7 December 2012:
NSA Tempest Control Plan: http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-tempest-control.pdf
10 May 2012:
NSA TEMPEST History: http://cryptome.org/2012/05/nsa-tempest-history.pdf
22 June 2011:
6 April 2003: Add
5 March 2002: Two security papers announced today on optical Tempest risks:
For emissions security, HIJACK, NONSTOP and TEAPOT, see also Ross Anderson's Security Engineering, Chapter 15.
HIJACK, NONSTOP, and TEAPOT Vulnerabilities
A STU-III is a highly sophisticated digital device; however, they suffer from a particular nasty vulnerability to strong RF signals that if not properly addressed can cause the accidental disclosure of classified information, and recovery of the keys by an eavesdropper. While the unit itself is well shielded, the power line feeding the unit may not have a clean ground (thus negating the shielding).
If the encryption equipment is located within six to ten wavelengths of a radio transmitter (such as a cellular telephone, beeper, or two way radio) the RF signal can mix with the signals inside the STU and carry information to an eavesdropper. This six to ten wavelengths is referred to as the "near field" or the wave front where the magnetic field of the signal is stronger then the electrical field.
The best way to deal with this is to never have a cellular telephone or pager on your person when using a STU, or within a radius of at least thirty feet (in any direction) from an operational STU (even with a good ground). If the STU is being used in a SCIF or secure facility a cell phone is supposed to be an excluded item, but it is simply amazing how many government people (who know better) forget to turn off their phone before entering controlled areas and thus cause classified materials to be compromised.
Spook Hint: If you have a powered up NEXTEL on your belt and you walk within 12 feet of a STU-III in secure mode you have just compromised the classified key.
Files at Cryptome.org: tempest-time.htm TEMPEST Timeline tempest-old.htm TEMPEST History NSA Documents Obtained by FOIA nacsem-5112.htm NACSEM 5112 NONSTOP Evaluation Techniques nstissi-7000.htm NSTISSI No. 7000 TEMPEST Countermeasures for Facilities nacsim-5000.htm NACSIM 5000 Tempest Fundamentals nacsim-5000.zip NACSIM 5000 Tempest Fundamentals (Zipped 570K) nsa-94-106.htm NSA No. 94-106 Specification for Shielded Enclosures tempest-2-95.htm NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95 Red/Black Installation Guidance nt1-92-1-5.htm NSTISSAM TEMPEST 1/92 - TOC and Sections 1-5 nt1-92-6-12.htm NSTISSAM TEMPEST 1/92 - Sections 6-12 nstissam1-92a.htm NSTISSAM TEMPEST 1/92 - Appendix A (TEMPEST Overview) nt1-92-B-M.htm NSTISSAM TEMPEST 1/92 - Appendixes B-M nt1-92-dist.htm NSTISSAM TEMPEST 1/92 - Distribution List nsa-reg90-6.htm NSA/CSS Reg. 90-6, Technical Security Program nsa-foia-app2.htm NSA Letter Releasing TEMPEST Documents nsa-foia-app.htm NSA FOIA Appeal for TEMPEST Information nsa-foia-req.htm NSA FOIA Request for TEMPEST Documents Other TEMPEST Documents nsa-etpp.htm NSA Endorsed TEMPEST Products Program nsa-ettsp.htm NSA Endorsed TEMPEST Test Services Procedures nsa-zep.htm NSA Zoned Equipment Program nstissam1-00.htm Maintenance and Disposition of TEMPEST Equipment (2000) nstissi-7000.htm TEMPEST Countermeasures for Facilities (1993) tempest-fr.htm French TEMPEST Documentation (2000) af-hb202d.htm US Air Force EI Tempest Installation Handbook (1999) afssi-7010.htm US Air Force Emission Security Assessments (1998) afssm-7011.htm US Air Force Emission Security Countermeasure Reviews (1998) qd-tempest.htm Quick and Dirty TEMPEST Experiment (1998) mil-hdbk-1195.htm Radio Frequency Shielded Enclsoures (1988) emp.htm US Army Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and TEMPEST Protection for Facilities (1990) zzz1002.htm National TEMPEST School Courses (1998) navch16.htm Chapter 16 of US Navy's Automated Information Systems Security Guidelines tempest-cpu.htm Controlled CPU TEMPEST emanations (1999) tempest-door.htm TEMPEST Door (1998) bema-se.htm Portable Radio Frequency Shielded Enclosures (1998) datasec.htm Data Security by Architectural Design, George R. Wilson (1995) rs232.pdf The Threat of Information Theft by Reception of Electromagnetic Radiation from RS-232 Cables, Peter Smulders (1990) tempest-law.htm Laws On TEMPEST, Christopher Seline (1989) tempest-leak.htm The Tempest Over Leaking Computers, Harold Highland (1988) bits.pdf Electromagnetic Eavesdropping Machines for bits.htm Christmas?, Wim Van Eck (1988) nsa-vaneck.htm NSA, Van Eck, Banks TEMPEST (1985) emr.pdf Electromagnetic Radiation from Video Display Units: