12 June 2003
Source: Excerpted from dossier on "Soviet Activities in Mexico, ZF010343W,"
received by FOIA from the
US Army Intelligence and Security Command.
Eyeball of U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fort Huachuca: http://cryptome.org/usaic-eyeball.htm
"EEI" (Essential Elements of Information) cited below:
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ar530-1e.htmAR 530-1 Appendix E
Protective MeasuresAR 530-1 E-1. General
a. In deciding what protective measures are needed and their required duration, consider the time required for a collection system to obtain, report, evaluate, and provide data to the adversary commander and the time at which effective adversary decisionmaking will no longer be possible.
b. Much information and material about military operations and activities may not qualify for classification under the provisions of AR 380-5, but could be of substantial value to hostile intelligence services particularly when-
1.Aggregated over time.
2.Focused on a discrete activity or long-term project.c. Such material if carelessly handled or disposed of would allow adversaries to-
1.Make more accurate estimates about related information that is classified.
2.Gain specific data that permits them to-(a) Refine their Essential Elements of Information (EEI) menu.(b) Specifically target their more costly, sensitive, and scarce technical collection assets against EEI targets that cannot be obtained through easier and less resource-intensive, open-source collection methods.
3.Permit simplified accumulation of useful data.
A "Rainford agent" is mentioned below. What does this mean; send to jya@pipeline.com
DISPOSITION FORM SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (if any)SECRETS - 15 May 60 FILE NO. ACSI-SC SUBJECT Hostile Intelligence Utilization of Technical Surveillance Devices (U) TO Chief, Investigations Br FROM Chief, Security Division DATE MAR 31 1960 COMMENT NO. 1 Lt Col Molmen/78874/dh 1. (C). It is requested that your office assist Fourth and Sixth Armies in identifying technical monitoring devices used by the Soviet bloc from bases in Mexico for surveillance of Fort Huachucua and other Fourth and Sixth Army installations. To fulfill this requirement, request that your office: a. Contact Lt Col [ ] Research & Development Branch, CI/D Division, to determine the various magnitudes of electronic and other emanations occuring in the Fort Huachuca, Arizona area. b. Predicated upon discussions with Col[ ] determine which presently known Soviet bloc technical monitoring devices might be used in Mexico and/or the type of equipment which the Soviet bloc might use for this purpose. c. Predicated upon the results of a and b, above, provide CIAS material necessary to prepare for publication a loose-leaf "handy pocket" guide for distribution to Fourth and Sixth Army counterintelligence personnel. The handy pocket guide will include pictures, descriptions of radar dishes, antennaes, and other descriptive data which might assist in identifying Soviet bloc technical monitoring equipment. 2. (S) During November 59, this office informed Collection Division that it was within the capabilities of the Soviet Intelligence Service to employ technical surveillance devices of radar or seismograph type, mounted in northern Mexico and directed against U, S. missile, nuclear and aircraft activities. In Feb 60, Collection Division replied that plans were being formulated and measures would be taken by the appropriate national technical agency to determine if such devices were being used by the Soviets against the U.S. Military (Incl 1). [S] Stanley E. Whitmore STANLEY E. WHITMORE Colonel, GS Chief, Security Division 1 incl DF dtd 20 Nov 59 subj: Mexico-based Sov bloc Espi & Subv activities directed against CONUS Armies(U) w/1 Incl & Cmt 2 dtd 11 Feb 60 (S) REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 26 OCT 98 BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R 149SECRETDD 96 Form 1 FEB 50
SECRETACSI-SIB (31 Mar 60) SUBJECT: Hostile Intelligence Utilization of Technical Surveillance Devices (U) TO Chief, Security Division FROM Chief, Investigations Branch DATE 19 MAY 1960 COMMENT NO. 2 (S) 1. (U) Information requested in paragraph 1a, comment number 1, is not available from Lt Col [ ]R & D Branch, CI/D Division, ACSI. Other offices contacted with negative results were the Communications-Electronics Division, Office of the Chief, Research and Development; Combat Development Branch, Research and Development Division, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, and the Communications- Electronics Section, SMI Branch, ACSI. 2. (C) Discussions with personnel responsible for Communications-Electronics Security in ASA have indicated that this