25 August 2002. Thanks to Bill Gertz and Regnery.
This presents documents in Appendix A of Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to September 11, by Bill Gertz, Regnery, Washington, D.C., published August 25, 2002.
The documents are also available in scanned multiple TIFF images:
Pages 171-195 and 207-214, transcribed below:http://cryptome.org/trace-01.zip (32 TIFF images; 781KB)Pages 196-206, Excerpts from letter of FBI Agent Coleen Rowley to FBI headquarters regarding the investigation of Zararias Moussaoui:
http://cryptome.org/trace-02.zip (11 TIFF images; 813KB)See: http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,249997,00.html
171
Appendix A
The following pages present various documents that highlight the systemic, structural, and cultural problems within the U.S. intelligence agencies that contributed to the intelligence failures surrounding September 11. Most of the documents are classified. The publisher has agreed to withhold some material from publication at the request of the U.S. intelligence community in the interest of U.S. national security.
[172 blank.]
173
A top secret report by the CIA Counterterrorist Center on the role of
Osarna bin Laden in the 1996 terrorist attack on U.S. troops in Saudi
Arabia.
TOP SECRET UMBRA
NOFORN ORCON
DCI
Counterterrorist
Center
COUNTERTERRORIST CENTER COMMENTARY
Central
Intelligence
Agency
Information Implicating Usams Bin Ladin in the Dhahran Bombing (S NF OC)
Summary (U)
MATERIAL RELATING TO COOPERATIVE INTELLIGENCE |
*****
The Report (u)
NOFORN ORCON
TOP SECRET UMBRA
174
TOP SECRET UMBRA
NOFORN ORCON
(S NF OC)
(S NF OC)
MATERIAL WITHHELD AT THE REQUEST |
2
NOFORN ORCON
TOP SECRET UMBRA
175
TOP SECRET UMBRA
NOFORN ORCON
(S NF OC)
MATERIAL WITHHELD AT THE REQUEST |
3
NOFORN ORCON
TOP SECRET UMBRA
176
TOP SECRET UMBRA
NOFORN ORCON
(TS U NF OC)
Difficulties in Verifying the Information (S)
MATERIAL WITHHELD AT THE REQUEST |
Our capability to confirm
is extremely limited.
(TS U NF OC)
4
NOFORN ORCON
TOP SECRET UMBRA
177
A top secret report from the National Security Agency Operations Center
with a section on "Terrorism Around the World."
TOP SECRET UMBRA
NSA - NSOC Information as of 0500L Wednesday 7 May 1997 |
RESOURCE EMPHASIS (U)
MATERIAL RELATING TO ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE |
TERRORISM AROUND THE WORLD (C)
HANDLE VIA TALENT KEYHOLE/COMINT CHANNELS JOINTLY
TOP SECRET UMBRA GAMMA ORCON US ONLY
178
A secret report on the arrest of a top aide to Osama bin Laden.
May 7,1997
________________________________________________________________
| |
| S E C R E T SPOKE ORCON US/UK EYES ONLY |
|________________________________________________________________|
SUBJ: USAMA BIN LADEN: SENIOR BIN LADEN FINANCIAL OFFICIAL UNDER
ARREST IN UNSPECIFIED COUNTRY (SC-OC-US/UK EYES ONLY)
<TEXT>
REQS: 0R9011 2R1764 4R1765 2R1884 4R1795
TEXT: ((DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED
BY ORIGINATOR))
MATERIAL WITHHELD AT THE REQUEST |
- - - - - - - - - - TEAR LINE - - - - - - - - - -
SECRET
REL UK
062100Z MAY 97
"THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN AN
IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL INVESTIGATIVE LEADS. IT CANNOT BE USED
IN AFFIDAVITS, COURT PROCEEDINGS, SUBPOENAS, OR FOR OTHER LEGAL OR
JUDICIAL PURPOSES."
SENIOR BIN LADEN FINANCIAL OFFICIAL UNDER ARREST IN UNSPECIFIED
COUNTRY (S-REL-UK)
(S-REL-UK) ABU FADEL, A SENIOR OFFICIAL OF ISLAMIC EXTREMIST
FINANCIER USAMA BIN LADEN'S ORGANIZATION, IS UNDER ARREST IN AN
UNSPECIFIED COUNTRY, ACCORDING TO EARLY MAY INFORMATION. ABU FADEL
IS AN ALIAS USED BY A KEY BIN LADEN FINANCIAL OFFICIAL, SIDI
AL-NADANI AL-GRAZI MUSTAFA AL-TAYYIB.
