18 January 2005. Thanks to James Atkinson
(www.tscm.com)
Related:
http://cryptome.org/state-belt.htm
http://cryptome.org/state-ivg.htm
Consider for a moment the irony of having one of major the U.S.
Governments espionage centers located between a road called
"Ashcroft Drive" and one called "Entomology Road".
The Beltsville Agricultural Research Center is world famous for the study
of insects, but more than one kind of bug is grown at this location. The
site has also been used as a base for spies and diplomats since the late
70's as a major communications center, and a wet-house where bugs of a
more electronic nature are nurtured. In a forested area near Rt 295 there
are two sister building set back from the road.
![[Image]](state-cia2.jpg)
Source
Left, State Dept./CIA Communications Station, right, CIA/NSA Special Collections Service
On page 2 of the following FCC document we see that MCI Worldcom operates
a satellite communications system from this location.
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-230090A1.pdf
Application for Authority
Class of Station: Fixed Earth Stations
MCI WORLDCOM NETWORK SERVICES, INC.
E030002 SES- LIC- 20030102- 00007 E
Nature of Service: Domestic Fixed Satellite Service
SITE ID: 1
LOCATION: 8101
Odell Rd, Montgomery, Beltsville, MD
39° 2' 48.40" N LAT.
76° 51' 52.90" W LONG.
Universal Antennas 1 18.3 meters
ANTENNA ID: 1183
0.00 dBW 3700.0000 - 4200.0000
MHz 44M2G7W
56.00 dBW PSK DATA 5925.0000 -
6425.0000 MHz 43K8G7W
71.60 dBW PSK DATA 5925.0000 -
6425.0000 MHz 44M2G7W
3700.0000 - 4200.0000 MHz 43K8G7W
Points of Communication:
1 - ALSAT - (ALSAT)
Note the listing on page 2, which reflects that MCI is operating the
Satellite Dish on the East side of the State Department Communications
Annex.
ALSAT is a foreign based commercial communications satellite with
surveillance capability, and the above frequency bands would allow this
systems to handle a huge about of materials. Also, the bandwidth that
they are using is enormous and they could move huge amounts of data
through a system like this.
http://dettifoss.fcc.gov/acweb/dettifoss/IBFS/IBFS_Ses_License.roi;16520?ViewDefault
http://dettifoss.fcc.gov/acweb/dettifoss/Genmen_a/db_8/d_admin.roi;119?ViewDefault
---------------------------------------------------------
Most State Department facilities have special phones lines that allow
personnel to call their families while abroad via this systems at little
or no cost, for example:
http://foia.state.gov/MMS/postrpt/pr_view_all.asp?CntryID=159
Telephones and Telecommunications Last Updated: 7/12/2004 5:25
AM
Local and international telephone service is available and
reliable. International direct dial service is excellent. A
one-minute call to the U.S. or other foreign country costs approximately
$1. Direct calls from the U.S. can be received in Hanoi without
cost.
Residences of all USG personnel are equipped with telephones.
Employees are responsible for paying the monthly residential telephone
bill.
Through the International Voice Gateway (IVG) Program, the Embassy has
four IVG telephone trunks directly connecting the office with the State
Department Telephone Switch at Beltsville, Maryland. This IVG
connection was installed as both a cost-saving and morale-boosting
program. Calls to the greater Washington area (703/202/301/410) are
free. All 1-800 numbers are also free of charge to Embassy
personnel. When placing personal calls, a commercial telephone
calling card can be used for numbers outside the D.C. area. These
personal calls will be billed to the employee as if the call originated
from Beltsville, Maryland.
Also,
http://foia.state.gov/MMS/IVG_prefix/ivgprefix_start.asp
IVG Usage Dial Prefix Codes
The International Voice Gateway (IVG) switch is located in
Beltsville, Maryland and provides interconnectivity from 135 overseas
locations to all Department of State and government agencies located in
the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.
Through the use of calling cards, it also enables users to access the FTS
networks, GETS, WITS, as well as commercial numbers for international
direct dialing at substantially reduced rates.
Embassy to Off-Network Overseas Location: When calling from an Embassy to
a different country, but not an IVG location, you must use your ID3
Calling Card.
Off-Network Overseas Location to Department of State and/or U.S.
Location: You must use your ID3 Calling Card. When calling from an
off-network overseas location to an off-network location, you must use
your ID3 Calling Card.
and,
http://foia.state.gov/masterdocs/05fah02/tel0640.pdf
5 FAH-2 H-640
INTERNATIONAL VOICE GATEWAY
(TL:TEL-1; 07-01-1998)
5 FAH-2 H-641 DESCRIPTION
(TL:TEL-1; 07-01-1998)
(Uniform State/USAID/USIA)
The International Voice Gateway (IVG) is an international telephone
network directly linking foreign affairs agency headquarters with field
offices abroad via dedicated voice circuitry. DTS-PO established the network to
provide a cost-effective, U.S. Government-controlled and switched
telephone service for foreign affairs agencies. Dial tone and switching
for IVG trunks are provided by the central switch at the Network Control
Center in Beltsville. DTS-PO manages the network and maintains the central
switch and circuitry up to the PBX at destination points.