information can be ascertained by the ASA Operations Center at Fort Huachuca, if the Chief, ASA Attn: AC of S, Development, is formally requested to initiate a project for this purpose. However, attention is invited to the fact that mere compilation of this data is of questionable value unless Electronics Security and Communications Security Surveys are conducted by ASA. Also, the nature of activities at Fort Huachuca is such that the number and type of electronic emitters being tested is constantly changing. Individually, some of these emitters may be unclassified and of no concern. If, however, these emitters are intercepted and evaluated as a part of overall activities they then become a matter of concern to ASA. 3. (C) [Five lines redacted.] 4. (C) Much of the information requested in paragraph 1b, Comment # 1 is believed to be available from the Collection Signal Analysis Agency, National Security Agency, if that Agency is provided with general data as to frequency and magnitude of signals being emitted from Fort Huachuca. 5. (C) In summary, the information requested in part 1 a, Comment # 1 can be ascertained only by ASA as indicated in par 2 above. This data must then be provided NSA in a request for that EEI desired by par 1b, comment no. 1.par 6. It is recommended that this information be requested by the Communications- Electronic Security Section, SMI Branch, which is responsible for formulation of policy guidance and staff supervision for operational aspects of Communications- Electronics Security. [S] Lee M. Martin LEE M. MARTIN Lt Colonel, GS Chief, Investigations Branch 1 Incl n/c REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL ON 26 OCT 98 BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1B 2 150SECRET
SECRETACSI-SC (31 March 60) SUBJECT: Hostile Intelligence Utilization of Technical Surveillance Devices (U TO: Chief, SMI FROM: Chief, Security Division DATE: JUL 8 1960 COMMENT NO. 3 ACSI-SC/Lt Col [ ] 78874/clw 1. (U) Request your office implement recommendations contained in Paragraph 5, Comment 2, above. 2. (C) Security Branch, OSigO, has been requested to provide information describing, in non-technical language, technical monitoring equipment which might be used by individuals to monitor, in behalf of the Soviets, signals emitted by Fort Huachucua and other Fourth and Sixth Army signal installations. 3. (U) An ONI publication, classified CONFIDENTIAL and concerning a similar subject, distributed to personnel engaged in electronic countermeasures, is attached for your information. [S} Darrel G. Costello STANLEY E. WHITMORE Colonel, CS Chief, Security Division 2 Incl Added 1 Incl 2. ONI 26-21A [Not provided] REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 MAR 98 BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD 5200.1R R'cd
CIBN 28 Sep 60
ML 151SECRET
[Similar to page 149 except redacted name included.] -SC/Lt Col Molmen/78874/dh S - 15 May 60 ACSI-SC Hostile Intelligence Utilization of Technical Surveillance Devices (U) Chief, Investigations Br Chief, Security Division MAR 31 1960 Lt Col Molmen/78874/dh 1. (C). It is requested that your office assist Fourth and Sixth Armies in identifying technical monitoring devices used by the Soviet bloc from bases in Mexico for surveillance of Fort Huachucua and other Fourth and Sixth Army installations. To fulfill this requirement, request that your office: a. Contact Lt Col Fred R. Ulrich, Research & Development Branch, CI/D Division, to determine the various magnitudes of electronic and other emanations occuring in the Fort Huachuca, Arizona area. b. Predicated upon discussions with Col Ulrich, determine which presently known Soviet bloc technical monitoring devices might be used in Mexico and/or the type of equipment which the Soviet bloc might use for this purpose. c. Predicated upon the results of a and b, above, provide CIAS material necessary to prepare for publication a loose-leaf "handy pocket" guide for distribution to Fourth and Sixth Army counterintelligence personnel. The handy pocket guide will include pictures, descriptions of radar dishes, antennaes, and other descriptive data which might assist in identifying Soviet bloc technical monitoring equipment. 2. (S) During November 59, this office informed Collection Division that it was within the capabilities of the Soviet Intelligence Service to employ technical surveillance devices of radar or seismograph type, mounted in northern Mexico and directed against U, S. missile, nuclear and aircraft activities. In Feb 60, Collection Division replied that plans were being formulated and measures would be taken by the appropriate national technical agency to determine if such devices were being used by the Soviets against the U.S. Military (Incl 1). Signed STANLEY E. WHITMORE Colonel, GS Chief, Security Division 1 Incl DF dtd 20 Nov 59 subj: Mexico-based Sov bloc Espi & Subv activities directed against CONUS Armies(U) w/1 Incl & Cmt 2 dtd 11 Feb 60 (S) REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 20 Jun 2000 BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO AUTH Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R RECORD SECTION COPY Counterintelligence Br Rec'd, 5 Apr 60 KEW 152
