, Homeland Security, and others,
have access to a common database of up-to-date terrorist person-related data
collected by US government agencies and other appropriate sources. The creation
of a terrorism watchlisting unit at CIA may be a useful first step.
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Additional Attention to Foreign Language Training and Document
Exploration. CIA has paid insufficient attention to foreign language
training and documenting exploitation efforts requiring linguists. In the
most recent class of new case officers in training, less than one-third had
any language expertise. CIA also needs to focus on finding ways to provide
clearances for people with the right language skills in less commonly taught
languages for document exploitation and other linguist
needs.
Recommendation: Require all new case cfficers and analysts to achieve
a "level 3" language proficiency prior to initial deployment, and devise
a mechanism for nsuring language skill maintenance is incentivized and directly
tied to performance evaluation.
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Additional institutional support for the CT career path. CTC more
than in size from September 2001 to Spring 2002, but these officers were
not all experienced in the counterterrorism mission. CIA needs to ensure
that all training incorporates skill development to support the counterterrorism
mission, and that home basing for CTC case officers is a viable option and
is career-enhancing.
Recommendation: CIA should take immediate and sustained steps to dramatically
improve all aspects of its CT training program. Establish structures to provide
for homebasing in CTC in such a manner that ensures a normal career path
for these officers. Incorporate counterterrorism-related skill development
in all apprropriate training for case officers and analysts.
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Balance CIA's no threshold terrorist threat reporting policy. It has
been increasingly difficult for consumers to determine the reliability of
source reporting amidst the large volumes of reporting provided. One example
of a CTC summer 2001 threat report, entitled "Threat of Impending al-Qa'ida
Attack to Continue Indefinitely" illustrates the
point.
Recommendation: Internal policies, such as CTCs 'no threshold' threat
reporting policy, should be reviewed and modified to ensure that consumers
are getting the most reliaable reporting and that sufficient analysis is
applied to that product in advance of its wholesale dissemination, wherever
possible.
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Recruiting Assets. The availability and allocation of resources, including
the redirection by CIA managers of funds earmarked for core field collection
and analysis to headquarters, likely negatively impacted CIA's CT capabilities.
The excessive caution and burdensome vetting process resulting from the
guidelines on the recruitment of foreign assets and sources issued in 1995
undermined the CIA's ability and willingness to recruit assets, especially
those who would provide insights into terrorist organizations and other hard
targets. Despite a statutory requirement in December 2001 to rescind the
1995 guidelines the DCI still had not done so at the time this report was
completed.
Recommendation: The 1995 guidelines must be rescinded immediately, and
replaced with new guidelines that balance concerns about human rights behavior
and law breaking with the need for flexibility to take advantage of opportunities
to gather information on terrorist activities, as required by law.
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CIA's problems require more than just expressed commitment from senior managers.
They require sustained attention, and the subcommittee will looking for deeds
rather than words. As a start, CIA should begin to develop and implement
a strategic plan to address the shortcomings identified in this report.
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CIA may not be capable of providing information useful in preventing every
type of incident, but it can certainly manage its resources more efficiently
and effectively to enhance its CT capabilities and thereby reduce the likelihood
that future 9-11s will occur. HUMINT is one of our best hopes. We must not
squander this historic opportunity to effect lasting positive change.
FBI
The summary finding regarding FBI is that FBI's main problem going forward
is to overcome its information sharing failures. This report also arrived
at the findings and recommendations that follow.
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Enhance FBI's prevention mission. The Subcommittee has found that
FBI has has been investigating terrorist acts, but it has placed less emphasis
on preventing such acts. FBI identified many of its CT Program shortcomings
prior to 9-11, but was slow to implement necessary changes. FBI's policy
to decentralize investigations as inefficient for CT operations, especially
against the international terrorist target. FBI's CT Program was most negatively
impacted by the reticence of senior FBI mangers to institute broader
information-sharing initiatives; a failure to leverage FBI's ability to perform
joint financial operations with other U.S. government agencies against terrorists
until after 9-11; an ineffective FBI headquarters-based CT analytical capability
prior to 9-11; the failure to share field office CT expertise with the FBI
community-at-large; and critical staffing shortages of translators, interpreters,
and Special Agents with proficiency in languages native to most terrorists.
Since accepting the position as FBI Director just a few days prior to the
9-11 attacks, Robert Mueller has mandated positive, substantive changes in
the modus operandi of the FBI's CT Program.
Recommendation: "Ensuring adequate information sharing" should be communicated
throughout the Bureau as the Director's top priority, and a clear strategy
incorporating the personnel dimension, the technical dimension, and the legal
dimension of the information-sharing problem should be developed and communicated
immediately.
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Improve intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities. Significant
changes in law were made in the October 2001 USA Patriot Act and the May
2001 changes to the Attorney General's guidelines. While these may improve
intelligence gathering, FBI's analytical capabilities remain insufficient,
pending the establishment of the new Office of Intelligence.