5 FAH-2 H-642 INTERCONNECTIVITY
(TL:TEL-1; 07-01-1998)
(Uniform State/USAID/USIA)
IVG subscribers can connect to other U.S. Government networks by
dialing special access codes. DTS-PO periodically sends telegraphic
updates of IVG directories and detailed dialing instructions to all IVG
subscribers. The other networks are described in greater detail below.
5 FAH-2 H-642.1 Department of State Metropolitan
Area/Wide Area Network (MA/WAN) (Voice)
(TL:TEL-1; 07-01-1998)
(Uniform State/USAID/USIA)
The Department’s MA/WAN is a voice network connecting the IVG
central switch at Beltsville to Department facilities at Main State,
Washington area State annexes, and other facilities in Portsmouth, New
Hampshire, Charleston, South Carolina and USUN New York.
---------------------------------------------------------
Here is an article about MCI getting caught playing games with the
system:
http://www.computerweekly.com/Article123819.htm
Note that MCI was illegally routing "sensitive calls" through
Canada to save money.
---------------------------------------------------------
The same 8101 Odell address is also listed as a GSA building at:
http://www.iolp.gsa.gov/iolp/BuildingsList.asp?dID=2405
ALTERNATE COMM SITE
8101 ODELL RD
BELTSVILLE , MD 20705-4110
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY
-------------------------------------------------------------
An index for State department Annex locations indicates that this
location is part of the "Bureau of Information Resource Management":
http://foia.state.gov/MMS/Annexes/print_all_annex.asp
State Annex - SA-26
SA-26 Beltsville
8108 O'Dell St.
Beltsville, MD 20522
Major Office: IRM, AID
![[Image]](state-cia.jpg)
Source
------------------------------------------------------
Here is a listing of some of the people at the facility, broken down by
assignment/position:
http://foia.state.gov/alphalisting/alpha_print.asp?Range=DD
Alphabetical Listing of Employees
Name Number Room Office Location
Ortman, Edward 301-985-8318 102 Beltsville
Kahney, Joseph 301-985-8100 154 SA-26
Ivan, Patricia 301-985-8006 BIMC SA-26
White, Robert H. 301-985-8100 143 SA-26
Bazemore, Lisa C. 301-985-8022 107 SA-26
Ivory, Cynthia Y. 301-985-8797 126 SA-26
Delisa, John 301-985-8064 GTS (BIMC) SA-26
Heiser, Richard E. 301-985-8019 BIMC SA-26
Scott, Betty Jean 301-985-8037 2nd Fl SA-26
Bowden, Alfred Jerome 301-985-8711 111A(GTS) SA-26
Crawford, Steadman C. 301-985-8016 126(GTS/EN SA-26
Chavis, Keith 301-985-8100 A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Clark, Sherry 301-926-5710 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Steen, Jon J. 301-985-8100 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Beckloff, Mark 301-985-8787 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Ortman, Edward 301-985-8318 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Bristol, Robert 301-985-8122 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Jones, Jerry R. 301-985-8122 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Pantos, Lillian 301-985-8004 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Thomas, Anthony 301-985-4738 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Wilson, Rima S. 301-985-8122 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Harrell, Earl C. 301-985-8122 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Johnson, Chad R. 301-985-8318 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Mangal, Aaron S. 301-985-8208 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Marbley, Troy G. 301-985-8122 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Rice, William J. 301-985-8712 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Brown, Richard T. 301-985-8100 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Gonzalez, Jose F. 301-985-8512 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Ingram, Robert J. 301-985-8866 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Lippa, Michelle L. 301-985-8100 EMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Lippa, Michelle L. 301-985-8100 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Mooring, Odessa M. 301-985-8122 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Rios, Kixxonmin G. 301-985-8866 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Burgman, Charles E. 301-985-8815 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Dejesus, Yesenia D. 301-985-8712 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
McDaniel, Tyrone G. 301-985-8122 BMC A/DTSPO - Diplomatic Telecommunications Service, Program Office SA-26
Bruno-Nieves, Jorge L. 301-985-8100 109 A/DTSPO/GTS SA-26
Bryson, Cader A. 301-985-8945 A/OPR/FMS/RAM - Office of Facilities Management Services SA-26
Anderson, Michael G. 301-985-8946 B03E A/OPR/FMS/RAM - Office of Facilities Management Services SA-26
Palmer, Erica 301-985-8347 8th Fl DS/CIS/IST - Office of Information Security Technology SA-26
Hurt, Lolita M. 301-985-8347 DS/SI/AC SA-26
Perry, Gwenette C. 301-985-8347 DS/SI/AC SA-26
Washington, Shawnisa 301-985-8229 DS/SI/AC SA-26
D Elisa, John 301-985-8064 GTS IRM/NOC SA-26
Badra, Patrick M. 301-985-8433 IRM/NOC SA-26
Correll, Jacob A. 301-985-8008 GTS IRM/NOC SA-26
Bridgwood, Thomas F. 301-985-1717 GTS IRM/NOC SA-26
Carroll-Nickens, Mary 301-985-8371 117(GTS-NS IRM/OPS/ENM - Enterprise Network Management SA-26
Ballard, Paul E. 301-985-8217 Bsmt IRM/OPS/ENM/OPS/NA SA-26
Wardle, Shane C. 301-985-8250 Bsmt IRM/OPS/ENM/OPS/NA SA-26
Ross, Russell M. 301-985-8369 ENMOC IRM/OPS/ENM/OPS/NA SA-26
Williams, Sherman L. 301-985-8217 Bsmt IRM/OPS/ENM/OPS/NA SA-26
Webster, Tara Marsette 301-985-8460 ENMOC IRM/OPS/ENM/OPS/NA SA-26
Bullock-Bangoura, Wanda D. 301-985-8227 1269 IRM/OPS/ENM/OPS/NA SA-26
Beddingfield, Guthrie 301-985-8356 ABCD IRM/OPS/ENM/OPS/TC Beltsville
Kumar, Ravindra 301-985-8462 Bsmt IRM/OPS/ENM/OPS/TC SA-26
Neal, Joseph C. 301-985-8217 Bsmt IRM/OPS/ENM/OPS/TC SA-26