SECRET
REL UK
- - - - - - - - - - TEAR LINE - - - - - - - - - -
________________________________________________________________
| |
| S E C R E T SPOKE ORCON US/UK EYES ONLY |
|________________________________________________________________|
179
A secret report from a U.S. Embassy about a tip that an Islamic terrorist
had been granted a visa to travel to the United States in the late
1990s.
PTP2901
SECRET PTP2901
PAGE 01
@ACTION: SCT(00)
@INFO: A(00) DSCC(00) G(00) M(00) P(00)
PA(00) PRS(00) SSEX(00) WO(00)
===================
ACTION SCT-00
MATERIAL WITHHELD AT THE REQUEST |
FM AMEMBASSY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
AMEMBASSY
S E C R E T
TERREP
NOFORN
E.O.
TAGS:
SUBJECT: REPORT THAT AN ALLEGED MEMBER OF
RECEIVED A VISA FOR TRAVEL
TO THE U.S.
REF: (A) CAIRO 04443, (B) CAIRO O4477
1. CLASSIFIED
2. SUMMARY: Consular Offier received a
call from an individual who identified himself as
claimed that who
he identified as a member of
received a visa to travel to the United States.
consular records checks revealed no issuance.
ROAL record check revealed no identifiable traces. END
SUMMARY
3. Consular Officer received a telephone
call from an individual who identified himself as
claimed to be a U.S. Citizen
residing in He stated that, at some
danger to himself, he was calling to warn U.S.
authorities that a member of
180
is attempting to travel to the United
States.
3. identified the group member as
is described as a 27-year old, white male (NFI).
According to received a visa o/a
Place of issuance unknown.
allegedly told the iasuing Consular Officer that
he intended to travel for business purposes to the
state of is allegedly accompanied by his
4. A search of consular files at AmEmbassy
revealed no visa issuance for a CLASS
checks revealed a hit on the name
and indicated a visa refusal in
A hit on the name
indicated a visa refusal, also in
Additional CLASS hits were yielded by
the none, however, matched the information
provided by the callar.
5. CLASS checks on the name were
negative.
6. record checks revealed no identifiable traces
on any of the above listed names.
SECRET
MATERIAL WITHHELD AT THE REQUEST |
181
A top secret report from the director of the National Security Agency
revealing that Iraq had been notified that a U.S. attack on Iraq was
close.
TOP SECRET UMBRA
DATE: 2 February 1998
FROM: DIRNSA
TO: NSA/SPECIAL-HCO
EXCLUSIVE FOR:
MATERIAL WITHHELD AT THE REQUEST |
INFO:
TOP SECRET UMBRA ORCON US ONLY
SERIAL:
TAGS:
SUBJ: Iraq/Crisis:
REQS:
TEXT: Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
(TSC-OC-UO)
DETAILS (U)
(TSC-OC-UO)
US ONLY
AORCON
TOP SECRET UMBRA
182
TOP SECRET UMBRA
Z-I3/00/97-98
2 February 1998
Page 2 of 2
(TSC-OC-UO)
MATERIAL WITHHELD AT THE REQUEST |
For dissemination/distribution questions, call P0213: NSTS: 963-3850; STU-III: 301-888-7383
Derived From:
Declassify ON:
US ONLY
AORCON
TOP SECRET UMBRA
183
Portion of a U.S government intelligence report indicating that Osama
bin Laden may be seeking asylum in Iran.
(CONFIDENTIAL) 9. Iran/Terrorism: Bin Ladin Asylum?
MATERIAL WITHHELD AT THE REQUEST |
184
A portion of the CIA's top secret daily intelligence summary reporting
the director of Central Intelligence's list of potential hot spots around
the world.
Top Secret
UMBRA
DCI Warning Committee Watchlist Summary
5 January 1998
________________________________________________________________
The following show the likelihood of a serious threat developing over the next
six months. (C)
Level of concern
(as compared to one week ago)
Chances of occurring are as high as 5 in 10
Confrontation between Iraq and US/coalition: Additional standoffs
likely when UN tries
to conduct intrusive inspections.
