6 June 2003
FOIA request to INSCOM: http://cryptome.org/inscom-foia.htm
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340
U-6,563/DAN-1A (FOIA) 28 May 2003
Mr. John Young
251 West 89th St, Suite 6E
New York, NY 10024
Dear Mr. Young:
This responds to your request to the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) under the Freedorn of Informatiun Act, dated 29 March 2001. Therein, you requested records concerning the Burma Intelligence Services. The INSCOM referred two documents to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for our review and direct response to you.
Upon review, it has been determined that some portions of one document are not releasable. The portions withheld are exempt from release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(2) and (b)(3), Freedom of Information Act. Subsection (b)(2) applies to information which pertains solely to the internal rules and practices of the agency. Subsection (b)(3) applies to information specifically exempted by a statute establishing particular criteria for withholding. The applicable statute is 10 U.S.C. Section 424. All reasonably segregable portions of the document are attached hereto.
All substantive portions of the remaining document are not releasable. The withheld portions are exempt from release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(6), Freedom of Information Act. Subsection (b)(1) applies to information properly classified under the criteria provided by Executive Order 12958, as amended. Subsection (b)(6) applies to information which if released would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of other individuals. There are no reasonably segregable portions of this exempt material.
You are advised that a requester may appeal, within 60 days, an initial decision to withhold a record or part thereof. Should you wish to exercise this right, you may do so by referring to case #0409-02 and adaressing your appeal to:
Defense Intelligence Agency
ATTN: DAN-1 A (FOIA)
Washington, D.C. 20340-5100
Sincerely,
ROBERT P. RICHARDSON
Chief, Freedom of Information Act Staff
Enclosure a/s
[XXX indicates redactions.] **************
*CONFIDENTIAL* ************** DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION VZCZCSCD042 Q5#G467 REUP 372233 0120950 RATCZYUW RUEKJCS8855 0120947-CCCC-RUEADWD. DAM18 ZNY CCCCC 11DAMO9 R 120947Z JAN 73 FM JCS INfO RUEADWD/CSA WASH nC RUENAAA/CNO WASH DC RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC R 1208302 JAN 73 FMXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC INFO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC CAMP HM SMITH HI BTC O N F I D E N T I A LXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX FROMXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX THIS IS IRXXXXXXXXXXXX 1. BURMA 2. (U) DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE SERVICES INTELLIGENCE (DDSI) INFLUENCE IN BURMA 3. N/A 4. 12 JAN 73 5. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX12 JAN 73 6. XXXX 7. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 8. XXXXXXXXXX 9. 12 JANUARY 1973 10. SIX 11. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 12. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 13. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 14. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 15. PART ONE: (C) THERE ARE MANY REPORTS ON DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE SERVICES INTELLIGENCE (DDSI) AND NONE OF THEM CAN PORTRAY THE ALL PERVASIVE INFLUENCE OF THIS ORGANIZATION ON ALL SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY IN BURMA. DDSI HAS AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE. ARREST, DETAIN, QUESTION AND MAINTAIN CUSTODY FOR YEARS ALL MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND CIVILIAN; IN SHORT, ANY CITIZEN OF BURMA. DDSI BY FUNCTIONAL CHARTS WOULD BE SUBORDIN- ATE TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND IN DAILY OPERATIONS THIS IS TRUE, BUT THE FINAL AUTHORITY AND SOURCE OFEXCLUDED FROM GENERALDECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE**************
*CONFIDENTIAL* ************** 2 BEST COPY AVAILABLE