Scott, Teresa D. 301-985-8806 140 IRM/OPS/ENM/OPS/TC SA-26
Rivera, Jose Antonio 301-985-8342 IRM/OPS/ENM/OPS/TC SA-26
Williams, Dorothea V. 301-985-8004 111 IRM/OPS/MSO - Messaging Systems Office Beltsville
Premo, Rob 301-985-8516 IRM/OPS/MSO - Messaging Systems Office SA-26
Hedges, John S. 301-985-8004 IRM/OPS/MSO - Messaging Systems Office SA-26
Walker, Michael D. 301-985-8516 IRM/OPS/MSO - Messaging Systems Office SA-26
Cabral, John L. 301-985-8005 108 IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC - Beltsville Messaging Center Division Beltsville
Bell, Anthony R. 301-985-8007 Vault IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC - Beltsville Messaging Center Division Beltsville
Leger, David J. 301-985-8061 IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC - Beltsville Messaging Center Division SA-26
Glover, Henry A. 301-985-8319 105 IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC - Beltsville Messaging Center Division SA-26
Williamson, Darrell L. 301-985-8122 IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC - Beltsville Messaging Center Division SA-26
Hamilton, Lee 301-985-8866 BELTSVILLE IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch SA-26
Harrell, Earl 301-985-8122 BELTSVILLE IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch SA-26
Marbley, Troy 301-985-8122 BELTSVILLE IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch SA-26
Childs, Albert 301-985-8039 BELTSVILLE IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch SA-26
Morris, Ofelia 301-985-8004 BELTSVILLE IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch SA-26
Haskins, Albert 301-985-8122 BELTSVILLE IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch SA-26
Edwards, Anthony 301-985-8866 BELTSVILLE IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch SA-26
McDaniels, Tyrone 301-985-8122 BELTSVILLE IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch SA-26
Williams, John A. 301-985-8866 BELTSVILLE IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch SA-26
Mooring, Odessa M. 301-985-8516 BELTSVILLE IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch SA-26
Jones, Frank R. 301-985-8122 IPC IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch Beltsville
Gomez, Bernabe Jesus 301-985-8122 1 IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch Beltsville
Hunt, Richard L. 301-985-8122 IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch SA-26
Manning, Felix 301-985-8122 111 IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch SA-26
Zayas, Orlando 301-926-5405 111 IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch SA-26
Champ, Renee C. 301-985-8296 108 IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch SA-26
Gibson, Mary E. 301-985-8105 104 IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch SA-26
Stephens, James 301-985-8866 111 IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch SA-26
Motes, Roger D. 301-985-8516 PRIMARY IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS - Operations Branch SA-26
Barclay, James E. 301-985-8302 108 IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/TS - Technical Services Branch Beltsville
Battle, Ronald Nelson 301-926-5400 5420 IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/TS - Technical Services Branch Beltsville
Beechum, Michael E. 301-926-5405 IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/TS - Technical Services Branch SA-26
Norton, Adrian L. 301-985-8124 112 IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/TS - Technical Services Branch SA-26
Fleming, Carla M. 301-985-8032 111 IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC/PRG - Programming Branch Beltsville
Hill, Bruce 301-985-8060 111 IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC/PRG - Programming Branch SA-26
Kodey, Mark 301-985-8060 111 IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC/PRG - Programming Branch SA-26
Lutes, Mike 301-985-8714 111 IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC/PRG - Programming Branch SA-26
Ledger, Dave 301-985-8060 111 IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC/PRG - Programming Branch SA-26
Mobeka, Rita 301-985-8505 111 IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC/PRG - Programming Branch SA-26
Garner, Cedric 301-985-8060 111 IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC/PRG - Programming Branch SA-26
Jackson, Larry 301-985-8061 111 IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC/PRG - Programming Branch SA-26
Knight, Gerald 301-985-8060 111 IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC/PRG - Programming Branch SA-26
Knieriem, Gerry 301-985-8060 111 IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC/PRG - Programming Branch SA-26
Spellane, Michael 301-985-8145 111 IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC/PRG - Programming Branch SA-26
Schneider, Paul C. 301-985-8123 111 IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC/PRG - Programming Branch SA-26
Hampton, Angel B. 301-985-8905 1986E IRM/OPS/SIO/APD/PAY - Payroll Applications Branch SA-26
Dormio, Debora L. 301-985-8900 117 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/CSO - Client/Server Operations Branch Beltsville
Woodland, Marian G. 301-985-8293 130 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/CSO - Client/Server Operations Branch Beltsville
Baia, Joseph L. 301-985-8738 139 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/CSO - Client/Server Operations Branch SA-26
McCree-Green, Carol E. 301-985-8902 136 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/CSO - Client/Server Operations Branch SA-26
Williamson, Johnnie R. 301-985-8727 139 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/CSO - Client/Server Operations Branch SA-26
Dumas, Jimmie J. 301-985-8721 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch Beltsville
Chase, Mary L. 301-985-8312 135 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch Beltsville
