12 June 2002
Source:
http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/latest&f=02061103.plt&t=/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml
US Department of State
International Information Programs
Washington File
_________________________________
11 June 2002
(State Department official outlines efforts at Senate hearing June 11)
(2270)
The United States has broadened and strengthened its efforts, over the
past 15 years, to deal with threats stemming from the proliferation of
unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), but "we will need to keep working hard
to keep pace with the threat," a key State Department nonproliferation
official says.
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation Vann Van Diepen
told a Senate subcommittee June 11 that UAVs are potential delivery
systems for weapons of mass destruction, and "there is a potential for
terrorist groups to produce or acquire small UAVs and use them for CBW
(chemical and biological weapons) delivery."
He said the United States has attempted to use aggressively "a broad
spectrum of measures" to affect various aspects of the UAV
proliferation threat, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,
U.S. and multilateral export controls, the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) guidelines, sanctions against foreign governments
involved in proliferation activity, military and intelligence
capabilities, and diplomacy.
"Energetic U.S. use of all of these tools, and intensive cooperation
with our friends and allies, have had a positive impact in impeding
the UAV proliferation threat," he said before the Senate Governmental
Affairs subcommittee on international security, proliferation and
federal services.
But Van Diepen warned that "our adversaries are determined," and the
increasing reliance on UAVs worldwide (including in civilian roles)
and the dual-use nature of much UAV technology "will make our job more
difficult in the future."
Following is the prepared text of Van Diepen's testimony:
(begin text)
Testimony of Vann Van Diepen
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation
Provided to the Senate Governmental Affairs
Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation
and Federal Services
June 11, 2002
Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, and Members of the Committee:
It is my privilege to testify before you on behalf of the State
Department on the important subject of the proliferation implications
of cruise missiles and unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). These systems
provide important capabilities to the U.S. and its friends and allies,
and in the hands of our adversaries can pose substantial threats. I
will discuss briefly the threat potential from the proliferation of
cruise missiles and UAVs, and then describe the steps that the U.S.
and our nonproliferation partners have been taking to impede that
threat.
What are UAVs?
"Unmanned air vehicles" is the term used in the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) to refer to unmanned systems that fly within the
atmosphere and are not rocket-propelled. Different terms may be used
in other contexts, but for MTCR purposes this term includes cruise
missiles, as well as target drones, reconnaissance drones, and other
forms of UAVs, be they military or civilian, armed or unarmed. UAVs
can be as large as a jetliner or as small as a model airplane, can be
jet or propeller driven; there are even concepts for guided, unmanned
blimps that would be UAVs.
Uses of UAVs.
UAVs have been in military service since at least the use of the V-1
cruise missile and target drones in World War II. Since then, their
use has grown dramatically in land-attack (in ground-, sea-, and
air-launched modes), reconnaissance, as targets, and even in some
civilian applications such as pipeline inspection and crop-dusting.
The U.S. military is at the cutting edge, with nuclear-armed cruise
missiles in the inventory for over 20 years, and extensive use of
conventionally armed cruise missiles and of reconnaissance UAVs in the
Gulf War and most of our subsequent military engagements. As UAVs
become more capable (as in the recent use of armed UAVs in
Afghanistan), they are taking on more missions that have been
exclusively the province of manned aircraft; this is expected to grow
in the future, with the further development of so called Unmanned
Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs).
The UAV proliferation threat.
These same attributes of UAVs that are so useful for the U.S. military
-- for example, the ability to strike targets with precision and
substantial protection from interception and to collect real-time
intelligence -- make UAVs in the hands of our adversaries a threat to
us and to our friends and allies. Moreover, UAVs are potential
delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and indeed are
ideally suited for the delivery of chemical and biological weapons
(CBW) given UAVs' ability to disseminate aerosols in the right places
at the right altitudes. And while, thus far, the primary concern for
adversary use of WMD-armed UAVs has been with nation-states -- such as
Iraq, which has been converting L-29 trainer aircraft to UAVs for
probable CBW use -- there is a potential for terrorist groups to
produce or acquire small UAVs and use them for CBW delivery.