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*CONFIDENTIAL* ************** DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION DDSI POWER IS U NE WIN. NO FOREIGNER CAN EVER KNOW THE COMPLETE ORGANIZATION OF DDSI BECAUSE BY ITS NATURE MUCH OF ITS ACTIVITY IS CLOAKED IN SECRECY. THIS REPORT WILL ATTEMPT TO GO BEYOND THE ORGANIZATION AND GIVE A PICTURE OF THE INFLUENCE OF THIS ORGAN- IZATION. PART TWO: (C) DDSI HAS ALL OF THE FUNCTIONS OF A REGULAR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE TO INCLUDE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OF THE VARIOUS INSURGENCY GROUPS, PENE- TRATION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS. ITS ACTIVITIES GO MUCH BEYOND THIS AND INCLUDES INTERNAL SURVEILLANCE AND INVESTIGA- TIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED SERVICES, OF ALL MINISTERIES OF THE GOVERNMENT, ALL COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVITIES, ACTIVITIES OF MINORITY GROUPS IN BURMA, ACTIVITIES OF STUDENTS GROUPS AND CLOSE SURVEILLANCE OF VARIOUS RELIGIOUS GROUPS TO INCLUDE BUDDHIST MONKS AND MONASTERIES. ALTHOUGH IT CANNOT BE FOUND ON ANY CHART DDSI COMPLETELY CONTROLS THE PEOPLES POLICE FORCE (PPE) THROUGH THE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT UNIT OF DDSI, THE CHIEF OF THIS BRANCH OF DDSI PASSES ON ORDERS TO THF CHIEF OF THE PPF, (PRESENT CHIEF OF OPER- ATIONAL SUPPORT BRANCH IS MAJOR SOE MYINT - ARMY). THE ONLY COMP- ARISON THAT COULD BE DRAWN TO THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE TO SAY THAT DDSI COMBINES THE FUNCTIONS OF POWERS OF DIA, CIA AND THE FBI AND ALL THE STATE AND LOCAL POLICE FORCES TO INCLUDE OPERATING THE PRISONS. IN ADDITION THERE IS NO WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, NO BAIL PROCEDURES, NO RIGHT OF IMMEDIATE TRIAL, IN FACT THEY DO NOT EVEN HAVE TO GIVE A REASON FOR AN ARREST AND DETENTION. PART THREE: (C) THE STRENGTH FIGURES OF THE VARIOUS SECTIONS OF DDSI GIVEN IN REF (B) ARE TRUE AS FAR AS THEY GO BUT THAT IS JUST THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG. DDSI HAS PLAIN CLOTHES OPERATIONS IN EVERY CITY AND VILLAGE. IT IS KNOWN THAT EVERY FOREIGNER'S HOME AND EMBASSY HAS AT LEAST ONE EMPLOYEE WHO REPORTS TO DDSI ON THEIR ACTIVITIES, THESE EMPLOYEES HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO REPORT, FOR UNLESS THEY DO THEY WOULD HAVE THEIR RATIONS TAKEN AWAY FROM THEM AND COULD BE PICKED UP AND JAILED AT THE WILL OF DDSI, ANY FOREI- GNER MUST BE AWARE THAT EVEN CASUAL CONVERSATIONS WITH THEIR MOST TRUSTED BURMESE FRIENDS HAVE A GOOD CHANCE OF BEING REPORTED BACK TO DDSI. CRITICISM OF THIS GOVERNMENT IS NOT TOLERATED AND CON- TACTS WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS COULD BE WITHDRAWN IF DDSI BECAME AWARE OF CRITICISM. PART FOUR: (C) THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF BURMA (GUB) DOES NOT WANT IT'S EMPLOYEES, AND THIS INCLUDES ALMOST EVERYONE, TO ASSO- CIATE WITH FOREIGNERS, ALL INVITATIONS TO ATTEND A GATHERING AT A XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX(b)(2) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX **************
*CONFIDENTIAL* ************** 3 BEST COPY AVAILABLE
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*CONFIDENTIAL* ************** DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION ???? HOME IS CLEARED WITH DDSI. SOME MINISTERS CAN GIVE ???? PERMISSION TO A SELECT FEW WHO HAVE BEEN CLEARED ???? BY DDSI TO NORMAL DIPLOMATIC FUNCTIONS BUT IF THERE IS ???? DSI MUST GIVE CLEARANCE. THE SAME FEW GOVERNMENT FIGURES ???? FOREIGN FUNCTIONS AND CONTACT WITH THE MAJORITY OF THE ???? EL IS FORBIDDEN. THOSE WHO ATTEND ARE EXPECTED TO REPORT ???? WRITING: (A) WHO WAS PRESENT, (B) SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION, QUESTIONS ASKED OF THE BURMESE AND THE ANSWER GIVEN. MOST WOULD PREFER NOT TO ATTEND THESE FUNCTIONS BECAUSE OF THE ???? STIGMA OF ASSOCIATING WITH FOREIGNERS AND THE TROUBLE ???? HE REPORT. (C) IT SEEMS THAT THE PRINCIPLE REQUIREMENT TO HOLD A POSITION IN DDSI IS LOYALTY TO U NE WIN BUT AT LEAST THREE PRINCIPLE OFFICERS SAVE BEEN TRAINED BY THE UNITED STATES, ???? THE DIRECTOR, LTC SOE MYINT CHIEF OF THE INTELLIGENCE ???? MAJOR CHIT YI, CHIEF OF PROTOCOL SECTION. MOST ???? HAVE A HIGH REGARD FOR DDSI FOR ITS INTERNAL INTELLI ???? TIES AND FOR ITS ACTIVITIES IN THAILAND. THE PRINCIPLE ???? HAILAND IS THE U NU FORCES. THE GUB HAS VERY LITTLE ???? ANYTHING THAT TAKES PLACE OUTSIDE ITS BORDERS EXCEPT ???? D CHINA AND TO A LESSER EXTENT INDIA. THIS, OF COURSE, ???? A GREAT AMOUNT OF DDSI TIME AND ENERGY IS SPENT ON ???? E INSURGENT FORCES AND BLACKMARKET ACTIVITIES ???? CITIZENS OR, AS THEY DEFINE IT, THE REMAINS OF THE ???? APITALIST INFLUENCE IN BURMA. (C) DDSI IS THE SINGLE MOST INFLUENTIAL PART OF THE ???? STABLISHMENT IN BURMA. AS THE GUB PROGRESSES MORE FROM A ???? VERNMENT TOWARDS THE BURMA SOCIALIST PROGRAMME PARTY ???? IGHT LOSE SOME OF ITS POWER, BUT AT THE PRESENT THERE IS ???? ON OF ANY ORGANIZATION OF THE BSPP TO SUPPORT IT. FOR ???? TE FUTURE DDSI WILL REMAIN AS THE INVESTIGATOR, POLICE- ???? AND CHIEF SOURCE OF INFORMATION FOR THE GUB. XXXXXX(b)(2) XXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX(b)(2) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX **************
*CONFIDENTIAL* ************** 4