Day, Marcus R. 301-985-8406 130 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch Beltsville
Cook, Tyrone W. 301-985-8292 130 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch Beltsville
Brown, Elliott W. 301-985-8737 135 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch Beltsville
Davis, Leonard W. 301-985-8739 135 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch Beltsville
Cornelison, Jim X. 301-985-8290 130 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch Beltsville
Jackson, Ramona D. 301-985-8793 130 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch Beltsville
Johnson, Sheila D. 301-985-8295 130 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch Beltsville
Raiford, Angela E. 301-985-8741 135 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch Beltsville
Williams, Steve R. 301-985-8732 130 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch Beltsville
Wilson, Barbara J. 301-985-8294 135 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch Beltsville
Smith, Lawrence C. 301-985-8901 1921 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch Beltsville
Wise, Pernell X. 301-985-8790 135-A IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch Beltsville
Alami, Michelle E. 301-985-8746 Bubble IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch Beltsville
Douglas, Kirk 301-985-8901 117 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch SA-26
Parker, Carlton 301-985-8743 OPS IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch SA-26
Sands, Vance H. 301-985-8795 135 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch SA-26
Slater, Demetrius 301-985-8700 139 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch SA-26
Stevens, Phillip H. 301-985-8731 135B IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch SA-26
Clough, Patricia A. 301-985-8700 1st Fl IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch SA-26
Weinberger, Jim C. 301-985-8792 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch SA-26
Collins, Tony C. 301-985-8794 130 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch SA-26
Richardson, Barbara A. 301-985-8700 130 IRM/OPS/SIO/MFS/OP - Operations Branch SA-26
http://foia.state.gov/MMS/OrgDirectory/OrgDir.asp?ID=56
MESSAGING SYSTEMS (IRM/OPS/MSO)
Director Susan Musser, Acting 5440 202-647-7787
Deputy Director Susan Musser 5440 202-647-7787
Management Analysis Staff Chief Patsy Butler 5440 202-647-7768
Messaging Systems Products Division Chief Edward Courlang 2288C SA34 703-912-8009
Special Messaging Operation Divisions Chief Frontis Wiggins 5440 202-647-7989
E-Mail Division Chief Larry McElroy 1921 202-736-4878
Main State Messaging Center Division Chief Margaret Johnson 5440 202-647-7795
Beltsville Messaging Center Division Chief John Cabral 117 SA26 301-985-8005
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The East side of the Odell Road facility has two large Parabolic dish
antenna for satellite up-link and down link. On the South side of the
building there is a very tall red/orange and white tower with a
point-to-point microwave dish to another site in the area. Next to this
is a much shorter mast, with a large log-periodic antenna that we often
see on the roofs of embassies and diplomatic facilities across the globe.
There is also a fiber optic cable between this facility, and the one just
to the east of it (the Special Collection Service).
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.fbodaily.com/cbd/archive/1999/06(June)/22-Jun-1999/70sol003.htm
COMMERCE BUSINESS DAILY ISSUE OF JUNE 22,1999 PSA#2372
U.S. Agency for International Development, M/OP/B/HNE, Room 7.09-120,
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20523-7100
70 -- GENERAL PURPOSE AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT SOL
M/OP/HNE/P99-002 DUE 062599 POC POC Daisy Matthews: Purchasing Agent,
M/OP/B/HNE, Fax (202) 216-3052, Tel: (202) 712-0512, Internet:
dmatthews@usaid.gov, Contracting Officer, James A. Jeckell WEB:
http://www.info.usaid.gov/procurements_bus_opp/procurement/announce/cbd,
http://www.info.usaid.gov.
E-MAIL: dmatthews@usaid.gov,
http://www.info.usaid.gov.
This is a combined synopsis/solicitation for commercial items prepared in accordance
with the format in Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) subpart 12.6, as supplemented
with additional information included in this notice. This announcement constitutes
the only solicitation; quotes are being requested and A WRITTEN SOLICITATION WILL NOT
BE ISSUED. This CBD notice can be viewed and downloaded using the Agency Web Site.
The Worldwide web address is http://www.info.usaid.gov. Select Business and Procurement
Opportunities from the home page, then "USAID Procurements." On the following screen,
select "Download Available USAID Solicitations." The Solicitation Number for this
Request For Quotations (RFQ) is M/OP/HNE/P99-002. The Government anticipates awarding
a single purchase order. This procurement is for the following items:
CLIN NO. 001, Part No. ALSM64-05AE, 64KB Airlink Wireless Modems,Input Power: 90-270 VAC 50/60 HZ Qty. 12 ea.;
CLIN NO. 002, Part No. ALS128-05AB, 128KB Airlink Wireless Modems, Input Power: 90-270 VAC 50/60 HZ Qty. 6 ea.;
CLIN NO. 003, Part No. ALS256-05AB, 256KB Airlink Wireless Modems, Input Power 90-270 VAC 50/60 HZ Qty. 12 ea.;
CLIN NO. 004, Part No. YEA-24SP-NF, 24DBI Semiparabolic Antenna Qty. 30 ea.;
CLIN NO, Part No. 005 YELA-24, Lighting Arrestor with Bracket/Female Connector Qty. 30 ea.;
CLIN NO. 006, Part No. YEX-4UF-010M/M, Ultra-Flex RF Cable 10 foot N. Male Connector Qty. 4 ea.;
CLIN NO. 007, Part No. YEC-4UF-020M/M Ultra, Flex RF Cable 20 Foot N. Cable Connector Qty. 4 ea.;
CLIN NO.008, Part No. YEC-400-1000B, 1000 Foot Spool LMR Cable (Bulk Reel) Qty. 1,
CLIN NO. 009, Part No. YE-73565, Type N. 50 OHM Solder/Clamp Connector Qty. 50 ea.