Major unrest In Nigeria: Abacha foils 21 December coup; more arrests likely.
Chances of occurring are as high as 3 in 10
Fighting In Bosnia: Plavsic likely to form "govemment of experts" with Socialists and Muslims.
Violence in Serbia-Kosovo: More Kosovar demonstrations and terrorist attacks are likely and they will test Serb restraint.
Conflict In the Aegean: Announced Turkish training in the Aegean will increase tension.
Loss of regime control In North Korea: P'yongyang will need massive food aid this year.
Direct fighting between Palestinian and Israeli forces: Israel's redeployment proposal unlikely to meet Palestinian minimum requirements; Netanyahu's control of government increasingly tenuous.
Instability in Haiti: Political impasse remains as economic problems mount.
Significant Instability in Colombia: Fighting among guerilla, paramilitary elements, and the government continues.
Breakdown of Angolan peace process: If UN peacekeepers depart as scheduled on 1 February, security vacuum may spark fighting.
________________________________________________________________
Secret NOFORN
361034PM6 1-98
Top Secret
5 January 1998
185
An article from the CIA's top secret daily intelligence summary highlighting
the involvement of Osama bin Laden in illegal narcotics trafficking in
Afghanistan in the late 1990s.
Afghanistan: Drugs and Terror Nexus (C/NF)
Afghanistan-based terrorism financier Usama bin Ladin recently may have agreed
to a Taleban request to fund the repair of an irrigation canal in Helmand
province, displacing a
NGO that had planned to rebuild the canal as part of a larger
anti-narcotics crop-substitution program,
Reconstruction of the canal, which was destroyed during the war, was to cost
the NGO $250,000 and, when completed, would irrigate 150,000 acres of land.
(C)
Afghanistan is the world's second largest illicit opium producer and Helmand province is the country's top opium-producing region; last year it yielded an estimated 690 metric tons of opium on some 53,000 acres, (S/USO)
Comment: Repair of the canal will aid the cultivation of opium poppy, reportedly an important source of revenue for the Taleban. Bin Ladin, who does not have strong personal or ideological ties to the Taleban, probably believes he is buying insurance against US attempts to persuade the Taleban to expel him. The Taleban, in soliciting bin Ladin's funding for the irrigation scheme, are probably seeking to avoid the tough conditions of US-funding that require measurable reductions in opium cultivation. (S/US0)
(SECRET/US
ONLY)
__________________________________________________________________
TOP SECRET CODEWORD/EXDIS May 6,1997
186
An article from the CIA's top secret daily intelligence summary on the
terrorist targeting of the U.S. military headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia.
Top Secret
UMBRA
SAUDI ARABIA: Signs Of Targeting US Compound in Riyadh (S)
MATERIAL WITHHELD AT THE REQUEST |
-- The Embassy and US military have taken steps to enhance security and relocate Personnel stationed there. (S NF)
-- In another, widely reported fax early last week, another group -- the Islamic Movement for Change, had claimed responsibility for the Al Khubar Towers bombing and threatened an attack on the US, implying that the attack would be soon. This group had previously claimed responsibility for the bombing in November of the Saudi Arabian National Guard building in Riyadh.
-- Neither statement provides details to support the claims, and neither can be verified. (S NF) -CIA, DIA-
Top Secret
24 July 1996
187
Top Secret
UMBRA
________________________________________________________________
Saudi Arabia; US Military Training Mission. Central Riyadh,
20 July 1996 (U)
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH OF U.S. MILITARY HEADQUARTERS IN |
Secret NOFORN
Top Secret
24 July 1996
188
A top secret CIA article on the involvement of Afghanistan's Taliban militia
in the drug trade.
Top Secret
UMBRA
AFGHANISTAN: Tallban Drug Trade Connection (C NF)
Kabul has issued a statement defending its record on counternarcotics and accusing its opponents of involvement in the drug trade, Kabul's statement singles out regions held by Taliban as particularly active in the drug trade. (C NF)
Became all major political factions in Afghanistan are involved in the drug trade to some degree, Kabul's claims appear self-serving. Nevertheless, report Taliban complicity -- if not direct involvement -- with opium poppy cultivation and opiate trafficking.