Dealing with the UAV proliferation threat.
U.S. efforts to impede threats stemming from the proliferation of UAVs
and their technology encompass a broad spectrum of measures. As in
other nonproliferation areas, the U.S. attempts to use aggressively
all of these tools to affect various aspects of the UAV proliferation
threat.
-- Norms: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty prohibits the
acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon states, and the
Biological Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention prohibit
the acquisition of CBW. This helps dissuade new countries from getting
into the WMD (and thus, WMD-delivery) business, impedes and
de-legitimizes WMD proliferation, and supports the other measures the
U.S. takes to fight proliferation. In addition, the MTCR Guidelines
serve as a de facto norm against exports in support of delivery UAVs.
-- Export controls: U.S. and multilateral export controls help deny
proliferators access to the Western technology (the best technology)
that might be misused to develop WMD delivery systems, making
adversary UAV programs slower, more costly, and less effective and
reliable.
MTCR Category I. The MTCR from its inception in 1987 subjected exports
of UAVs inherently capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg
to a range of at least 300 km (so-called "Category I" or "MTCR-class"
UAVs) and their directly associated technology to an unconditional
"strong presumption of denial." Exports of complete guidance sets and
warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing subsystems useable in such UAVs,
and their directly associated technology, also are subject to a
"strong presumption of denial." Exports of the specially designed
production facilities for Category I UAVs and their complete
subsystems, and the technology directly associated with such
facilities, are prohibited. (Of course, these strictures apply only to
MTCR members and unilateral adherents.)
MTCR Category II. Key components and materials useable in producing
MTCR-class UAVs -- such as small, fuel-efficient jet engines;
structural composites and their production equipment; various types of
avionics, guidance, and flight control systems; telemetry and ground
support equipment; various test equipment; and stealth technology --
are controlled as MTCR Category II items. MTCR countries review
exports of such items on a case-by-case basis against specified
nonproliferation criteria, and such exports are subject to a "strong
presumption of denial" if judged to be intended for use in WMD
delivery. In 1994, additional UAVs -- those not captured under
Category I, but inherently capable of a 300 km range regardless of
payload -- were added Category II MTCR controls.
Wassenaar. In addition to being controlled under the MTCR, military
UAVs and their components are controlled under the Wassenaar
Arrangement -- the nonproliferation regime for conventional arms and
associated dual-use items. Wassenaar also requires controls on the
export of a wide range of materials and equipment useful in the
production of UAVs, beyond those controlled by the MTCR.
Catch-all controls. Moreover, there are a large number of relevant
items that are not controlled under the MTCR or Wassenaar, mostly
because of their broad civil uses (e.g., in manned aircraft). On a
national basis, the U.S. and most other members of the
nonproliferation regimes have enacted "catch-all" controls to cover
exports of such items when an exporter knows or is informed by his
government that they are intended for use in WMD programs (including
WMD delivery).
Non-regime suppliers. The MTCR Guidelines encourage all countries to
unilaterally abide by ("adhere to") the Guidelines. To the extent
non-MTCR countries apply similar export controls, proliferators'
efforts to obtain items for their UAV programs are further
complicated. (Israel and several Central and Eastern European
countries have adhered to the MTCR Guidelines.) The U.S. has a
worldwide program of export control assistance -- focused on Central
and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States, but also
operating in East Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia -- to help
countries enact regime-compatible export control laws and regulations,
to erect effective interagency export licensing systems, and to
improve enforcement.
-- Regimes: In addition to its role as a de facto norm -- and its
export controls covering UAVs down to a range/payload capability of
300 km/0 kg, as well as key items of equipment and technology -- the
MTCR also serves as a forum where Partner (member) countries can share
information and concerns, and coordinate their national missile
nonproliferation efforts. UAVs have taken on increasing prominence in
the MTCR over the past several years, including specific attention in
the annual Information Exchanges during MTCR Plenary meetings.
