20 October 2010. More on this 5 November 2010 at NYU.
Discussion of the Wikileaks insurance file when it first appeared: http://cryptome.org/0002/wl-diary-mirror.htm
The Wikileaks tweet to download its "insurance" file appears to be a feint to misinform about its next releases.
Assange's long-tweet and attack on Wired appears a part of the feint.
Daniel Schmitt's and "insiders" falling out with Assange appear a part of the feint.
The several leaks to the media and joint newsmaking about what the next leak appears a part of the feint.
Wikileaks being down for several weeks appears a part of the feint.
Taunting US DoD appears part of the feint.
The Swedish rape allegation appears part of the feint.
Feint from what?
1. The alleged 260,000 diplomatic cables taken by Bradley Manning and passed on to Wikileaks. These would be of much greater significance than the Aghan military files and any Iraq war files.
2. The diplomatic cables have dropped off the media radar and seemingly the concern of the administration. That would be consistent with a campaign to diminish interest in them by emphasizing the more outrage-arousing military files and threat to servicemembers and Afghan agents. A feint by the administration.
3. The lesser known diplomatic cables are far more informative about US policy than the type of military files released by Wikileaks. And their release would be considerably more damaging to the US than the military files.
4. Hints that the the next Wikileaks release will be Iraq war files would set the stage for a much greater shock when unexpected material is released -- diplomatic cables or materials not yet identified, possibly on senior US governmental officials in the three branches and on the officials of other governments -- and could also divert any US attempt to block the material as if it consisted of "national security" information, the basis of most stringent multi-national intervention.
5. Disclosure of illegality or scandalous behavior of government officials -- US and others -- would be more damaging than release of military data for it would break the case for national security intervention and lead to the withdrawal of military investigation -- it would greatly please the military to be relieved of blame for insecurity. It would turn the spotlight on the civilian USG and engender public support for investigation of malfeasance in high office, the justification for that has been amply demonstrated.
6. Lessons learned from the Afghan war release are to not repeat what was done before but use that expectation as a ploy. Instead:
7. Release in multiple batches not a single bombshell, in timed releases not all at once.
8. Release through arrangements with multiple parties who may or may not know of each other.
9. Release in multiple outlets not associated with the media, which may or may not know of each other.
10. Release to other governments and openly, none knowing about the other.
11. Release to other governments covertly, none knowing about the other.
12. Release false and padded information along with, or instead of, legitimate material, as placebos; declare this openly and keep secret certain aspects.
13. Withhold information and declare this openly.
14. Withhold information and keep this secret, with perhaps a taste hinted.
15. Do not overly focus on military intel fatuity, continue to go too far covering political, economic, religious, educational, humanitarian, NGO, personal -- other leak and secrecy two coin sides, anti-leak and anti-secrecy shills, FOIA and whistleblower sanctimones, media, advertising and their comedians, TLAs and their pensions bloat, defense and anti-war warlovers, lobbying and political lawyers NGO manipulators, ex-spies flogging spy-contracts with national security threat-mongering, venerable public heros and award-granting leeches, organized anything industries.
16. Beware lawyers with backbone plumage and strut, they are officers of the state obliged to shop you for law and order.
17. Establish several means of "insurance," some open, some secret far better than always duplicitous insurance.
18. Continue to prepare future releases under the feint of dramatic releases.
19. Release by little noticed seepage through means not easily recognized.
20. Encourage a thousand Wikileaks openly, some fake, some seemingly opposed, some sacrificial bait, then more out of sight.
21. Use the brand to mislead. Pretend to be what is most easily attackable by experienced opponents.
22. Feint, stab, feint, stab. Ever more devious in getting forbidden information out about those who are desperate to control it. Beware corrupting heirarchy, feint it.
23. Avoid the money trap, it is all dirty.
24. Pretend to trust insiders and the core, expect betrayal, that is what insiders and core are for.
Caveat on the diplomatic cables: State and CIA share a long-established highly secure means of global communication superior to and separate from the system allegedly accessed by Bradley Manning, if accounts are accurate and not deliberately deceptive. This top secret and above information is multi-level encrypted and burst-transmitted at known DC-area facilities (1)(2)(3)(4) for distribution and decryption by the local recipient office's crypto facility according to the multiple levels of access. The most sensitive information is transmitted by courier: nobody at top secret-and-above level trusts digital systems except to mislead. DoD has a separate, equally secure global command and control system (1)(2) which is far more secure than the secret-and-below level system available to Manning.