-- indicates Taliban is facilitating drug trafficking in exchange for shipments of food and fuel.-- indicates that most of the opium-producing areas in Afghanistan are in regions controlled by Taliban.
-- Taliban collects a "religious tax" on poppy cultivation, according to
MATERIAL WITHHELD AT THE REQUEST |
Taliban has repeatedly stated that opiate production, trafficking, and use are forbidden under Islamic law. however, state that Taliban officials realize the lack of economic alternatives makes stemming the drug trade difficult.
-- Claims of direct Taliban involvement in the drug trade, and subsequent Taliban denial of such involvement, may continue as Afghanistan's opposing factions jockey for international political support and assistance. (S NF) -CIA, DIA-
Top Secret
17 June 1996
4
189
A top secret CIA article about Islamic terrorists in Egypt.
Top Secret
UMBRA
EGYPT: Terrorists Divided but Still Dangerous (S NF)
More than a month after the attack in Luxor, the Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya is beset by growing divisiveness over its killing of 60 foreign tourists. The attack sparked public criticism by some of its leaders living abroad and leaders jailed in Egypt about the group's strategy and targets. (S NF)
-- The group appears to have begun recruiting outside its traditional target population -- three of the Luxor terrorists were advanced university students with no police record.-- The attackers may have been trained in Egypt rather than abroad. (S NF OC)
Role of Foreign Supporters (C)
say that foreign support has become increasingly important to al-Gama'at, however, and the group may have carried out the attack to impress them.
-- operational leader Hamza resides in Afghanistan, possibly with bin Ladin, and indicates other Egyptian extremists arc moving there.-- Iran is providing Egyptian extremist groups with training, logisfic, and financial support,
Threats of More Attacks (S NF)
Hardline al-Gama'at elements are threatening more attacks if Cairo continues to crack down on them.
MATERIAL WITHHELD AT THE REQUEST |
Top Secret
5 January 1998
10
190
Top Secret
UMBRA
-- A truck bomb attack there in late 1995 by the Egyptian al-Jihad group killed 17 people and nearly destroyed the building. (TS U NF OC)
Al-Gama'at's renewed willingness to challenge the Egyptian Government, its
closer ties to ardent anti-US supporters, and its determination to appear
strong in the midst of serious internal wrangling could lead it to conduct
more spectacular attacks, including against a US target. The group still
has skilled operatives in Egypt and abroad who are capable of such an operation.
(S NF) -CIA. DIA, NSA-
Top Secret
5 January 1998
11
191
A top secret National Security Agency report about a terrorist attack
in Egypt.
TOP SECRET UMBRA
Information as of 0500 EST 05 January 1998
MATERIAL WITHHELD AT THE REQUEST |
TOP SECRET UMBRA GAMMA ORCON NOFORN
192
A top secret National Security Agency report by the W Group of the National
Security Operations Center.
TOP SECRET UMBRA ORCON NOFORN
TOP SECRET UMBRA ORCON US ONLY
****************************************************************
****************************************************************
W GROUP NSOC DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
Wednesday 07 MAY 1997
****************************************************************
****************************************************************
* * * PROPOSED BRIEFING ITEMS * * *
Hamas Acquires Missiles for Attack
* * * SIGNIFICANT PRODUCT * * *
Senior Bin Laden Financial Official Under Arrest in Unspecified Country
(SC OC US/UK ONLY)
MATERIAL WITHHELD AT THE REQUEST
OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS.
Narcotics Trafficking Kingpin to Resume
Operations Following 3-Month Hiatus, (TSC OC)
Iran's Chinese-Supplied Glass-Lined Equipment Factory to be Completed By
End of Lack of Raw Materials May Delay Its Commissioning (TSC OC
US/AUS/CAN/UK ONLY)
(TSC OC US/AUS/CAN/UK ONLY) Iran's Chinese-supplied glass-lined
equipment production plant will be complete by the end of June 1997.
193
A top secret report from the intelligence facility in Cheltenham,
England.
FM DIRNSA TO CIA // // STATE/RCI // //
MATERIAL WITHHELD AT THE REQUEST OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS.