F.O.B Point, 8101 Odell Drive, Beltsvile, Maryland,20705.
Date of Delivery: No later than July 30, 1999. No partial quotes will be considered.
Please acknowledge all requirements on quotations. Please indicate F.O.B point on quote.
This procurement is set-aside for small business. The provision at FAR 52.212-1,
Instructions to Offerors, applies to this acquisition. Evaluation is based on best value
including cost and ability to meet service requirements. Offerors shall include a
completed copy of the provision at FAR 52.212-3, Offeror Representations and
Certifications-Commercial Items, with its offer. The clause at 52.212-4, Contract terms
and Conditions-Commercial Items, applies to this acquisition. In addition to the guidance
contained in FAR 52.212-4, contractors shall submit proof of delivery with their invoices.
The receiving office or representative of USAID may in the form of a bill of lading or
other shipping document sign proof of delivery. Invoices received without proof of
delivery with their invoices will not be accepted. The clause at FAR 52.212-5, Contract
Terms and Conditions Required to Implement Status or Executive Orders-Commercial Items,
applies to this acquisition. Offers are due by close of business 07/25/99, and can be
submitted by fax to (202) 216-3052 Attn: Daisy Matthews. Inquiries regarding this
request will only be accepted via Fax. Posted 06/18/99 (W-SN344815). (0169)
COMMERCE BUSINESS DAILY ISSUE OF JULY 20,1999 PSA#2391
U.S. Agency for International Development, M/OP/B/HNE, Room 7.09-120, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20523-7100
70 -- GENERAL PURPOSE AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT SOL M/OP/HNE/P99-003 DUE 072399 POC POC Daisy Matthews: Purchasing Agent, M/OP/B/HNE, Fax: (202) 216-3052; Telephone: (202) 712-0512, Internet: dmatthews@usaid.gov, Contracting Officer: James A. Jeckell WEB: http://www.info.usaid.gov/procurement_bus_opp/procurement/announce/cbd, http://www.info.usaid.gov. E-MAIL: http://www.info.usaid.gov, dmatthews@usaid.gov. This is a combined synopsis/solicitation for commercial items prepared in accordance with the format in Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) subpart 12.6, as supplemented with additional information included in this notice. This announcement constitutes the only solicitation; quotes are being requested and A WRITTEN SOLICITATION WILL NOT BE ISSUED. This CBD notice can be viewed and downloaded using the Agency Web Site. The Worldwide web address is http://www.info.usaid.gov. Select Business and Procurement Opportunities from the home page, then "USAID Procurements." On the following screen, select "Download Available USAID Solicitations." The Solicitation Number for this Request For Quotations (RFQ) is M/OP/HNE/P99-003. The Government anticipates awarding a single purchase order. This procurement is for the following item:
CLIN NO. 001, Part No. Radyne DD 2401L, Receive-Only Modem, with Cisco Cable Kit, Twenty (20) each.
F.O.B Point, 8101 Odell Drive, Suite 110, Beltsvile, Maryland,20705.
Date of Delivery: No later than August 20, 1999. No partial quotes will be considered. Please acknowledge all requirements on quotations. Please indicate F.O.B point on quote. This procurement is set-aside for small business. The provision at FAR 52.212-1, Instructions to Offerors, applies to this acquisition. Evaluation is based on best value including cost and ability to meet service requirements. Offerors shall include a completed copy of the provision at FAR 52.212-3, Offeror Representations and Certifications-Commercial Items, with its offer. The clause at 52.212-4, Contract terms and Conditions-Commercial Items, applies to this acquisition. In addition to the guidance contained in FAR 52.212-4, contractors shall submit proof of delivery with their invoices. The receiving office or representative of USAID may in the form of a bill of lading or other shipping document sign proof of delivery. Invoices received without proof of delivery with their invoices will not be accepted. The clause at FAR 52.212-5, Contract Termsand Conditions Required to Implement Status or Executive Orders-Commercial Items, applies to this acquisition. Offers are due by close of business 07/23/99, and can be submitted by fax to (202) 216-3052 Attn: Daisy Matthews. Inquiries regarding this request will only be accepted via Fax. Posted 07/16/99 (W-SN355185). (0197)
Loren Data Corp. http://www.ld.com (SYN# 0398 19990720\70-0012.SOL
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http://216.33.118.202/EPSData/AID/Synopses/11471/M-OP-1787/PROPOSALINSTRUCTIONS.doc
Courier services will cover the District of Columbia; Montgomery and Prince George's County, Maryland, Fairfax and Arlington Counties, and the Cities of Alexandria and Falls Church, Virginia. Approximately eighty (80) percent of service calls will originate or terminate at the Agency office located in the District of Columbia.