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Address foreign language shortfalls. A January 2002 report noted that
FBI projected shortages of permanent translators and interpreters in FY 2002
and 2003, and reported backlogs of thousands of un-reviewed and untranslated
materials. In key counterterrorism languages, FBI reported having in June
2001 a critical shortage of special agents with some proficiency, and FBI
had very few translators and interpreters with native language skills in
those languages.
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Fixing Information Technology Challenges. The Webster Commission in
March 2002 noted in detail many of the information technology challenges
of the FBI. FBI has made concerted efforts to implement change to improve
technology.
Recommendation: The FBI Director should review the IT implementation strategy
to ensure that it incorporates plans to facilitate the necessary information
sharing processes needed within the intelligence and homeland security
communities.
NSA
The summary finding regarding NSA is that NSA needs to change from a passive
gatherer to a proactive hunter - a revolution in how it conducts its work.
This report also arrived the findings and recommendations that follow.
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Ensure Appropriate Intelligence Collection Priorities. The Subcommittee
found it troubling that more SIGINT resources were not devoted by NSA to
CT prior to 9-11, given the prior terrorist attacks against US interests
starting in 1983. Also lof concern is the fact that NSA hired virtually no
new employees for an extended period of time prior to 9-11, resulting in
a negative impact in overall capabilities, including
CT.
Recommendation: NSA should review its processes for setting collection
and analysis priorities to ensure that appropriate resources and effort are
devoted to important targets like CT.
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Address Analyst and Linguist Shortfalls. In April 2000, the GAO reporte
a significant shortfall in linguists at NSA. After the 9-11 attacks, this
shortfall actually increased slightly and was well below additional requirements
identified since 9-11. A long-term linguist and analyst hiring strategy is
required, as well as a methodical program to improve the skills of non-native
linguists. The solution should not be agency
specific.
Recommendation: In conjunction with the community, NSA should develop
a long-term strategyfor ensuring appropriate number of linguists are available
as well as ensuring a structure for surge linguist capabilities in unanticipated
crisis areas.
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Support Signal Research and Target Development. In the art of finding
new targets, before 9-11 NSA did not have a comprehensive, focused,
counter-terrorism target development effort. Although there were numerous
analysts conducting the mission across NSA and its collection sites, NSA
claims there were insufficient resources to conduct a focused CT-specific
target development effort. NSA needs an aggressive target development focus
against CT and other targets that should not be in competition for assets
conducting sustained collection against established targets. NSA also needs
to strengthen a cultural norm in the organization to encourage target
discovery.
Recommendation: NSA should review its signals research and target development
effort to ensure that long-term objectives in the counterterrorism effort
are met, especially in follow-on phases beyond the campaign in
Afghanistan.
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Need for worldwide collection across the global communications network.
The global communications network is increasingly digital, high-volume fiber
optic cable rather than radio frequency, internet rather than telephone,
and packet-switched rather than circuit-switched, with customer instruments
moving from fixed to mobilie. NSA has been unable to organize itself to define
and implement an integrated system that can follow the target across the
global intelligent network, beyond high-level goals and plans. NSA also needs
to develop methodologies to find non-governmental radical extremists who
are associated with international terrorist organizations but might not be
in direct contact with them. NSA also needs to balance modernization funds
across its collection systems in order to continue to produce intelligence
on CT.
Recommendation: NSA must define and implement an integrated system that
can follow a target across the global intelligent network.
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Fix Systems Development Deficiencies. NSA has fundamental acquisition
management problems. Technical solutions continue to be solved by tackling
isolated smaller "manageable" projects and lack a larger plan on how these
small projects will integrate into a whole. NSA has historically been able
to successfully develop quick reaction solutions to address crisis needs,
but has been unable to establish an effective requirements process for balancing
systems acquisition with available resources.
Recommendation: NSA should work with an outside body of experts on resource
management and organizational restructuring to ensure that its organizatignal
reform efforts currently underway appropriately align current mission needs,
expected future needs, resources, and organizational processes and
structures.
WMD
The summary finding regarding weapons of mass destruction terrorism is that
terrorist interest in CBRN weapons has been strong enough to require that
the US address this threat more vigorously than it ever has before. This
report arrived at the additional findings an recommendations that follow.
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Strong terrorist interest in CBRN. Terrorist interest in CBRN weapons
has been sufficiently strong to require that the US address this threat
vigorously with the highest priority. Bin Ladin declared in 1998 that acquiring
unconventional weapons was "a religious duty". Documents recovered from
Afghanistan show that bin Ladcn was pursuing a biological weapons research
program.