WHITE HOUSE FBI T O P S E C R E T UMBRA GAMMA ORCON QQQQ WARNING: THIS IS HIGHLY SENSITIVE GAMMA CONTROLLED COMINT
194
TAGS: SUBJ: REQS: WARNING: Dissemination among U.S. customers of the information in this report is subject to special control. TEXT: KEY POINTS
MATERIAL WITHHELD AT THE REQUEST OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS.
DETAILS
195
MATERIAL WITHHELD AT THE REQUEST |
Footnotes: DECL: OADR NNNN
Pages 196-206
Excerpts from letter of FBI special agent Coleen Rowley to FBI headquarters regarding the investigation of Zararias Moussaoui. She alleges FBI missteps and management failures, and charges that the FBI failed to respond to September 11 warning signs.
See: http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,249997,00.html
Or: http://cryptome.org/trace-02.htm
207
A letter from CIA director George Tenet on the CIA's "diversity management"
effort.
If, in the 21st Century, we are to continue to succeed in our global Mission, the men and women of US Intelligence are going to have to be smarter, bolder and more agile than ever before -- and we are going to have to become a much more diverse Intelligence Community.
This is not a matter of political correctness. Just as the business community does, we in the Intelligence Community must see Diversity as a corporate imperative -- a strategic goal. Our people are our most precious assets -- not satellites, or light tables or high speed computers. To meet the world-wide challenges of coming decades, our Community will need to attract, train and retain talented employees who have a deep understanding of other societies, cultures and languages. And we must be able to compete with private industry for the best and brightest from all across America.
I challenge each and every one of you to join me in increasing and nurturing diversity within our ranks. Each and every one of us can find ways to ensure that our Intelligence Community is a vibrant place where gifted Americans from all ethnic backgrounds and fields of expertise want to work. A Community where diversity is welcome and a variety of views is sought and heard. A Community where equal opportunities for training and advancement are afforded to all. A Community where our people are valued for the content of their characters and the quality of their work. In short, a Community that embodies American excellence, American values, and American ideals.
I consider the advancement of Diversity to be a vital part of our Strategic Plan for the Intelligence Community. By employing Diversity as a powerful tool, together we can build a workforce that is strongly equipped to deal with a 21st Century world full of challenges and opporoxities for our nation. I urge your active support of our Community's Diversity efforts.
Sincerely,
[Signature]
George J. Tenet
UNCLASSIFIED
2
208
Portions of a classified Republic of the Philippines intelligence report
reveal that, as early as 1995, terrorists linked to al Qaeda were planning
to use aircraft packed with explosives for a "suicide bombing" of CIA
headquarters.
Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
National Police Commission
National Headquarters Philippine National Police
INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION GROUP
Camp Crame, Quezon City
09 January 1995
____________________________________________
Seizure of Terrorist Documents and Material
in Malate, Metro Manila
____________________________________________
1. BACKGROUND
Analysis of seized documents, materials and computer printouts generated through the decoded Toshiba laptop computer was conducted in two (2) separate analysis sessions on 08 January 1995 by SIG-IC analysts. assisted by CIG-IC researchers.
[Illegible] session was conducted frp, 081400 - 081800 January and the second session was conducted from 082300 - 090330 January 1995. These analysis sessions were conducted at the SIG-IC office, Crame, Quezon City.
The report seeks to present several highlights on the terrorist plans and related information and background information on three (3) terrorist conspirators. A brief discussion on the PAL plane explosion in Narita Airport is likewise presented in the report. Concluding the document [text missing]
209
5. At Hongkong Airport, SAEED AKMAN will wait for the flight schedule of UA FL Nr 02 bound for Singapore. He will board the plane and plant the bomb following the pattern he had undertaken with UA FL NR 01.
6. The long-time detonating period of the. bombs planted at the bathrooms of the UA FL NRS 01 and 02 is good for four (4) days. It is estimated that when the UA FL NR 01 return flight from LOS ANGELES is approaching HONGKONG and the UA FL NR 02 is on its return flight from SINGAPORE and is similarly approaching, the two (2) bombs will simultaneously explode in the air.
After the successful terrorist attacks, SAEED will rendezvous with ABDUL BASIT in Karachi, PAKISTAN sometime last week of January 1994.
| A future bombing target to be executed by SAEED AKMAN is principally directed on the CIA Headquarters in Langley, VIRGINIA. The document specifically cited the charter service of a commercial type aircraft loaded with powerful bombs to be dived-crashed by SAEED AKMAN. This is apparently intended to demonstrate to the whole world that a Muslim martyr is ready and determined to die for the glorification of Islam. There are no other details on this specific suicide bombing plan. |
VI. THE PAL PLANE EXPLOSION IN NARITA AIRPORT, JAPAN
Several entries on a document specifically cited the involvement of ABDUL BASIT MAMMOD ABDUL KARIM In the PAL plane explosion in Narita Airport, Japan. Information lifted from the document clearly indicates that ABDUL BASIT was responsible In the planting of the nitro glycerin bomb in the PAL plane with flight route Manila-Cebu-Narita.
ARDUL BASIT planted thebomb at a life jacket at a time when the airplane passengers were taking their snacks. It appeared that he transferred seat when he planted the bomb at the Mactan International Airport. ABDUL waited for the arrival of another domestic flight bound for Manila.
210
A classified Philippines government document based on debriefing of an
al Qaeda terrorist shows that the group was planning attacks on U.S. nuclear
power plants and CIA headquarters as early as 1994.
AFTER DEBRIEFING
===================================================
1. The [illegible] information provided by Abdullah Hakim HASHIM MURAD debriefing [illegible] on 10 April 1995.
a. [Illegible] BASIT was staying with MURAD apartment, [illegible] idea of conducting an attack [illegible] Prime Minister [illegible].
b. MURAD denies knowledge on Munir IBRAHIM [illegible] Abdul MADANI and [illegible] BALUCH but he provided the followingi data about Abdul SHAKOOR nad [sic] [illegible] AL-BAHAR.
Abdul SHAKOORNationality: Pakistani
Height: 5'5 (approx.)
Weight: 65 Kils (appox.)
Age: 24 yrs old
Build: Medium
Occupation: None
Address: Liari, Karachi, Pakistan
Subject formerly resided in Kuwait [illegible] Pakistan together with his familiy when the Gulf War broke [illegible] with BASIT when [illegible] the six (6) months explosive training in Pakistan. However, he was able to complete only two (2) weeks of said training. Apparently, BASIT liked him because of his being immature [illegible] often disregard [illegible] which the former asked him to accomplish.
Yagoob AL-BAHAR (not AL-BAKAR)
Subject is a Saudia national. He fought in Afghan war for fourteen (14) years. He went to Tajakistan after the Afghan war and fought wfth the Tajiks against the Russian. He died thereat in 1994.
c. Murad denies familiarity regarding Al-Majid Importers Exporters Company. Nevertheless he disclosed that Sharafabad Chowrang is an apartment located in Karachi wherein Abdul MAJID used to stay.
d. In mid 1993, BASIT have had an accident while he was making detonators from lead azide. MURAD did not know exactly why BASIT was making said detonators, however, he has a feeling then that the BASIT is planning to attack PM Benazir BHUTTO since it was during said period that they were discussing the idea of attacking the PM. Said accident was the first one that
211
BASIT had expeienced. The second was when he provided explosive training to Murad. it almost come to explosion when he carelessly mixed several kinds of chemicals inside a container. The third was when he drunk the sulfuric acid that he had poured into a medicine bottle which he had mistaken as the softdrink that he poured into the same kind of bottle. His face was burned during the said accident.
e. In his plan to attack the US Consulate office In Karachi, he intends to.use an improvised rocket that he learned to assemble during his training in Afghanistan. It was drawn in the notes of MURAD which was among the items confiscated during the raid of apartment 603.
| f. The plan to attack US nuclear station was discussed in Quetta in October 1994 while the idea of attacking the CIA headquarters was discussed in the Philippines in December 1994 as conceptualized by MURAD. |
g. BASIT sent to MURAD in Dubai, through a money changer company whose office
in Dubai is located in place called AL-KHOUR.
212
A secret Philippines intelligence report based on the debriefing of an
al Qaeda terrorist reveals how homemade bombs were
constructed.