-- Interdiction: The U.S. has a longstanding, day-to-day program of
identifying potential exports of proliferation concern (including
those related to UAVs) and working with other countries to investigate
and, if warranted, stop such exports from proceeding. While the
details of these activities are classified, they are an important
contributor to achieving our nonproliferation objectives.
-- Sanctions: A variety of U.S. domestic laws require sanctions
against foreign governments or (usually) entities involved in
proliferation activities, including certain activities related to
UAVs. The threat of sanctions can act as a deterrent to proliferation
activity, and in some cases the diplomacy surrounding sanctions or
waivers can result in positive nonproliferation progress.
The missile sanctions law (amendments to the Arms Export Control Act
and Export Administration Act, codified in the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 1991) requires sanctions against foreign
persons knowingly involved in the trade of MTCR-controlled items that
contribute to MTCR-class missile programs (including UAV programs) in
countries that are not "MTCR adherents" as defined in the law. As a
result of one such sanctions case, China committed in October 1994 not
to export ground-to-ground MTCR-class missiles (including UAVs of this
type); as far as we are aware, China has abided by this pledge.
The Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act requires sanctions against foreign
governments or persons that contribute knowingly and materially to
efforts by Iran or Iraq to acquire destabilizing numbers and types of
advanced conventional weapons (which include such cruise missiles as
the President determines destabilize the military balance or enhance
offensive capabilities in destabilizing ways).
Lethal Military Equipment (LME) sanctions (contained in annual Foreign
Relations Authorization Acts and in the Foreign Assistance Act)
require sanctions against governments that provide LME (which would
include cruise missiles) to countries on the U.S. terrorist list
(Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Sudan).
The Iran Nonproliferation Act provides for possible sanctions against
foreign persons that export to Iran items on multilateral export
control lists (including the UAV-relevant items on the MTCR and
Wassenaar lists).
-- Military capabilities: Our efforts and those of our friends and
allies to defend against adversary UAVs and the WMD they might
deliver, as well as to be able, if necessary, to destroy adversary UAV
holdings and to retaliate against UAV and UAV-WMD use, help to deter
use of UAVs against us and to make UAVs a less attractive option for
our adversaries to pursue.
-- Intelligence capabilities: Good intelligence is central to all
aspects of nonproliferation. The U.S. Intelligence Community has done
a very good job in building awareness within the Policy Community of
the UAV threat, and in supporting U.S. efforts to sensitize other
countries. Intelligence liaison relationships also are important means
of facilitating interdictions and of assisting other countries' export
control enforcement.
-- Diplomacy: All of the above tools are enabled by active U.S.
diplomacy. We are a leading member of the WMD treaties and the
nonproliferation regimes and have worked actively to promote export
controls and to obtain behavior changes in sanctions cases. Even
military and intelligence capabilities require coalitions, access,
overflights, etc., which are made possible by diplomacy. In addition,
we can sometimes use diplomacy directly as a nonproliferation tool,
independent of the others, to promote good behavior and dissuade
irresponsible behavior.
Energetic U.S. use of all of these tools, and intensive cooperation
with our friends and allies, have had a positive impact in impeding
the UAV proliferation threat. Adversaries' efforts to acquire UAVs
have been complicated, and made more time-consuming and expensive. To
the extent they have been able to acquire UAVs, our adversaries have
had to settle for systems that are less effective and less reliable
than if our nonproliferation efforts had not existed.
Conclusion.
Just as they provide real opportunities for U.S. and allied
militaries, UAVs also provide opportunities for our adversaries to
threaten us. Dealing with that threat has been a part of U.S.
nonproliferation efforts for over 15 years, and we have been
strengthening our ability to impede and cope with it -- broadening
MTCR export controls, adding "catch-all" controls, improving our
military and intelligence capabilities. But we will need to keep
working hard to keep pace with the threat, not only because our
adversaries are determined, but because the increasing reliance on
UAVs worldwide (including in civilian roles) and the dual-use nature
of much UAV technology will make our job more difficult in the future.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)