Agency's offices are currently located:
District of Columbia
Ronald Reagon International Trade Building
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20523
Maryland
(1) USAID Mainframe
Computer Center
8101 Odell Road
Beltsville, MD 20705
Virginia
(2) Tower Building
(State Annex 14)
1100 Wilsong Boulevard
Rosslyn, VA 22209
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http://md.allpages.com/beltsville/real-estate/real-estate-services/
Montage Inc
8101 Odell Road
Beltsville, MD 20705-4110
Phone: (301) 210-4540
Business Types: Property Maintenance & Services
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http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020718-scs1.htm
The Baltimore Sun July 18, 2002
Report faults decisions by intelligence agencies
By Tom Bowman
WASHINGTON - The nation's spy agencies failed to provide adequate warning of the
Sept. 11 terrorist attacks due partly to a series of "questionable management
decisions" about where to spend money and assign workers, according to a sharply
worded congressional report released yesterday.
The Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency must do more
to penetrate al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations, said the report by the
House Intelligence Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security.
It was the first congressional report on the subject since the attacks on the
Pentagon and the World Trade Center.
The CIA should hire more foreign agents, while the NSA must shift from being
a passive listener to a "proactive hunter" of terrorist targets.
At the same time, the FBI was faulted in the report for the reluctance of top
officials to share counterintelligence information with other agencies.
"This report contains constructive suggestions for what the intelligence
community needs to do to strengthen our country's counterterrorism intelligence
capabilities," said Rep. Porter J. Goss, the Florida Republican who chairs the
committee and has joined with the Senate committee in an investigation into why
America had no advance warning of the attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon.
The FBI had no immediate comment on the report, while the CIA and NSA said
they were making progress in dealing with the terrorist threat. Though funding
for counterterrorism has sharply increased, both intelligence agencies said
they face budget constraints in pursuing terrorists and spies.
The intelligence community, with an annual budget in excess of $30 billion,
is expected to receive billions of dollars more in the coming years. The CIA
has an estimated work force of 19,000 and the NSA is believed to have 25,000
employees at Fort Meade, although precise figures are classified.
While the report repeated long-standing criticisms that the agencies must
hire more linguists and analysts to fight terrorism, the report broke ground
by focusing on management decisions it said were key factors in the agencies'
inability to sound the alarm before Sept. 11.
The CIA's human intelligence - such as that gathered by foreign spies in the
agency's employ - steadily eroded in the early to mid-1990s because the CIA
perceived a reduced terrorist threat, the report said.
It said the NSA had failed to find a way to closely follow a target who switches
from a land-line phone to a cell phone or an Internet address.
A senior intelligence official, who requested anonymity, said the CIA had yet
to completely review the 100-page classified report. A declassified, 10-page
summary was publicly released.
But the intelligence official defended the agency's efforts on counterterrorism.
Beginning in 1997, Director George J. Tenet beefed up the agency's efforts
against terrorism with new employees and more focused analysis. Counterterrorism
funding grew by 50 percent between 1997 and 2001, while the number of case
officers - those who recruit foreign spies - rose by the same percentage.
The official laid part of the agency's difficulty at the feet of Congress and
the White House: "We certainly ask the administration and Congress to reverse
the trend of increasing intelligence funding after terrorist attacks and then
dropping back to former inadequate levels after the smoke clears."
Robert Baer, a CIA officer for 21 years who left in 1997 and wrote about his
experiences in the recent book See No Evil, said the committee's criticisms
jibe with his own. Too much money was spent on CIA headquarters staff, he
said, and not enough on the critical and often risky intelligence work overseas.
The committee report "is right on the mark," he said.
NSA released a statement saying it is dedicated to meeting technological
challenges and ensuring that it has the right skills mix in its work force.
The statement also said that since the end of the Cold War, "NSA is one-third
smaller in population and has one-third fewer resources at its disposal."
John Pike, an intelligence analyst with globalsecurity.org, said that many
of the criticisms were not new, and some of them amount to "Monday morning
quarterbacking" by Congress.
Still, Pike said he was intrigued that the committee is calling for NSA to
become a hunter rather than a passive listener. He said that might mean the
agency will be encouraged to start "placing more bugs" around the world
through its Special Collection Service, a joint program it runs with CIA
that operates out of a secret office building in Beltsville.
-------------------------------------------
http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/publicfeature/apr03/code.html
Bond, James Bond
But a big remaining challenge, according to John Pike, a defense expert and
founder of GlobalSecurity.org, are fiber-optic cables that stay on land.
"I think that one of the things that [Navy Seals] spend a fair amount of time
doing is [going] ashore...and walking to the nearest land line," says Pike.
"They were doing that in Iraq a decade ago." Pike believes that this may also
be how fiber-optic communications in North Korea and other countries are
monitored: "It's cat and mouse, we try to see how many taps we can put on
[chief of state Kim Jong II's] fiber-optic network, and the Dear Leader runs
around and tries to catch them."
Another, more aggressive approach to the land-line problem is to force an
opponent onto the airwaves. "One of the things the United States has been
doing since the middle of 2002 is systematically taking apart Iraq's
land-line communications with air strikes, to force them to communicate
via channels that are more readily compromised," says Pike. Indeed, this
may be the reason why U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell was able to
present incriminating Iraqi telephone conversations to the United Nations
last February.