SECRET
Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
I N T E L L I G E N C E C O M M A N D
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION GROUP
Camp Crame, Quezon City
21 February 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Case Director
Case Supervisor
SUBJECT: Debriefing Report
1. The following are the information obtained during the
debriefing conducted to ABDUL HASIM JURAD on 21 February 195.
a. MURAD stressed that there was no bomb that he and
BASIT had manufactured or completbd priof to his arrest. However,
he claims that during the raid of apartment 603, one policeman
showed him one (1) pipe bomb. which according to the latter was
already completed. Nevertheless, he cannot ascertain the truth-
fulness of the policeman's claim for as far as he is concerned,
there was no bomb that he and BASIT have had manufactured during
his stay in said apartment.
b. Before his arrest, MURAD is supposed to make one (1)
320 ml and (1) 350 ml nitroglycerine bombs which he will be
placing in (2) bottles of contact-lenses cleaning liquid. Said
bombs are the ones he supposedly use in the plot to bomb US air
carriers. Likewise, he is supposed to bring with him some nitro-
cellulose which he will be placing inside the bottles of nitro-
glycerine after passing through the X-Ray machines. Said nitro-
cellulose is in a form of cotton balls dipped in a mixture of
citric and nitric acids and is being use to increases the sta-
bility of nitroglycerine. BASIT is the one supposed to make said
nitrocellulose.
Nevertheless, he was able to make two (2) sets of
timing devices from the four (4) casio wristwatches that he and
BASIT bought from Shangri-La Plaza. He disclosed that two (2)
wristwatches is needed in making a set of timing device capable
of a four (4) days delay of detonation.
On the other hand, BASIT is supposed to make three (3)
to four (4) sets of acetone broxide pipe bombs intended for the
bombing of the Pope. Likewise, he was expected to make a remote
control device from a handheld Icom radio which he will be using
in detonating said bombs.
SECRET
213
SECRET
c. MURAD further stressed that thert~ was no bomb that
they have completed prior to his arrest, hence, there wasn't any
bomb that has been transferred or taken to another location.
d. MURAD was given an assufance that the nitroglycerine
can easily pass through the airport's X-Ray machine and was
advised to follow the normal procedure in boarding an aircraft.
e. MURAD is not aware whether BASIT or any of the lat-
ter's companions have contacts with any airport, travel agency,
cargo company or any group of the tourism industry.
f. MURAD denies knowledge of any terrorist conducting
surveillance of any airport.
g. In the plot to bomb US air carriers, MURAD is ex-
pected to use first class ticket which BASIT will provide.
h. MURAD had used first class ticket once during his
travel from Pakistan to Dubai.
i. MURAD claimed that they prefer to use chemicals in
making explosives since they can easily acquire same. Likewise,
explosives made from chemicals can easily pass on through air-
ports' X-Ray machines because of its low density characteristic.
Thus, he denies knowledge of any terrorist groups or individuals
who use SEMTEX, C4 and the likes.
j. MURAD claimed that he use to follow legitimate or
normal procedure in making flight reservations and he is not
aware whether BASIT and his companions are doing same. Hence, he
denies knowledge on specific travel agency being used by the
latter.
k. MURAD claimed that BASIT and AHMAD AJAJ purchased
Scandinavian passports from Peshawar, Pakistan sometime in Novem-
ber 1992. The duo used said passports during their trip to New
York. However, he do not know from whom did the duo purchased
same and he has no knowledge on the names listed in the said
passports.
1. The only commercial or recreational places known to
MURAD wherein BASIT used to meet his companions is the Seven
Eleven Store located at M. Adriatico Street in Malate and a
Karaoke Bar located along A. Mabini Street in Manila.
m. MURAD claimed that he has no knowledge regarding the
personalities of BASIT's contacts in Algeria and Egypt. He knew
BASIT's contacts in said countries are his former classmates in
the Mujaheedin training that the latter had undergope in Jalala-
bad, Afghanistan. Likewise, he has never seen or observed BASIT
making phonecall any individual in said countries.
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n. MURAD recalls that BASIT told him once that "someday
the Liberation Army will grow and become an independent and
structured organization". Said statement made MURAD speculate
that BASIT is planning to form his own terrorist orgpnization.
o. BASIT had travelled in Asia specifically in Singa-
pore, Hongkong and the Philippines looking for a place wherein
the standard of living is considerably low. Thus, he had chosen
the Philippines to be his base country in Asia because of the low
standard of living. Likewise, it is the only country in Asia
wherein he contacted and had a formal meeting with fellow Muslim
extremists.
2. For information.
Case officer
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