SECRETACSI-SC (31 March 60) SUBJECT: Hostile Intelligence Utilization of Technical Surveillance Devices (U TO: Chief, SMI FROM: Chief, Security Division DATE: JUL 8 1960 COMMENT NO. 3 ACSI-SC/Lt Col [ ] 78874/clw 1. (U) Request your office implement recommendations contained in Paragraph 5, Comment 2, above. 2. (C) Security Branch, OSigO, has been requested to provide information describing, in non-technical language, technical monitoring equipment which might be used by individuals to monitor, in behalf of the Soviets, signals emitted by Fort Huachucua and other Fourth and Sixth Army signal installations. 3. (U) An ONI publication, classified CONFIDENTIAL and concerning a similar subject, distributed to personnel engaged in electronic countermeasures, is attached for your information. Sgd DARREL G. COSTELLO Lt Colonel, GS For STANLEY E. WHITMORE Colonel, CS Chief, Security Division 2 Incl Added 1 Incl 2. ONI 26-21A [Not provided] MEMO FOR RECORD (6 July 60) (S) ACSI-SC/Lt Col [ ]78874/clw CURRENT: SMI requested to initiate ac tion necessary to obtain information describing Soviet technical equipment used to monitor signals emitted by signal equipment being tested in US/Mexican border area. BACKGROUND: By Sec Div DF to Chief, Invest Br, dtd 31 March 60, subject as above, Inv Br was requested to obtain information concerning equipment which might be used to monitor signal corps activities in the Fort Huachucua area. By Comment 2 to this DF, Invest Br outlined plan of action to be accomplished by Communications-Electronic Security Section, SMI Branch, which involves queries to ABA and NSA for necessary information. RATIONALE: Action to be accomplished by SMI Branch may provide information necessary for publication of a loose-leaf "handy pocket" guide for distribution to Fourth and Sixth Army CI personnel. At the same time, OSigO, by separate DF, is being asked to provide similar information. AO Time: 8 hrs Typist: 1/2 hr RECORD SECTION COPY Counterintelligence bR C-3584 REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 3 MAR 1998 BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1R 153SECRET
SECRETACSI-SC/Lt Col Molmen/78874/dh SUBJECT: Hostile Intelligence Utilization of Technical Surveillance Devices(U) MEMO FOR RECORD: (24 Mar 60) Current: Investigations Branch requested to provide CIAS material necessary to prepare for publication a loose-leaf "handy pocket guide" which will assist Fourth and Sixth Army personnel in identifying Soviet bloc technical monitoring devices used in the Mexican border area. Background: As a result of General Collins visit to Sixth Army, he desired that ACSI publish a "handy pocket" guide to cover the following requirement: "What would the Soviets have to have in the way of monitor- ing equipment to engage in technical surveillance of Fort Huachucua op- erations from south of the border down Mexico way. We should have pre- pared somthing in the way of a collection guide for CIC on this subject for both Four and Six Army. Gen Collins suggested that we start with Lt Col Ulrich to develop what are the various magnitudes of electronic and other emanations from Huachucua. I believe we would have to go on from there to estimate what equipment the Soviets could use in Mexico for this purpose--then would come pictures, descriptions etc---size of radar dishes, antennae, etc, etc. Having all this poop in handy pocket form, or in his head, the Rainford agent could then browse around south of the border looking for it. Could also ask his friends, the Mexican cops, agents, etc., to look for the kind of thing described. Also cover what portable equipment the rascals might set up in or very near Huachucua for tech surveillance--black boxes with fishpoles, etc. Rationale: Investigations Branch "exercises staff supervision and renders reports of technical surveillance operations in the Pentagon Reservation and elsewhere, as directed," (Par 7, O&F Manual). This function requires that they know Soviet bloc technical surveillance de- vices. Investigations Branch is therefore qualified to provide CIAS material necessary to meet this handy-pocket guide requirement. REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 20 JUN 00 BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R RECORD Copy Counterintelligence Br 154SECRET