When a more subtle approach than aerial bombardment is called for, agencies
like the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) can call upon organizations such as the Special Collection
Service (SCS), a joint NSA-CIA covert group headquartered in Beltsville,
Md. "What this group does is the more surreptitious black-bag operations,"
explains Wayne Madsen, who previously worked at the NSA and is now a senior
fellow at the Electronic Privacy Information Center (Washington, D.C.).
Black-bag operations can include breaking into embassies or facilities of
communications providers and stealing information or installing bugs.
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"It's been extremely difficult to break Russian ciphers"
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By bugging a computer or communications system, information can be captured before
it's sent through a fiber-optic cable, author Bamford observes. A tiny microphone
dropped into a keyboard can pick up the sound made by the keys as they are struck
and transmit the sounds to a nearby receiver. Different keys, according to Bamford,
"sound different—each has a specific signature." Those signatures can be used to
reconstruct what was typed.
The SCS also allows the Sigint community "to be proactive, to go after information
rather than sit and wait," explains Bamford. Another important SCS mission is to
recruit people who work for targeted governments, like cryptographic clerks or
systems administrators, to ensure access to sensitive information, such as cipher
keys. When successful, such activities also allow the NSA to avoid another steep
hurdle: encryption.
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http://www.long-intl.com/mbw.htm
CIA OPERATIONS FACILITY - Provided master planning, scheduling, budgeting, and monthly
monitoring services on this $17 million new construction project at Beltsville, Maryland.
The project was a classified fast-track office/research facility.
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http://www.villagevoice.com/features/9908/vest_madsen.shtml
February 24 - March 2, 1999
A Most Unusual Collection Agency
How the U.S. undid UNSCOM through its empire of electronic ears
By Jason Vest and Wayne Madsen
When Saddam Hussein raised the possibility of attacking U.S. planes in Turkey
last week, his threats illustrated what many in diplomatic circles regard as
an international disgrace the emasculation of the UN by the U.S.
When UNSCOM, the UN's arms-inspection group for Iraq, was created in 1991, it
drew on personnel who, despite their respective nationalities, would serve the
UN. Whatever success UNSCOM achieved, however, was in spite of its
multinational makeup. While a devoted group of UN staffers managed to set up
an independent unit aimed at finding Saddam's weapons and ways of concealing
them, other countries seeking to do business with sanctions-impaired Iraq
notably France and Russia used inspectors as spies for their own ends.
But what ultimately killed UNSCOM were revelations that the U.S. government
had manipulated it by assuming control of its intelligence apparatus last
spring (or perhaps even earlier by using the group to slip spies into Iraq)
not so much to aid UNSCOM's mission, but to get information for use in future
aerial bombardments. When stories to this effect broke last month, however,
there was almost no consistency in descriptions of the agencies involved or
techniques used. The New York Times, for example, said only one CIA spy had
been sent into Baghdad last March to set up an automated eavesdropping device.
Time had multiple Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) operatives planting bugs
around Baghdad throughout 1998. The Wall Street Journal referred to the use of
one "device" from the National Security Agency (NSA) last year and "a series
of espionage operations used by the U.S. [since] 1996 to monitor the
communications" of Saddam and his elite.
When probing the world of espionage, rarely does a clear picture emerge. But
according to a handful of published sources, as well as assessments by
independent experts and interviews with current and former intelligence
officers, the U.S. government's prime mover in Iraqi electronic surveillance
was most likely a super-secret organization run jointly by the the CIA and the
NSA the spy agency charged with gathering signals intelligence (known as
SIGINT) called the Special Collection Service. Further, there is evidence to
suggest that the Baghdad operation was an example of the deployment of a
highly classified, multinational SIGINT agreement one that may have used
Australians to help the U.S. listen in months after the CIA failed to realize
the U.S. objective of overthrowing Saddam Hussein through covert action.
According to former UNSCOM chief inspector Scott Ritter, when the U.S. took
over the group's intelligence last year, a caveat was added regarding
staffing: only international personnel with U.S. clearances could participate.
"This requirement," says Ritter, "really shows the kind of perversion of
mission that went on. The U.S. was in control, but the way it operated from
day one was, U.S. runs it, but it had to be a foreigner [with a clearance]
operating the equipment."
Authors Andrew and Patrick Cockburn
demonstrate in their just published book Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of
Saddam Hussein, were two of the most colossally bungled CIA covert operations
since the Bay of Pigs. While details of one of the failed operations were
widely reported, the Cockburns fleshed out details of an arguably worse coup
attempt gone awry in June 1996. Iraqi counterintelligence had not only managed
to finger most of the suspects in advance, but months before had even captured
an encrypted mobile satellite communications device that the CIA gave the
plotters. Adding insult to injury, the Cockburns report, Iraqi
counterintelligence used the CIA's own device to notify them of their failure:
"We have arrested all your people," the CIA team in Amman, Jordan, reportedly
was told via their uplink. "You might as well pack up and go home."
Some UNSCOM staffers first under Russian Nikita Smidovich, later under
American Scott Ritter managed to create what amounted to a formidable micro-
espionage unit devoted to fulfilling UNSCOM's mission. Between information
passed on from various countries and use of unspecified but probably limited
surveillance equipment, the inspectors were gathering a great deal. But in
March 1998, according to Ritter, the U.S. told UNSCOM chair Richard Butler of
Australia that it wanted to "coordinate" UNSCOM's intelligence gathering.