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Capabilities are not widespread. Terrorist capabilities in CBRN have
not been widespread, but determined groups could access chemical, biological,
radiological and possibly nuclear devices. Al-Qa'ida trainers prior to Sept
11th were training people in poisons. There were indicators that they possessed
small quantities of toxic industrial chemicals, World War I-era CW agents,
and biological toxins. The most lethal chemical, biological, and radiological
devices are not easy to make, but non-state actors have demonstrated the
ability to acquire or fabricate chemical and biological wealions materials,
components, and complete weapons systems. There is much concern about dirty
bombs, or radiological dispersion devices. Nuclear weapons design is much
harder, but proliferation of fissile material and of expert knowledge from
other states' weapons complexes is continued cause for concern. Our intelligence
collection needs to focus on acquiring additional information in these
areas.
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IC response. The intelligence community is the first line of defense.
A sharp focus on offensive preventive measures and deeper analysis will be
necessary. It will remain necessary to maintain aggressive intelligence and
law enforcement operations for some years to come to lower the probability
of a CBRN attack by a non-state actor on the US or its interests. A number
of intelligence products note the gaps in IC knowledge of current CBRN
capabilities of terrorists. Focused effort is more urgent than
ever.
Recommendation: Congressional oversight committees, in conjunction with
the DCI, should focus immediately on assessing improvements in IC knowledcge
of current CBRN capabilities of terrorists, as well as assist in identifying
additional operational and analytic capabilities that are required to address
the threat.
Other Issues
The report also arrived at two findings and recommendations on additional
important ssues.
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Prosecute Leaks. Several leaks have done major damage to the intelligence
community's efforts.
Recommendation: Devise a senior level mechanism for overseeing the
investigation and, where possible, the prosecution of willful leakers.
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Congress: Create a leadership staff
mechanism
Recommendation: The Subcommittee recommends the creation of senior staff
positions within the leadership of both parties to coordinate and address
terrorism and homeland security issues, and budgets, in conjunction with
the existing committees of jurisdiction.
Recommendations for Congressional Activity
In addition to the specific recommendation set forth in the chapter on
Congressional oversight, the report concluded that a number of other activities
would be usefully undertaken by Congress.
Recommendation: The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence should
continue aggressive oversight on a number of issues identified by the
Subcommittee, including: ensuring robust unilateral clandestine collection
capabilities benefiting counterterrorism collection; improving the core training
program and career path for officers in the counterterrorism discipline;
enhancing language training capabilities across the IC; continued support
to important signals research and target development sites; support to NSA
to reform its acquisition process; global coverage capability for clandestine
human inlelligence collection and analysis.
Recommendation: HPSCI should continue to work with the Director of Central
Intelligence to examine emerging proposals for formulating one or several
interagency counterterrorism analytical units.
Recommendation: The Speaker should direct the relevant committees of
jurisdiction, including HPSCI, International Relations, Armed Services, and
Judiciary to conduct a joint assessment of the effectiveness of the U.S.
government's strategy, capabilities, and budgets to combat CBRN
terrorism.
Questions for Further Focus in the Future
The Subcommittee views oversight of intelligence-related elements of terrorism
and homeland security matters as critical to strengthening U.S. security
and will concentrate on these matters in the coming months. This study has
looked back. We must also raise questions for the future. The most important
of these questions, which will assist in setting the Subcommittee's agenda
going forward, are listed below.
1. End State. What will the end-state homeland security archificture
need to look like?
2. Intelligence Components. What are the key intelligence-related
components necessary in such an architecture? Where they do not yet exist,
how must we begin to build them?
3. Security and Other American Ideals. How should we rebalance America's
need for security -- and strong intelligence and warning -- with other American
ideals, such as economic prosperity and personal liberty.
4. Intelligence Support to All Parties. As the roles of citizens,
public, and rivate sectors, and first responders begin to clarify how can
the intelligence community be fully responsive to requirements for useful
information on the nature of he terrorist threat.
5. Technology Plan. What ought to be the technological components
-- especially critical in intelligence collection and analysis i- incorporated
into the end-state homeland security architecture?
6. Legal Framework. What ought to be the legal framework guiding the
homeland security intelligence collection and analysis missions?
7. Threat Assessment and Weapons of Mass Destruction. How will the
homeland security architecture ensure a full, ongoing process for assessing
the threat, including conventional tactics of mass destruction as well as
CBRN weapons.
8. Additional Threats. Although this report focuses on new capability
to rcduce the terrorist threat, it is important that, as priorities and resources
shift other threats to our national security continue to receive sufficient
understanding, monitoring, and warning.
The subcommittee expects this report to be helpful to the joint inquiry bein
conducted by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees into the September
11 attacks. Some of the questions posed by this report may be answered in
the course of their inquiry. Others will be the focus of the subcommittee's
efforts in the weeks ahead as it continues to work to reduce the threat of
future terrorist attacks.
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