Ritter insists that no U.S. spies under UNSCOM cover could have been operating
in Baghdad without his knowledge prior to his resignation in August 1998.
However, as veteran spies point out, if they were, Ritter probably wouldn't
have known. A number of sources interviewed by the Voice believe it possible
that Special Collection Service personnel may have been operating undercover
in Baghdad.
According to a former high-ranking intelligence official, SCS was formed in
the late 1970s after competition between the NSA's embassy-based eavesdroppers
and the CIA's globe-trotting bugging specialists from its Division D had
become counterproductive. While sources differ on how SCS works some claim
its agents never leave their secret embassy warrens where they perform close-
quarters electronic eavesdropping, while others say agents operate embassy-
based equipment in addition to performing riskier "black-bag" jobs, or break-
ins, for purposes of bugging "there's a lot of pride taken in what SCS has
accomplished," the former official says.
Intriguingly, the only on-the-record account of the Special Collection Service
has been provided not by an American but by a Canadian. Mike Frost, formerly
of the Communications Security Establishment Canada's NSA equivalent served
as deputy director of CSE's SCS counterpart and was trained by the SCS. In a
1994 memoir, Frost describes the complexities of mounting "special collection"
operations finding ways to transport sophisticated eavesdropping equipment in
diplomatic pouches without arousing suspicion, surreptitiously assembling a
device without arousing suspicion in his embassy, technically troubleshooting
under less than ideal conditions and also devotes considerable space to
describing visits to SCS's old College Park headquarters.
"It is not the usual sanitorium-clean atmosphere you would expect to find in a
top-secret installation," writes Frost. "Wires everywhere, jerry-rigged gizmos
everywhere, computers all over the place, some people buzzing around in three-
piece suits, and others in jeans and t-shirts. [It was] the ultimate testing
and engineering centre for any espionage equipment." Perhaps one of its most
extraordinary areas was its "live room," a 30-foot-square area where NSA and
CIA devices were put through dry runs, and where engineers simulated the
electronic environment of cities where eavesdroppers are deployed. Several
years ago, according to sources, SCS relocated to a new, 300-acre, three-
building complex disguised as a corporate campus and shielded by a dense
forest outside Beltsville, Maryland. Curious visitors to the site will find
themselves stopped at a gate by a Department of Defense police officer who, if
one lingers, will threaten arrest.
There are good reasons, explains an old NSA hand, for havingelectronic ears on
terra firma in addition to satellites. "If you're listening to something from
thousands of miles up, the footprint to sort through is so huge, and finding
what you are looking for is not a simple chore. If you know more or less
specifically what you want, it's easier to get it in close proximity. And if
it happens to be a low-powered signal, it may not travel far enough."
According to two sources familiar with intelligence activity in Iraq, the U.S.
may have been aided by information delivered either to UNSCOM or SCS from
Ericsson, the Swedish telecommunications firm. It's not an unreasonable
assumption; though Ericsson brushes off questions about it, in 1996 a Middle
Eastern businessman filed suit against the company, claiming, among other
things, that it had stiffed him on his commission for brokering a deal between
the Iraqis and Ericsson for sensitive defense communications equipment, which,
reportedly, included encrypted cell phones.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, a veteran intelligence official confirmed
that the NSA has "arrangements" with other communications firms that allow NSA
to access supposedly secure communications, but cooperation from Ericsson
would be "a breakthrough despite our best efforts, they always kept their
distance. But it's not beyond the realm of possibility." (This is not without
precedent; though hardly covered in the American press, it has been reported
that Switzerland's Crypto AG long the supplier of cipher equipment to many of
the world's neutral and "rogue" states enjoyed such an "arrangement" with the
NSA for decades. Crypto AG denies this.)
There is, however, another possible scenario regarding participation by
Ericsson in an intelligence venture. According to FAS analyst Pike, it's much
more likely that anyone doing intelligence work in Iraq would want a schematic
of Baghdad's telephone system which Ericsson installed in the late '60s and
has subsequently updated. "I would find it to be far more plausible that the
U.S. intelligence community would be interested in acquiring, and Ericsson
would be interested in supplying, the wiring diagram for Baghdad's telephone
exchange than encryption algorithms for cell phones," he says.
Also, he explains, finding ways to tap into a whole phone system or pull
short-range signals out of the air without being obvious is clearly SCS's
portfolio. "This type of risky close surveillance is what SCS was formed to
do," he says. "When you think of NSA, you think satellites. When you think
CIA, you think James Bond and microfilm. But you don't really think of an
agency whose sole purpose is to get up real close and use the best technology
there is to listen and transmit. That's SCS."
Regarding any possible collaboration in Iraq with SCS or UNSCOM, Kathy Egan,
Ericsson spokesperson, said she had no information on such an operation, but
if there was one, "It would be classified and we would not be able to talk
about it." It's also possible, according to Mike Frost, that cleverly
disguised bugs might have been planted in Baghdad SCS, he recalls, managed to
listen in on secured facilities by bugging pigeons. But, says a retired CIA
veteran, with UNSCOM effectively dead, bugging is now out of the question. "I
hope the take from this op," he says, "was worth losing the only access the
outside world's disarmament experts had to Iraq."
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